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Title: Low Heart Rate and Crime: Exploring the Link From an Analytical Perspective 




Although low resting heart rate is often cited as “the best-replicated biological 
correlate” of antisocial behaviour, this association remains unexplained. Several theoretical 
explanations have been proposed throughout the years, but they have been mostly based on 
unfounded and questionable assumptions. Amongst these, fearlessness and stimulation-
seeking hypotheses have gained ground and become well established in the literature, despite 
the fact that they have been subjected to scarce empirical verifications yielding mixed results. 
Therefore, employing situational action theory as a theoretical framework, a new explanatory 
model of the relationship between low heart rate and crime was developed. It was argued that 
heart rate cannot be a cause of crime, but only a marker of a cause of crime. Specifically, it 
was hypothesised that a person’s crime propensity would fully mediate the link between heart 
rate and crime. In order to test the crime propensity model and compare its efficiency against 
the fearlessness and stimulation-seeking hypotheses, the Cambridge adolescent behaviour 
study was conducted. It set out to explore the mechanism underlying the heart rate-crime 
association in a sample of 487 adolescents recruited from 14 schools in England. Participants 
completed self-report measures of stimulation-seeking, fearlessness, crime propensity, and 
criminal behaviour, and their heart rate was measured at rest and in response to a stressor. 
Crime involvement was significantly associated only with heart rate reactivity, whereas the 
link with resting heart rate was non-significant. Out of the three models with fearlessness, 
stimulation-seeking, and crime propensity as potential mediators, only crime propensity fully 
mediated the link between heart rate reactivity and crime, rendering the direct effect of heart 
rate reactivity on crime non-significant. Therefore, the empirical results supported the newly 
developed crime propensity model and highlighted the benefits of replacing the prevalent risk 
factor approach in (biosocial) criminology with an analytical approach that aims to explain 
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1.1. Biosocial Criminology: Are We in Need of (Another) Paradigm Shift? 
 
Criminology has traditionally relied on social factors in the study of crime, as 
sociological criminology was the dominating and uncontested paradigm in the 20th century 
(Cullen, 2009). However, in recent years a substantial body of empirical evidence has drawn 
attention to the fact that biological factors too have an important role in explaining criminal 
behaviour. This has paved the way for a new and up-and-coming paradigm – a biosocial 
criminology. It represents an integrative and multidisciplinary perspective that seeks to 
incorporate knowledge and methods from various fields such as genetics, neuroscience, 
endocrinology, and evolutionary psychology, along with findings about environmental 
factors, into a study of crime and antisocial behaviour (Beaver & Walsh, 2011). Instead of 
focusing on a pseudo-dichotomy of nature vs nurture, it explores how the interaction between 
nature and nurture gives rise to antisocial propensity (Eichelberger & Barnes, 2015). 
Although initially there was a strong resistance against biosocial criminology based mostly 
on ideological grounds (Wright & Cullen, 2012), that surprisingly still lingers on (e.g., 
Carrier & Walby, 2014; Fallin, Whooley, & Barker, 2018; Larregue & Rollins, 2019), it has 
become increasingly difficult to ignore the role of biological factors in criminal behaviour 
due to a large number of empirical evidence that has accumulated over time. During the past 
15 years, there has been a significant increase in published biosocial work transforming such 
publications from being outliers to appearing often in criminological journals and having 
dedicated special issues (Barnes & Boutwell, 2015; DeLisi, 2009; Vaske, 2017). A Google 
Scholar search for the keywords biosocial criminology by the end of 2019 gave more than 
9000 results, out of which more than 60% has been published in the last 10 years.  
As a consequence of the increase in biosocial research in criminology, nowadays 
there is a well-documented knowledge about which biological factors are related to criminal 
behaviour, alongside recent efforts to apply these findings to intervention programmes aimed 
at reducing antisocial behaviour (Bootsman, 2019; Choy, Focquaert, & Raine, 2020; Glenn & 
McCauley, 2019). The list of biological correlates of crime, aggression, and antisocial 
behaviour in general is virtually endless, including structural and functional abnormalities of 
different brain regions (e.g., the prefrontal cortex, amygdala, striatum), neurotransmitters 
(e.g., serotonin, noradrenalin, dopamine), hormones (e.g., testosterone, thyroid hormones, 
cortisol), candidate genes (e.g., MAO-A, DAT1, 5-HTTLPR), neurocognitive malfunctioning 
(e.g., working memory, attention, inhibition), psychophysiology (e.g., indices of 





birth complications, maternal nicotine and/or alcohol consumption, malnutrition, heavy metal 
blood levels; Beaver & Walsh, 2011; DeLisi & Vaughn, 2015; Glenn & Raine, 2014; Ogilvie, 
Stewart, Chan, & Shum, 2011; Raine, 2002, 2018; Van Der Gronde, Kempes, Van El, Rinne, 
& Pieters, 2014; Walsh & Beaver, 2009). Biosocial research has advanced criminology by 
bringing biology, a long-overlooked, but an indispensable part of the criminological puzzle, 
back into the discussion. It has also undoubtably enriched factual knowledge about antisocial 
behaviour. However, criminology has not yet fully seized all the opportunities to advance the 
understanding of crime that the biosocial perspective has to offer. 
Findings from biosocial studies could be used to falsify existing criminological 
theories, contribute to a more nuanced understanding of how individual crime propensity 
develops, and help guide future research endeavours into a more promising direction. 
Although there have been some attempts in using biosocial empirical data to falsify certain 
hypotheses from mainstream criminological theories (e.g., Beaver, Wright, & DeLisi, 2007; 
Wikström & Treiber, 2007), these have not gained ground in the field. Instead, criminology 
has continued its trend of adding more theories without falsifying the existing ones (Beaver & 
Walsh, 2011). For example, leaving aside all the other problems of the general theory of 
crime (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990), its hypotheses that development of self-control is 
completed by the age of 10 and solely determined by (parental) socialisation stand in stark 
contrast with genetic, neuroscientific, and neuropsychological literature. There is an 
overwhelming empirical evidence which shows that the ability to exercise self-control 
depends on an efficient functioning of executive functions seated in the prefrontal cortex 
which develop well into young adulthood following a rapid prefrontal brain maturation 
during adolescence (Beaver et al., 2007; Caballero, Granberg, & Tseng, 2016; Cauffman, 
Steinberg, & Piquero, 2005; Jackson & Beaver, 2013; Steinberg et al., 2008; Wikström & 
Treiber, 2007; Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). Likewise, research exploring development of 
impulsivity (i.e., low self-control) shows that it too follows a trajectory of linear decrease 
from childhood into the adulthood (Burt, 2020; Burt, Sweeten, & Simons, 2014; Steinberg et 
al., 2008, 2009). The premise that self-control remains stable after the suggested formative 
period is clearly refuted by a number of studies showing that self-control is only moderately 
stable and that there are both intra- and inter-individual differences across the life-span (for a 
review, please see Burt et al., 2014). Therefore, the idea that one’s self-control is fully 
developed by the age of 10 and unchangeable thereafter is simply untenable.  
Biosocial research also refutes the other major hypothesis of the general theory of 





socialisation practices. Instead, the ability to exercise self-control also depends on the 
integrity of specific neurocognitive factors, including the above-mentioned executive 
functions supported by the prefrontal cortex. Neuroscientific research has clearly 
demonstrated that distinct prefrontal brain areas support different functions indispensable for 
efficient behavioural inhibition. Specifically, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is relevant for 
the cognitive aspects of self-control such as working memory and attention, whereas the 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex underpins the emotional and motivational aspects such as 
affect control and value-based decision-making (Boes et al., 2011; Damasio, 1994; Ishikawa 
& Raine, 2003; Schneider & Koenigs, 2017; Szczepanski & Knight, 2014). Indeed, lesion 
studies and research involving brain stimulation techniques in healthy participants have 
provided evidence for the causal role of the prefrontal cortex in exhibiting self-control. 
Namely, it has been reported that patients following the prefrontal damage exhibit impulsive 
and disinhibited behaviour (Anderson, Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1999; Meyers, 
Berman, Scheibel, & Hayman, 1992; Schneider & Koenigs, 2017; Szczepanski & Knight, 
2014), whereas applying brain stimulation techniques over the prefrontal cortex of healthy 
participants has been shown to induce changes in exhibiting self-control (Brevet-Aeby, 
Brunelin, Iceta, Padovan, & Poulet, 2016; Cho et al., 2010; Falcone et al., 2016; Knoch & 
Fehr, 2007). Finally, behavioural genetics studies have demonstrated a significant genetic 
contribution to self-control variability at a population level (Beaver et al., 2009; Beaver, 
Wright, DeLisi, & Vaughn, 2008; Wright & Beaver, 2005).  
However, despite all the accumulated empirical evidence disproving specific 
hypotheses of the general theory of crime, it has not been modified nor discarded; instead, it 
is still widely used across the field in its original form (e.g., Donner, Marcum, Jennings, 
Higgins, & Banfield, 2014; Hirtenlehner & Kunz, 2017; Vazsonyi, Jiskrova, Ksinan, & 
Blatný, 2016; Vazsonyi, Mikuška, & Kelley, 2017). Therefore, as the scientific progress of 
any discipline is based on falsification of some theories and validation of others (Bernard, 
1990), it is hard to argue that criminology has moved forward despite all the novel biosocial 
data. In that context, the more important question is not whether a theory has accumulated a 
large amount of empirical support, but if any sound research has falsified it. As seen in the 
example of the general theory of crime, criminology has not done much in the past decades to 
advance its scientific progress and falsify its numerous theories despite advances in biosocial 
research whose findings could contribute to the falsification process. 
Apart from falsifying criminological theories, biosocial findings could also be used to 





gives rise to individual tendency to commit crime. This could be achieved through a two-fold 
process involving reviewing and integrating existing elements of biosocial knowledge, as 
well as generating new findings by conducting novel, biologically-informed research. Current 
biosocial literature could be reviewed and parsed through to distinguish factors that could be 
causally related to individual crime propensity, such as the brain mechanisms underpinning 
ability to exercise self-control or moral decision-making (e.g., Ishikawa & Raine, 2003; 
Raine, 2019; Treiber, 2011; Wikström & Treiber, 2007), and set them apart from mere 
correlates of crime that could only be markers of causes at best, such as low-seated ears or 
low resting heart rate (Glenn & Raine, 2014; Raine, 2013). As an example of this practice, 
Burt and Simons (2014) suggested that the well-established link between childhood 
maltreatment and later antisocial and criminal behaviour (Afifi, Fortier, Sareen, & Taillieu, 
2019; Currie & Tekin, 2012; Mersky, Topitzes, & Reynolds, 2012; Smith, Ireland, 
Thornberry, & Elwyn, 2008; Smith & Thornberry, 1995) could be explained using 
neurological mechanisms. Namely, they integrated findings showing that childhood adversity 
is associated with structural and functional alterations in the amygdala (e.g., McCrory et al., 
2013; Pechtel, Lyons-Ruth, Anderson, & Teicher, 2014), the prefrontal cortex (e.g., Hart et 
al., 2018; Van Harmelen et al., 2010), and their inter-connectivity (e.g., Birn, Patriat, Phillips, 
Germain, & Herringa, 2014; Jedd et al., 2015), which in turn underpin emotion regulation 
(e.g., Banks, Eddy, Angstadt, Nathan, & Luan Phan, 2007; Golkar et al., 2012; Hare, 
Tottenham, Davidson, Glover, & Casey, 2005) and impulsivity (e.g., Goya-Maldonado et al., 
2010; Kerr et al., 2015), into a potential explanatory mechanism by which childhood 
maltreatment causes crime through altering brain development and decreasing self-control. 
Furthermore, future criminological research investigating individual causes of crime 
could generate more precise and nuanced explanations if it were guided by biosocial findings 
about the bi-directional and dynamic interaction between biological and environmental 
factors. For example, almost 20 years ago a high-impact publication using data from the 
Dunedin longitudinal study demonstrated differential effects of childhood maltreatment on a 
person’s later antisocial behaviour conditional on the individual’s MAO-A genotype1 (Caspi 
et al., 2002). Therefore, more of such research could provide invaluable insights into how the 
same environmental factors can lead to different antisocial outcomes depending on the 
 
1 Specifically, this refers to a functional polymorphism in the gene encoding monoamine oxidase A 
enzyme which breaks down neurotransmitters such as serotonin, dopamine, and norepinephrine, and thereby 
affects brain neurochemistry (Caspi et al., 2002). Since the original finding was published, the effect of this 
particular gene-environment interaction on antisocial behaviour has been replicated across different studies (for 





underlying biological characteristics of an individual. In a like manner, future criminological 
research inspired by the latest developments in epigenetics, which refers to any process that 
changes gene expression without affecting the DNA sequence (Weinhold, 2006), has a 
potential to inform on how different environmental conditions can lead to different outcomes 
by affecting gene expression which in turn changes neural biochemistry (Burt & Simons, 
2014; Palumbo, Mariotti, Iofrida, & Pellegrini, 2018). Having this in mind, it has been 
encouraging to see the recent emergence of articles introducing epigenetics into the field of 
criminology (Burt & Simons, 2014; Palumbo et al., 2018; Walsh & Yun, 2014), including the 
latest article attempting to integrate epigenetics and micro-geographic perspective within the 
criminology of place which proposed that living in a crime hot-spot can lead to crime through 
interaction with genetic factors (Leshem & Weisburd, 2019). In addition, findings regarding 
neuroplasticity (i.e., the capacity of brain to change and rewire its structure and function in 
response to experiences throughout life-course; Draganski et al., 2006; Maguire, Woollett, & 
Spiers, 2006; Münte, Altenmüller, & Jäncke, 2002; Voss, Thomas, Cisneros-Franco, & De 
Villers-Sidani, 2017) and adult neurogenesis (i.e., the ability of brain to create new neurons 
throughout life; Kempermann et al., 2018; Ming & Song, 2011; Steiner, Tata, & Frisén, 2019; 
Zhao, Deng, & Gage, 2008) have opened up exciting new avenues of research that could 
provide important insights on the fine interaction between nature and nurture, and how it 
leads to prosocial or antisocial behaviour. Apart from generating a more comprehensive 
understanding of crime propensity development, this type of research could also inform and 
inspire novel prevention and intervention programmes (Leshem & Weisburd, 2019; Palumbo 
et al., 2018; Tremblay, 2015). Overall, it seems that there is much room for improvement in 
criminology and that the field could benefit more from biosocial paradigm if it were to apply 
biological findings to both criminological theories and research. 
 
1.1.1. Risk Factor Approach: A Dominating Paradigm 
 
One of the main reasons why biosocial findings have not been sufficiently used to 
advance our understanding of criminal behaviour is the prevailing risk-factor (i.e., 
correlational) paradigm, that has plagued not only biosocial criminology, but the entire 
discipline in general. Instead of an analytical perspective, biosocial criminology generally 
tends to employ a correlational approach which focuses exclusively on statistical associations 





and how (i.e., through which mechanisms; Treiber, 2017a). This approach has led to piling up 
a large number of (in many cases, causally irrelevant) correlates which obscure the overall 
understanding of crime rather than advancing it (Wikström, 2006). Furthermore, in some 
instances when an attempt to explain the mechanism underlying the link between biological 
factors and crime has been made, scholars use the most convenient criminological theories 
without taking into consideration the major criticisms these theories face, which renders their 
explanations dubious (e.g., Armstrong & Boutwell, 2012; Rocque, Posick, & Felix, 2015). 
This is the consequence of the aforementioned lack of falsification process in criminology, 
which leaves the discipline in a poor state where one is quickly overwhelmed by an 
abundance of theories which have one thing in common -  they have never been 
(acknowledged as) refuted despite the enormous volume of research (Bruinsma, 2016). As a 
result, biosocial criminology has developed a strong evidence base about biological correlates 
of antisocial behaviour, but distinguishing which few of the many correlates have causal 
properties and delineating the mechanisms by which they are associated with crime has been 
lagging behind.   
The fundamental problem with the risk-factor approach is that it does not make a 
difference between causes, markers, correlates, and statistical flukes (Wikström, 2012; 
Wikström & Bouhana, 2017). A “risk factor” is a variable that correlates with an antisocial 
outcome, but it does not reveal anything more about the association, including the most 
crucial matter: whether it is causally related to the outcome or not. A cause will necessarily 
correlate with the outcome, but a correlation does not automatically imply causation. 
However, due to two logical fallacies, post hoc, ergo propter hoc ("after this, therefore 
because of this") and cum hoc, ergo propter hoc (“with this, therefore because of this”), there 
is a danger of mistaking a simple correlate for a cause as it is often the case in the (biosocial) 
literature (Levitin, 2018). Therefore, a risk factor approach has essentially led to hoarding an 
excessive quantity of correlates without actually determining whether they can cause crime 
which should be the main concern of any discipline which aims to inform public policy. 
Moreover, an exclusive focus on a statistical significance of an association between a 
predictor and an antisocial outcome is not a very informative approach. Namely, in large 
enough samples even the smallest relationships will be “statistically significant” despite a 
lack of any real-world importance. In many cases, such risk factors are not even particularly 
useful predictors as the effect size of their relationship with crime may be very small 
(Wikström, 2012). For instance, people with a history of head injuries may be more likely to 





suffer brain injuries will not become criminals. In fact, in an attempt to avoid such overhyped 
claims and misuses of statistics, more than 800 academics have recently called for a complete 
abandonment of the concept of statistical significance (Amrhein, Greenland, & Mcshane, 
2019).  
If criminology does not have a clear understanding of how crime happens and what 
are the mechanisms of crime causation, it cannot advance nor develop effective prevention 
and intervention programmes. Designing such programmes based on a risk-factor approach 
would necessarily involve a lot of wasted resources as it is practically “a shot in the dark” 
because in the majority of the cases they will be tackling markers of antisocial behaviour that 
are not the source of crime and hence changing them will not generate the desired outcome. 
Favouring such an approach of treating symptoms instead of causes of crime would be 
equivalent to giving a patient with meningitis a paracetamol to treat the fever instead of 
antibiotics which would tackle the bacterial cause of the disease. Despite this, it is often 
recommended that reducing such risk factors should be an appropriate policy response. Not 
only could such advice prove unhelpful, but it could also lead to potentially harmful policy 
decisions. 
On the other hand, one of the main arguments put forward by the proponents of risk-
factor approach is that a variable should be valued based on its ability to predict crime, and 
for that purpose it should not matter whether it is a cause of crime or not (Glenn & Raine, 
2014). Even though such argumentation provides a step forward in terms of acknowledgment 
that correlation does not imply causation, this approach is not particularly useful nor will it 
help criminology progress as a science. Even if by some unlikely chance we find a set of 
predictors which could very precisely predict crime occurrence, unless they are the causal 
factors, we would not be able to use such information to prevent crime which should be the 
overarching goal. The risk factor approach may predict crime, but it certainly cannot explain 
it. Moreover, taking this road may unintentionally lead to unforeseen adverse consequences, 
which are starting to show in algorithms that predict crime and recidivism (Benbouzid, 2019; 
Brennan, Dieterich, & Ehret, 2009; Hannah-Moffat, 2019; Perry, McInnis, Price, Smith, & 
Hollywood, 2013). Namely, with the advent of machine-learning, there has been an explosion 
in application of algorithms in various aspects of human life, including criminal justice 
system. These algorithms are produced using the risk-factor approach, that is, a machine is 
fed by historical crime data and then finds patterns related to crime based on correlations and 
regressions. A number of such predictive algorithms have been created for the purpose of 





pretrial, determining parole, and sentencing. However, recently these algorithms have been a 
target of serious accusations regarding their effectiveness and fairness, with specific criticism 
of their criminalisation of poverty and racial minorities (Dressel & Farid, 2018; Fry, 2018; 
O’Neil, 2016). Many of these criminal risk assessment algorithms have been found to 
mistakenly label people from low-income and minority communities as having a high risk for 
reoffending, which is a consequence of the fact that being poor or black correlates with 
crime, but it certainly does not cause it. These inaccuracies led to a shared statement signed 
by more than 100 civil rights and community organizations expressing their concerns about 
the use of algorithms in pretrial risk assessments and their potential worsening of racial 
inequalities (“The use of pretrial”, 2018).  
There are many other examples of making wrong decisions in the criminal justice 
system based on a correlate that is not causally related to crime. For instance, in the United 
States, a 19-year old man was convicted of statutory rape after having a consensual sex with a 
14-year old girl, for which sentencing guidelines recommended seven to 16 months in prison. 
However, he was sentenced to 18 months in prison as a risk assessment algorithm increased 
the upper limit to two years of incarceration. Further investigation showed that the algorithm 
used young age as a risk factor, and had he been 17 years older, paradoxically, the algorithm 
would have suggested no prison sentence at all (Fry, 2018). Therefore, given the questionable 
effectiveness of such algorithms and the seriousness of their role in influencing life-altering 
decisions, it is hard to argue that predicting crime based on mere correlates is as harmless as 
previously suggested. 
 As documented in the previous paragraphs, there is a strong need for a shift to the 
analytical approach that will specifically aim to explain why and how crime happens. As 
biosocial criminology has accumulated a vast knowledge about correlates of crime, the next 
step would be to tidy-up and distinguish which few amongst all variables have a potential to 
be causally related to crime. For each association, it should be determined whether there is a 
plausible causal process which would explain how a certain biological factor is linked to 
crime. If a variable has a potential to be a cause of crime, further research should be 
undertaken to investigate what is its specific role in the underlying mechanism that brings 
about crime and describe such process as precisely as possible. For example, having minor 
physical anomalies, such as low-seated ears (Glenn & Raine, 2014; Raine, 1993a, 2002), 
cannot cause anyone to commit a crime. Similarly, a surgery to correct low-seated ears would 
not prevent offending either. However, having a dysfunctional dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 





could lead to difficulties in exercising self-control and acting in accordance with one’s own 
morality in situations where there is an external environmental pressure to transgress. 
Therefore, intervention programs that are based on cognitive nurturing with a goal to 
establish and potentiate neural pathways and strengthen executive functions have the 
potential to be successful (Wikström, 2019; Wikström & Treiber, 2019).  
The principal aim of the current study is to advocate for a change towards analytical 
perspective in biosocial criminology by setting an example. Work presented herein will take 
“the best-replicated biological correlate” of antisocial behaviour (Ortiz & Raine, 2004, p. 
154), low heart rate, and critically examine its role in criminal behaviour. Given the 
supremacy of the correlational approach, it is not at all surprising that there is an abundance 
of research studies demonstrating the statistical association between low heart rate and 
antisocial behaviour, while the underlying causal mechanisms remain unknown. Although 
theoretical explanations of this association have been proposed, they lack rigorous empirical 
verification and still remain in the realm of speculation (Armstrong, 2011; Raine, 2002). The 
goal of the present study is to address this research gap and explore the underlying 
mechanism linking low heart rate and crime by employing the analytical approach and 
placing this biological marker within a theoretical context. 
 
1.2. Review of the Link Between Low Heart Rate and Antisocial Behaviour 
 
The objective of the current section is to provide an in-depth and up-to-date review of 
the empirical studies investigating the association between heart rate measured at rest (i.e., 
resting heart rate) and in response to a stressor (i.e., heart rate reactivity) and different 
measures of antisocial behaviour. It will be divided into two parts that will shed light onto 
studies supporting such a link, but also empirical findings refuting it. Finally, there will be an 










1.2.1. Empirical Evidence Supporting the Antisocial Behaviour-Heart Rate Link 
 
In the past few decades, a substantial body of research has accumulated demonstrating 
the negative association between heart rate and multiple types of antisocial behaviour, crime 
included. Low heart rate has been linked to aggression (Armstrong, Keller, Franklin, & 
Macmillan, 2009; Jennings, Pardini, & Matthews, 2017; Raine, Venables, & Mednick, 1997), 
including its reactive and proactive forms (Portnoy et al., 2014; Xu, Raine, Yu, & Krieg, 
2014), delinquency (Choy et al., 2015; Gao, Huang, & Li, 2017; Loeber, Pardini, 
Stouthamer-Loeber, & Raine, 2007; Portnoy et al., 2014), arrest and conviction frequencies 
(Armstrong, Boisvert, Flores, Symonds, & Gangitano, 2017; Jennings, Piquero, & 
Farrington, 2013; Koegl, Farrington, & Raine, 2018; Raine, Venables, & Williams, 1990), 
inclusive of violent and non-violent offending (Choy, Raine, Venables, & Farrington, 2017; 
Latvala, Kuja-Halkola, Almqvist, Larsson, & Lichtenstein, 2015; Murray et al., 2016; Van de 
Weijer, de Jong, Bijleveld, Blokland, & Raine, 2017), and a number of specific antisocial 
behaviours such as lying (Dierckx et al., 2014), academic dishonesty (Portnoy, Legee, Raine, 
Choy, & Rudo-Hutt, 2019), stalking (Boisvert et al., 2017), and rule-breaking behaviours 
(Fagan, Zhang, & Gao, 2017; Sijtsema et al., 2010). Furthermore, low heart rate has been 
found to correlate with a range of personality features of interest to criminology, such as 
impulsivity (Bennett, Blissett, Carroll, & Ginty, 2014; Bibbey, Ginty, Brindle, Phillips, & 
Carroll, 2016; Choy et al., 2015; Mathias & Stanford, 2003; Schmidt, Mussel, & Hewig, 
2013), callous-unemotional traits (Fagan et al., 2017; Gao et al., 2017; Kavish et al., 2017), 
psychopathy (Choy et al., 2015; Fanti et al., 2017; Raine, Fung, Portnoy, Choy, & Spring, 
2014), and hostility (Jennings et al., 2017). Importantly, these findings have been replicated 
using different methods of assessing antisocial behaviour including self- and observer-
reported measures (Armstrong et al., 2009; Fagan et al., 2017; Portnoy et al., 2014; Raine et 
al., 1997; Sijtsema et al., 2013), clinical diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder and 
various disruptive disorders (Fairchild et al., 2008; Popma et al., 2006; Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, 
LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000; Van Goozen, Matths, Cohen-Kettenis, Buitelaar, & Van England, 
2000; Van Goozen et al., 1998), and official criminal records data (Choy et al., 2017; 
Jennings et al., 2013; Murray et al., 2016; Van de Weijer et al., 2017).  
The relationship between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour has been confirmed 
in different populations, including student, convict, delinquent, clinical, and community 





2018; Osumi, Shimazaki, Imai, Sugiura, & Ohira, 2007). It has also been shown to hold 
across the life span, from early childhood into adulthood (Armstrong et al., 2009; Jennings et 
al., 2017; Maliphant, Watkins, & Davies, 2003; Portnoy et al., 2014; Raine et al., 2014, 
1997), and in both female and male subjects (Brzozowski, Gillespie, Dixon, & Mitchell, 
2018; Jennings et al., 2013; Latvala et al., 2015; Sijtsema et al., 2013). Furthermore, this 
finding appears to be a cross-cultural phenomenon, as it has been reported in samples from 
more than a dozen countries across the continents, such as Mauritius, Brazil, China, Canada, 
and Sweden (Raine, 2015). 
The replication across different research designs and involving a range of control 
variables have further added to the robustness of the evidence underpinning the relationship 
between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour. This result has been found to hold up after 
taking into an account a number of possible confounding variables, such as body mass index, 
smoking, alcohol intake, physical fitness, age, race, gender, socioeconomic status, cognitive 
ability, self-control, attachment to parents, and peer delinquency, amongst others (Armstrong 
et al., 2009; Cauffman et al., 2005; Jennings et al., 2013; Latvala et al., 2015). In addition to 
cross-sectional design, the association between heart rate and criminal offending has been 
confirmed in longitudinal studies as well. After controlling for the effects of relevant 
covariates, low resting heart rate measured throughout adolescence, from early puberty to late 
adolescence, has been associated with violent and non-violent crimes committed later in life, 
with follow-up periods from just a few years to up to more than three and a half decades 
(Choy et al., 2017; Latvala et al., 2015; Murray et al., 2016; Raine et al., 1990; Van de Weijer 
et al., 2017; Wadsworth, 1976). There are also some preliminary findings that resting heart 
rate measured in early childhood can predict later antisocial behaviour. Data from the 
Mauritius child health project (Raine et al., 1997) have shown that a low heart rate assessed at 
age as early as three years can predict parent-rated aggressive behaviour in children eight 
years later. The most profound contribution of this finding is that it eliminates the effects of 
many variables with a confounding influence that necessarily or potentially happen later in 
life, such as smoking, alcohol and/or drug use, athleticism, puberty, and antisocial lifestyle. 
In general, besides documenting the predictive power of heart rate, prospective studies are 
also significant because they discard the possibility that a criminal lifestyle could somehow 
cause low heart rate (Ortiz & Raine, 2004). 
Furthermore, low heart rate has been put forward in criminological literature as 
diagnostically specific to antisocial behaviour (Ortiz & Raine, 2004; Raine, 2002). The 





antisocial and disruptive behaviours have lower heart rates compared to typically developing 
and psychiatric control samples (Dietrich et al., 2007; Fairchild et al., 2008; Maliphant et al., 
2003; Popma et al., 2006), and that internalizing psychiatric disorders, such as depression and 
anxiety disorders, have been found to be, if anything, characterized by high cardiovascular 
activity (Dierckx et al., 2014; Monk et al., 2001; Schumann, Andrack, & Bär, 2017). This 
may seem as a very promising development, particularly in light of the fact that psychiatry 
has put much effort during the recent decades into finding biomarkers of mental disorders, 
alas without much success. Twenty years ago, the American Psychiatric Association task 
force for the latest edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th 
ed.; DSM-5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) set out to include biological measures 
into diagnostic criteria for mental disorders, and yet their endeavours had not materialised 
(Kupfer, 2013). The underlying reason was not a lack of potential biomarkers for psychiatric 
disorders, but their lack of specificity, that is, the fact that the same biomarkers were related 
to a number of different psychiatric disorders (Venigalla, Mekala, Hassan, Ahmed, Zain, & 
Dar, 2017). Therefore, an indication of low resting heart rate potentially being a specific 
indicator featuring only in antisocial and disruptive disorders seemed as a very alluring 
finding. Indeed, the DSM-5 classified low heart rate among the risk and prognostic factors for 
conduct disorder, a childhood precursor of antisocial personality disorder, and stressed its 
diagnostic specificity. A valid and clinically useful biomarker should also be able to predict 
treatment response, and one study has provided some preliminary findings that this might be 
the case with low heart rate. Namely, the study examining the success of an intensive 
cognitive behavioural intervention aimed at reducing aggression and delinquency in a group 
of children with disruptive behaviour disorder has shown that low heart rate was the only 
significant predictor of therapy success among several other variables, including cognitive 
functioning and severity of disruptive symptoms before the intervention (Stadler et al., 2008). 
The results have clearly demonstrated that a group of children who did not respond to the 
therapy had a significantly lower resting heart rate. At the end, however, even though heart 
rate seemed to be the most replicated of all potential biomarkers for conduct problems, it was 
not included amongst the diagnostic criteria of the DSM-5. The supporting evidence was not 
strong enough and there was no clear cut-off point for what makes a “low heart rate” hence 
diminishing its clinical usefulness (Moffitt et al., 2008). 
On the other hand, high heart rate has been proposed as a “buffering protective factor”  
which supposedly protects individuals from engaging in antisocial and criminal behaviour 





2013; Sijtsema et al., 2013). There has been some initial evidence providing support that high 
heart rate, measured either at rest or in response to a stimulus, is associated with lower 
antisocial behaviour. For example, a study employing a sample of adolescents recruited from 
residential welfare institutions has shown that participants with high resting heart rate have 
demonstrated the lowest score on a measure of antisocial behaviour (Lösel & Bender, 1997). 
Similarly, heart rate reactivity has been found to be heightened in a group of non-criminal 
men with criminal fathers in comparison to groups of criminal men with criminal fathers, 
criminal men with non-criminal fathers, and non-criminal men with non-criminal fathers 
(Brennan et al., 1997). Such findings have been interpreted in the literature as an evidence 
that high risk individuals may be protected from developing antisocial behaviours by their 
high heart rate (Adjorlolo, 2017; Wilson & Scarpa, 2013). However, this proposal is 
problematic as it does not include a mechanism by which a high heart rate could avert a 
person from exhibiting antisocial behaviour. The cited findings point to an association at best, 
and do not offer evidence of a causal link whereby increasing heart rate prevents a person 
from committing antisocial acts. 
In a like manner, high heart rate has also been associated with desistance from 
criminal behaviour. A prospective study has shown that antisocial adolescents who desisted 
from adult crime had significantly higher resting heart rate than a group of antisocial 
adolescents who had become criminals by the age of 29 years (Raine, Venables, & Williams, 
1995). However, subsequent studies have failed to replicate the finding that high heart rate 
measured either at rest or in response to stress predicts desistance from antisocial behaviour 
measured from early adolescence into adulthood (Baker et al., 2009; De Vries-Bouw et al., 
2011; Hammerton et al., 2018; Loeber et al., 2007). 
 
1.2.2. Empirical Evidence Refuting the Antisocial Behaviour-Heart Rate Link 
 
Although a review of the literature points to a robust, well-replicated inverse 
association between heart rate and antisocial behaviour, there have been some reports of 
inconsistent results that should be acknowledged. Such findings may be broadly categorized 
into those showing no evidence of the association (e.g., Piquero, Ling, Raine, & Piquero, 
2020) and those showing a positive relationship (e.g., Deutz et al., 2019). Studies that belong 
to the former group are usually associated with certain methodological characteristics such as 





children or women (e.g., Wilson & Scarpa, 2013), or using psychopathy as a measure of 
antisocial behaviour (e.g., Kavish, Boisvert, et al., 2019). Studies belonging to the latter 
group often use clinical samples of children and adolescents (e.g., De Wied, Boxtel, 
Posthumus, Goudena, & Matthys, 2009). 
As to the studies showing no relationship between heart rate and antisocial behaviour, 
some of them suffer from certain methodological issues, such as having a small sample size 
which may lead to non-significant results due to low statistical power, especially having in 
mind that such effects are usually of small magnitude (De Wied, Van Boxtel, Matthys, & 
Meeus, 2012; Scarpa, Haden, & Tanaka, 2010; Scarpa et al., 2008). Another commonality of 
a group of studies that have reported non-significant results is measuring antisocial behaviour 
in early childhood. It seems that heart rate measured at age as early as 14 months, and up to 
36 months, does not predict aggressive and externalizing behaviour at ages three and seven 
years (Dierckx et al., 2014; Van Hulle, Corley, Zahn-Waxler, Kagan, & Hewitt, 2000). 
Similarly, a study looking into aggressive behaviour of four-year-olds has not found evidence 
of lower heart rate in aggressive children or in children diagnosed with oppositional defiant 
disorder or conduct disorder (Posthumus, Böcker, Raaijmakers, Van Engeland, & Matthys, 
2009). One possibility is that the relationship between heart rate and antisocial behaviour 
does not show until preadolescent and adolescent period. However, since aggression is a 
developmentally common phenomenon in early childhood (Tremblay, 2015), it is also 
plausible that at this age the link between heart rate and antisocial behaviour cannot shine 
through because most pre-schoolers exhibit aggressive behaviour. Developmental research 
shows a trajectory of aggression which involves an increase of this behaviour during early 
childhood, followed by a decrease from the preschool age to adolescence (Côté, Vaillancourt, 
LeBlanc, Nagin, & Tremblay, 2006; NICHD Early Child Care Research, 2004). Therefore, it 
is possible that low heart rate characterizes only a minority of children who do not follow this 
trajectory and instead persist in aggressive behaviour. Results from the Mauritius child health 
project (Raine, Venables, et al., 1997) which have shown that heart rate measured at age three 
years predicted aggressive behaviour at age 11 provide preliminary support for the latter 
explanation, but further research is necessary to draw firm conclusions. 
Another source of non-significant results stems from female samples. Several studies 
utilizing samples of preadolescent, adolescent, and adult females have failed to replicate the 
negative association between heart rate and a range of antisocial behaviours, including 
aggression, rule-breaking behaviour, and callous-unemotional traits (Boisvert et al., 2017; 





However, two meta-analyses have concluded that this link can be found in female 
participants as well. A meta-analysis conducted on studies using samples of children and 
adolescents has found no significant difference in effect sizes for girls and boys (Ortiz & 
Raine, 2004). Similarly, a subsequent meta-analysis conducted on 115 independent effect 
sizes obtained from studies including all age groups has concluded that the link between 
resting heart rate and antisocial behaviour is found in both male and female samples, 
although the summary effect size calculated from male samples was higher (Portnoy & 
Farrington, 2015). Out of 18 studies conducted using only female samples, 13 had effect sizes 
in the expected, negative direction.  
Finally, mixed findings have been reported when analysing the relationship between 
heart rate and psychopathy. Some studies have demonstrated a negative link between heart 
rate measured either at rest or in response to a stimuli, and psychopathic traits (Choy et al., 
2015; Fanti et al., 2017; Gao, Raine, & Schug, 2012; Kyranides, Fanti, Sikki, & Patrick, 
2017), whereas others found no evidence of a relationship between these variables (Kavish, 
Boisvert, et al., 2019; Kavish, Fu, Vaughn, Qian, & Boutwell, 2019; Portnoy et al., 2014). 
Explanation of inconsistent findings may lie in the fact that there is no clear consensus among 
researchers about what features psychopathy actually entails, which has led to parallel 
existence of many different measures of psychopathy that tap into similar but not identical 
constructs (Copestake, Gray, & Snowden, 2011; Lilienfeld, 1994; Patrick, Fowles, & 
Krueger, 2009; Salekin, Chen, Sellbom, Lester, & MacDougall, 2014; Williams, Paulhus, & 
Hare, 2007; Wright, 2009). Particularly, there is a disagreement whether antisocial behaviour 
represents an inherent part of psychopathy or it is just a consequence of psychopathic 
personality traits (Cooke, Michie, Hart, & Clark, 2004; Hare & Neumann, 2005, 2010; 
Skeem & Cooke, 2010). This has propelled some authors to suggest that divergent results 
could be explained by taking into an account if a measure of psychopathy used in a study 
included items describing overt antisocial behaviour or not (Kavish, Boisvert, et al., 2019; 
Kavish, Fu, et al., 2019). They have suggested that the link between psychopathy and heart 
rate could be explained by inclusion of antisocial behaviour, and once a measure included 
only personality features of psychopathy, the relationship would disappear. However, 
although there are some studies confirming this conclusion (Hammerton et al., 2018; 
Ishikawa, Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, & Lacasse, 2001; Kavish, Boisvert, et al., 2019; Kavish, Fu, 
et al., 2019), there is also a significant number of studies which have reported a negative link 





2017; Gao et al., 2017; Kavish et al., 2017). Therefore, this explanation does not seem to be 
fully supported by the empirical data. 
Another methodological challenge in psychopathy research is reflected in 
discrepancies regarding how different studies define psychopathy even if it is measured using 
the same instrument. Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (Hare, 2003) is one of the most 
commonly used measures of psychopathy which yields a score on a scale between zero and 
40, with a suggested cut-off point of 30 or greater to indicate psychopathy. However, despite 
the instructions in the instrument manual, different researchers have used different cut-off 
points to define psychopathy in their studies, often decreasing the critical threshold to mid-
20s or lower (Koenigs, 2012). Therefore, the inconsistencies in the results regarding the link 
between psychopathic traits and heart rate are possibly a consequence of methodological 
issues characterising the sub-field of psychopathy research. 
The most conclusive answer to the question whether there is a relationship between 
heart rate and psychopathy could be obtained by conducting a meta-analysis. Thus far, two 
meta-analyses have been reported with conflicting results. Lorber (2004) has concluded there 
was no evidence of the link between resting heart rate and psychopathy, whereas Portnoy and 
Farrington (2015) have found a significant negative link with the effect size of d = − 0.19,     
p < .01. However, Lorber’s (2004) meta-analysis suffers from certain methodological 
problems which could have potentially led to biased conclusions and underestimation of the 
summary effect size. Firstly, it has included 17 effect sizes which were all calculated from 
small-scale studies where the number of participants ranged from 20 to 64 per study. 
Secondly, the bulk of the studies compared psychopaths vs non-psychopaths, with only a few 
studies looking at the link between continuous variables. Finally, seven studies included into 
the meta-analysis have been coded as having no effect whatsoever (d = 0), despite the fact 
that these articles had not provided enough details to actually calculate their exact effect 
sizes. The authors of these studies had just reported a “non-significant” result that Lorber 
translated into an effect size of zero which is not the same (i.e., an effect size could be higher 
than zero but still non-significant). On the other hand, Portnoy and Farrington’s (2015) meta-
analysis has not incorporated the seven questionable non-significant studies into the analysis, 
and hence their results might have overestimated the strength of the relationship. Therefore, it 
seems that conclusive results regarding the link between heart rate and psychopathy are not 
yet available. A potential way forward could lie in conducting a new meta-analysis that 
would include novel research findings, address the methodological issues in question, and 





Besides some studies showing no association between heart rate and antisocial 
behaviour, findings about positive links represent another type of inconsistent data. Out of the 
115 independent effect sizes included in a meta-analysis exploring the link between resting 
heart rate and antisocial behaviour, 34 were in a positive direction with seven studies having 
a statistically significant result (Portnoy & Farrington, 2015). However, these findings could 
be explained by taking a closer look into the sample type and outcome variables used in these 
studies. A significant number of the studies showing a positive association either included in 
the above mentioned meta-analysis or conducted at a later date (De Wied et al., 2009; Deutz 
et al., 2019; Schoorl, Rijn, Wied, Goozen, & Swaab, 2016; Zahn & Kruesi, 1993), have used 
clinical samples of children diagnosed with disruptive behaviour disorders, or have used such 
symptoms as an outcome measure of antisocial behaviour. However, children with 
externalizing problems are far from being a homogenous group. They often suffer from 
comorbid internalizing problems which represents more of a rule rather than an exception, 
with a significant number of children diagnosed with disruptive behaviour disorder showing a 
pattern of high anxiety, impulsivity, and emotional dysregulation (De Wied et al., 2009; 
Deutz et al., 2019; Dierckx et al., 2014). As internalizing problems, anxiety in particular, 
have been found to be associated with high heart rate, it is plausible that they represent 
confounding factor which is the actual driving force of the positive link between heart rate 
and antisocial behaviour in such samples. Indeed, resting heart rate has been shown to 
increase with dysregulation, a common factor among externalizing and internalizing 
symptoms comprised of anxiety, depression, aggression, and attention problems (Deutz et al., 
2019). There are also other potentially confounding variables which could perhaps explain 
the findings of a positive association between heart rate and antisocial behaviour. 
Specifically, these children are often taking medications and suffer from other comorbid 
diagnoses associated with high resting heart rate, such as autism spectrum disorder (Bal et al., 
2010; Ming, Julu, Brimacombe, Connor, & Daniels, 2005).  
Finally, another reason closely related to heterogeneity of children with disruptive 
behaviours, but that could also explain some of the findings regarding the positive association 
between heart rate and antisocial behaviour in other samples as well, might lie in the type of 
aggression measured in such studies. Namely, there are two distinct types of aggression that 
are suggested to be associated with different physiological features: reactive aggression, a 
defensive response to a threatening or frustrating incident associated with strong negative 
emotions, and proactive aggression, an instrumental aggression motivated by an anticipation 





Sterzer, 2010). It has been proposed that physiological underarousal is associated with 
proactive aggression, whereas reactive aggression is characterized by physiological 
overarousal (Scarpa & Raine, 2000). Indeed, there has been some preliminary evidence 
supporting this conclusion wherein low and high heart rates were related to proactive and 
reactive aggression, respectively (Scarpa et al., 2010; Schoorl et al., 2016). Another study has 
shown that in a sample of more than 300 school children resting heart rate was inversely 
associated with the both types of aggressive behaviour (Raine et al., 2014). However, once 
the proactive aggression was controlled for, reactive aggression ceased to be significantly 
associated with heart rate, whereas the negative association with proactive aggression 
remained significant even after accounting for the effect of reactive aggression. Therefore, a 
positive association between heart rate and antisocial behaviour can be explained in the many 
cases by the use of clinical samples in which it is hard to disentangle the effects of 
confounding factors, or by measuring antisocial behaviour through reactive aggression.  
 
1.3. Is There a Relationship Between Low Heart Rate and Antisocial Behaviour? 
 
Overall, the review of the literature seems to suggest a robust and well-replicated 
association between low heart rate and a range of antisocial behaviours, but some inconsistent 
findings have been reported as well. Therefore, a meta-analysis should provide the most 
reliable answer to the questions of the strength of the relationship, homogeneity of its effect 
sizes, and the influence of possible moderating variables.  
Thus far there have been several meta-analyses looking at the relationship between 
heart rate and various antisocial behaviours. The first two meta-analyses have examined 
studies published up until 2002, with one looking into the link between heart rate measured at 
rest, in response to a task, and as heart rate reactivity (as a function of change from resting 
state), and aggression, psychopathy, and conduct problems (Lorber, 2004), whereas the other 
publication has examined heart rate measured at rest or in response to stress, and antisocial 
behaviour in samples of children and adolescents (Ortiz & Raine, 2004). Lorber (2004) has 
concluded that both aggression and conduct problems were significantly related to low 
resting heart rate with the effect sizes of d = - 0.38 (across 16 studies) and d = - 0.33 (across 
13 studies), respectively. Results regarding heart rate measured in response to a task have 
suggested a different conclusion. Neither aggression nor conduct problems have been found 





However, the analyses have not differentiated between types of tasks, and therefore stressful, 
neutral, and orienting tasks have been merged into the same category, which led to substantial 
heterogeneity of the included effect sizes. Unsurprisingly, valence of a task has emerged as a 
significant moderating variable in the case of aggression, and a significant negative effect has 
emerged for the studies that used aversive tasks. This meta-analysis suffers from other 
limitations as well, such as excluding longitudinal studies, not considering general antisocial 
behaviour, and coding studies which had reported non-significant results without including a 
precise effect size as having an effect size of zero. 
Next, Ortiz and Raine’s (2004) publication has included results from two meta-
analyses of effect sizes retrieved from studies with samples of participants younger than 19 
years which focused on antisocial behaviour on the whole, bringing together conducts such as 
aggression, delinquency, violence, and externalizing disorders. The primary meta-analysis 
has focused only on resting heart rate, whereas the secondary meta-analysis has explored 
heart rate measured in response to a stressor. Using 45 independent effect sizes from a dataset 
of 5868 participants, the former meta-analysis has yielded a significant overall effect size of  
d = - 0.44, p < .001. In total, 43 effect sizes were negative, whereas there were only two 
positive effect sizes, both statistically non-significant (p > .05). The latter meta-analysis has 
been on a smaller scale involving less than 600 participants and 10 effect sizes, all of which 
were negative. Its result has pointed to a strong negative effect of d = − 0.76, p < .001. 
Furthermore, the relationship between heart rate and general antisocial behaviour seems 
robust as none of the moderating variables has significantly influenced the effect size, 
including sex, age, source of participants’ recruitment, and the study design (despite an 
average nine years of follow-up in prospective studies).  
Finally, the most recent meta-analysis of the association between resting heart rate 
and antisocial behaviour has attempted to address the shortcomings of the prior meta-analyses 
(Portnoy & Farrington, 2015). It included both published and unpublished studies up to 2012, 
yielding 115 independent effect sizes in total. The resulting overall effect size ranged from    
d = - 0.15, p < .01 to d = - 0.20, p < .01, depending on the type of the model used to calculate 
these values. Authors have concluded that the relationship was well-replicated and robust, 
and that it held across age, sex, types of antisocial behaviour, different recruitment sources, 
and study designs. However, it is striking that the overall effect size is much weaker 
compared to the ones reported in prior meta-analyses. Furthermore, Ortiz and Raine (2004) 
reported that out of all the studies included in their analysis, 96% had negative effect sizes, 





direction, with 31% having a statistically significant effect. Portnoy and Farrington (2015) 
have suggested that this difference could be potentially explained by the “Proteus 
phenomenon” (Ioannidis & Trikalinos, 2005), which acknowledges a trend wherein once a 
new observation has been noted, significant findings are more likely to be published, and 
when they accumulate in a considerable number, the trend reverses, and non-significant or 
refuting findings become more appealing for publication. Finding of a significant negative 
association between the year of publication and the strength of its effect size has been put 
forward as supportive of this explanation. However, the authors have also concluded that the 
publication bias is the unlikely cause of their overall findings, and therefore there may be 
other reasons why there have been more non-significant findings in later years, including 
employing better and more rigorous methodology. 
A meticulous review of studies examining the relationship between heart rate and 
antisocial behaviour reveals that there may be another, overlooked reason that could 
potentially explain the inconsistent findings. It has been noted that there are discrepancies in 
the way resting heart rate has been measured across the studies, such that it is not always 
clear whether a “resting heart rate” had been indeed measured at rest, or in response to a 
stressor. A number of studies reporting a significant inverse relationship involving resting 
heart rate have used measurement procedures that participants may have actually experienced 
as stressful. Several studies using samples of children and adolescents have been conducted 
in laboratory rooms and/or using equipment that may have been perceived as invasive, such 
as electrodes, especially if they have been placed below a child’s chest (Raine et al., 1990, 
1997; Xu et al., 2014). For example, one of these studies included crying of its three-year-old 
participants as a control variable (Raine, Venables, et al., 1997). A technician was assessing 
how much a child cried during the heart rate measurement on a scale from one, whereby the 
child did not cry, to five, which meant uncontrollable crying. Therefore, it is safe to assume 
that at least some of the children in the study experienced this assessment as stressful, which 
means that their heart rate was actually measured in response to a stressor, not at rest. Next, it 
has been recommended to measure heart rate for at least a full minute in order to obtain an 
accurate baseline measurement (Cornet, 2015; Kobayashi, 2013; Pickering, 2013; Smith, 
Duell, & Martin, 2003). A reading resulting from a shorter measurement may be imprecise 
due to potential changes in the heart rhythm, with a possible error being further amplified by 
multiplication with an integer (e.g., measuring heart rate for 30 seconds and multiplying it by 
two to obtain a number of beats per minute). However, many studies have failed to adhere to 





al., 2014). Furthermore, several studies have used measures obtained from medical 
examination files, and such assessments could be experienced as stressful and anxiety-
inducing by some people (Koegl et al., 2018; Latvala et al., 2015; Van de Weijer et al., 2017). 
This is additionally complicated in the cases where the medical examination has been 
conducted as part of a mandatory army conscription procedure, as there could be other 
reasons why the resulting heart rate measurement may not represent a valid baseline measure. 
For example, such examination could be perceived as stressful by some people as it 
determines whether they would be sent to serve in a military, or some conscripts may even 
temporarily tamper with their health measures to be freed of the service. It is also 
questionable how precise are these readings given that they are measured in a high number of 
people over very short periods of time. One study has noted that sometimes physicians would 
measure a heart rate for only 15 seconds and then multiply it by four to get a number of beats 
per minute, which would in that case represent only an approximation of heart rate (Van de 
Weijer et al., 2017).  
Furthermore, a bulk of the studies showing a negative association with antisocial 
behaviour have measured resting heart rate while participants sat quietly and were instructed 
to relax (e.g., Brzozowski et al., 2018; Jennings et al., 2013; Xu et al., 2014). However, the 
main problem with this procedure is that it cannot ensure a standardised experience for all 
participants. Some people may be bored or sleepy, some may feel anxious in anticipation 
what will happen next or just by being in an unfamiliar situation, while others may be 
thinking of something else that could incite various emotions, all of which can influence their 
heart rate in different ways. Almost 20 years ago, it was recommended in 
psychophysiological literature that a resting measure of heart rate should be obtained while 
the participants are engaged in a minimally demanding task such as watching a relaxing 
video, as it had been proven better at achieving cardiovascular baseline in comparison to 
resting quietly (Piferi, Kline, Younger, & Lawler, 2000). Interestingly, often studies that have 
followed this advice and measured resting heart rate while the participants were watching the 
recommended relaxing video (Coral Sea Dreaming, Small World Music Inc.) have found no 
associations with antisocial behaviour measures (Colasante & Malti, 2017; Oldenhof et al., 
2019; Prätzlich et al., 2019; Van Zonneveld, Platje, De Sonneville, Van Goozen, & Swaab, 
2017; Wilson & Scarpa, 2013, 2014). Moreover, studies that have used similar minimally 
demanding tasks, such as watching other types of relaxing videos, reading a magazine, or 
completing questionnaires, or that have otherwise put more effort into obtaining a more valid 





measuring heart rate over a longer period, have also found no associations with different 
antisocial behaviours (Bimmel, Van Ijzendoorn, Bakermans-Kranenburg, Juffer, & De Geus, 
2008; De Vries-Bouw et al., 2011; Galán, Choe, Forbes, & Shaw, 2017; Posthumus et al., 
2009). Some of these studies have also included a measure of heart rate during a stressor, 
and, despite a lack of association with resting heart rate, antisocial behaviours have shown a 
significant inverse link with the heart rate reactivity (Bimmel et al., 2008; De Vries-Bouw et 
al., 2011; Van Zonneveld et al., 2017). Having in mind these results, it is possible that the 
relationship between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour does not apply to resting heart 
rate, but only to heart rate reactivity. This hypothesis can be tested by conducting an updated 
meta-analysis which would include the method of obtaining baseline cardiovascular activity 
as a moderating variable. However, it is crucial that future studies start employing 
standardised protocols for measuring resting heart rate and heart rate reactivity. Heart rate at 
rest and cardiac response to stress are two distinct phenomena with different underlying 
mechanisms and should not be therefore conflated in research if we are to better understand 
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2.1. Review of Proposed Mechanisms Linking Heart Rate and Antisocial 
Behaviour 
 
Despite the overwhelming number of empirical studies showing a robust, inverse 
association between heart rate and criminal behaviour, little is known beyond the mere 
existence of the link due to the predominance of the correlational research paradigm. If there 
is indeed such a relationship, it is crucial to understand how, that is, through which 
mechanism, are these variables associated with one another. Although different explanations 
of the underlying mechanism have been proposed, these hypotheses are mostly 
underdeveloped, unsubstantiated, based on questionable assumptions, and lack rigorous 
empirical verification. This chapter aims to list, summarise, and scrutinise existing theoretical 
explanations provided by different authors across the criminological literature. 
 
2.1.1. Low Arousal and Stimulation-Seeking 
 
A predecessor of the stimulation-seeking hypothesis is the low arousal theory derived 
from Eysenck’s theory of personality and its relation to criminality (Eysenck, 1977, 1997). 
Eysenck has proposed that certain personality characteristics are more likely to be associated 
with criminal conduct through their associated biological features. Specifically, he argued 
that individuals characterised by high extraversion and/or psychoticism are more likely to be 
engaged in antisocial behaviour as they have low arousal that may predispose them towards 
criminal behaviour. He has further suggested that low arousal may lead to antisocial 
behaviour by disrupting orderly development of one’s conscience. It has been hypothesised 
that conscience is a conditioned response learnt through classical conditioning wherein 
arousal plays an important role. Therefore, his explanation is that low arousal promotes 
antisocial and criminal behaviour via lack of conscience caused by poor conditioning. 
Eysenck has also suggested an alternative mechanism through which low arousal may be 
associated with crime. Namely, he has suggested that individuals with low arousal may seek 
ways of increasing their arousal, such as engaging in risk-taking and impulsive actions, 
socializing with too many people, drug abuse, and promiscuous behaviour. The assumption is 
that these behaviours also increase chances of committing crime, although not necessarily 





Low arousal theory seems to be underdeveloped due to many vague and/or unfounded 
assumptions, such as the lack of specific explanation of how low arousal disrupts classical 
conditioning, why development of “conscience” would be contingent only on classical 
conditioning, and how the suggested arousal-increasing activities (such as being promiscuous 
or socializing with many people) bring about crime. In addition, the mechanism involving 
behaviours aimed at increasing arousal disregards the fact that a risky lifestyle will not have 
an equal influence on all people, but rather its effect will depend on their personal crime 
propensities (Svensson & Pauwels, 2010). Another important issue relates to a lack of clear 
definition of arousal and what measures of the central and/or autonomic nervous system 
functioning it entails. Arousal has been measured in the literature through very different 
means including resting electroencephalography, skin conductance, heart rate, and skin 
potential levels. However, research shows that there are no relations between these different 
measures or, if found, these inter-correlations are very low (Raine, 2002; Venables, 1987). 
Therefore, the low arousal theory does not appear to be able to provide a viable explanation 
of the relationship between heart rate and crime, as it lacks clarity and precision in defining 
its core concept and the specific mechanisms though which it brings about crime. Although 
the low arousal theory has been mostly abandoned in its original form, its derivate, a 
stimulation-seeking hypothesis, is currently one of the dominating theoretical explanations. 
According to the stimulation-seeking hypothesis, low level of arousal is experienced 
as an unpleasant physiological state (Eysenck, 1997; Quay, 1965; Raine et al., 1997). In order 
to address this problem and increase their arousal to a more optimal level, individuals 
characterised by low heart rate engage in stimulation-seeking behaviours, which may also 
include antisocial and criminal acts. Although very popular in the literature, this explanation 
is based on highly questionable assumptions. For example, an assumption that low heart rate 
is experienced as unpleasant is unfounded. There is no reason to believe that this might be the 
case, and if anything, a high heart rate is more likely to be experienced as discomforting. 
Another highly problematic core assumption is that antisocial behaviour is considered 
arousing and that it leads to a more comfortable physiological state.  
Apart from sketchy assumptions, it is also left unexplained how low arousal drives 
people to engage in stimulating behaviours. Research has indeed found some support for the 
positive association between stimulation-seeking personality traits and aggressive and deviant 
behaviours (Hammerton et al., 2018; Raine, Reynolds, Venables, Mednick, & Farrington, 
1998; Vazsonyi & Ksinan, 2017; Wilson & Scarpa, 2014). However, a meta-analysis 





and aggression has reported a significant, but small summary effect size (d = 0.19, p < .001). 
In addition, the relationship varied significantly across different methodological moderating 
variables (Wilson & Scarpa, 2011). On the other hand, there have been mixed results with 
regards to the link between stimulation-seeking and resting heart rate or heart rate reactivity. 
A few studies have indeed reported a negative association (Hammerton et al., 2018; Sijtsema 
et al., 2010), but a number of empirical data have failed to detect any significant link between 
the two (Armstrong & Boutwell, 2012; Breivik, Roth, & Jørgensen, 1998; Kavish, Boisvert, 
et al., 2019; Portnoy et al., 2014; Wilson & Scarpa, 2013, 2014). 
In addition, an overall interpretation of the stimulation-seeking research results has 
been complicated by the fact that this construct has been often conflated with impulsivity, 
even though they are independent constructs (Burt et al., 2014; Harden & Tucker-Drob, 2011; 
Magid, MacLean, & Colder, 2007; Steinberg et al., 2008; Vazsonyi & Ksinan, 2017). 
Stimulation-seeking has been defined as a personality trait characterised by “seeking of 
varied, novel, complex, and intense sensations and experiences, and the willingness to take 
physical, social, legal, and financial risks for the sake of such experience” (Zuckerman, 1994, 
p. 27). It has been further stressed that taking risks is related to stimulation-seeking, but it is 
not a core component of the definition. That is to say, stimulation-seeking individuals are 
prepared to take risks in order to experience wanted sensations, but do not seek risk for its 
own sake. On the other hand, a concept of impulsivity applies to a deficient self-control or 
response inhibition that prompts hurried, careless, and unplanned behaviour (Steinberg et al., 
2008). As any other behaviour, stimulation-seeking can be carried out impulsively, but 
certainly not all stimulating behaviours are conducted in such manner. In fact, engaging in 
stimulating activities can be premediated and planned in advance (e.g., organising an outdoor 
rock climbing trip). Similarly, not all impulsive behaviour will have a stimulating effect (e.g., 
ending a friendship abruptly). Therefore, even though these traits may come together in a 
person, they are in fact distinct and independent factors (Burt et al., 2014). Furthermore, these 
constructs follow different developmental trajectories and are supported by distinct neural 
systems (Harden & Tucker-Drob, 2011; Steinberg et al., 2008; Vazsonyi & Ksinan, 2017). 
Impulsivity is closely associated with the cognitive control system underpinned by the 
prefrontal cortex functioning and connecting areas of the anterior cingulate cortex (Steinberg, 
2007; Steinberg et al., 2008). It tends to decline linearly throughout adolescence and then 
stabilise in early ‘20s, which is consistent with findings about developmental trajectory of the 
prefrontal cortex which matures into early adulthood (Harden & Tucker-Drob, 2011; 





been associated with the socio-emotional system underpinned by the limbic and paralimbic 
areas of the brain (Somerville, Jones, & Casey, 2010; Steinberg, 2007; Steinberg et al., 2008). 
It develops along a curvilinear pattern associated with puberty as it increases until mid-
adolescence, after which it remains at the same level or declines (Harden & Tucker-Drob, 
2011; Steinberg et al., 2008; Vazsonyi & Ksinan, 2017). Its trajectory is in line with 
neuroscientific findings showing that subcortical regions associated with motivational, 
affective, and rewarding stimuli are more responsive at this age in comparison to both 
children and adult samples (Harden & Tucker-Drob, 2011; Somerville et al., 2010; Steinberg, 
2007; Steinberg et al., 2008). 
Theoretical conflation of stimulation-seeking and impulsivity has in turn affected 
operationalisation of these constructs. In many cases, these two personality traits have been 
either deliberately combined into a single construct (e.g., impulsive sensation-seeking 
subscale of the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire; Zuckerman, Kuhlman, 
Joireman, Teta, & Kraft, 1993), or have been intended as a measure of one of the two 
constructs, but have instead included items tapping into the other construct as well. For 
example, one of the most widely used measures of stimulation-seeking, Zuckerman’s 
Sensation Seeking Scale-V (Zuckerman, 1994), consists of four subscales, one of which is 
disinhibition which assesses impulsivity. Similarly, many measures of impulsivity also 
involve stimulation-seeking items. Exploratory factor analysis conducted on several widely 
used measures of impulsivity has yielded four factors, one of which was stimulation-seeking 
(Whiteside & Lynam, 2001).  
Therefore, although the stimulation-seeking hypothesis has been increasingly 
recognised as one of the main explanations of the heart rate – antisocial behaviour link, it 
does not seem to withstand a meticulous scrutiny. It is based on flimsy and unsupported 
assumptions and does not appear to offer a viable underlying mechanism connecting heart 
rate to crime. In addition, interpreting most of the research findings related to stimulation-
seeking has been further complicated by its conflation with impulsivity. Therefore, the 
studies showing the link with antisocial behaviour or heart rate often cannot distinguish 










According to the fearlessness hypothesis, low heart rate represents an indicator of low 
fear (Raine, 1996b; Raine, 1993b). It is assumed that the testing situation in which people’s 
heart rates are being measured are at least mildly stressful. For example, they are often part of 
a medical examination or conscription testing, they are conducted in unfamiliar settings, or 
precede unknown experimental tasks, all of which can unintentionally induce anticipatory 
anxiety. Research from the 1980s about decorated bomb disposal experts and paratrooper 
veterans has been cited in support of the idea that low heart rate is a marker of fearlessness, 
as it has shown that these individuals who presumably lack fear are characterised by low 
heart rates (Cox, Hallam, O’Connor, & Rachman, 1983; McMillan & Rachman, 1987; 
O’Connor, Hallam, & Rachman, 1985). It is further assumed that fearlessness trait 
predisposes people to committing crimes as such behaviour requires a lack of fear of the 
adverse consequences, either in terms of getting hurt or having to face legal consequences 
(Raine, 1996b; Raine, 1993b; Raine & Liu, 1998). The other proposed mechanism linking 
fearlessness to crime suggests that a lack of fear adversely affects socialization and 
development of conscience via poor fear conditioning, which in turn facilitates antisocial 
behaviour. It is believed that if a child does not fear punishment, this would interfere with the 
socialization process. 
Studies exploring the link between fearlessness and crime have not provided much 
support for it. For example, data from the Pittsburgh youth study has demonstrated that fear is 
indeed positively associated with reactive aggression, but there were no significant links with 
proactive aggression, and violent and non-violent delinquency (Portnoy et al., 2014). 
Similarly, Mauritius child health project results have shown that, although there was initally a 
correlation between a behavioural measure of fearlessness at age three and parent-rated 
measure of aggression at age 11, it was abolished after entering covariates (Raine et al., 
1998). Similarly, the idea that resting heart rate is inversely associated with fearlessness has 
not been supported by data (Portnoy et al., 2019, 2014). In fact, it is important to point out 
that the very empirical studies about the decorated bomb disposal experts and paratrooper 
veterans that have been used to inspire and support the fearlessness hypothesis have not been 
interpreted accurately. Firstly, the results of the statistical analyses have shown that these 
presumably fearless individuals maintained lower heart rate reactivity to stress compared to 





groups (Cox et al., 1983; McMillan & Rachman, 1987; O’Connor et al., 1985). Secondly, the 
decorated bomb disposal experts have not differed significantly from their non-decorated 
counterparts on reports of subjective feelings, that is, their subjective reactions to the testing 
situation have been the same, which is not in line with the fearlessness hypothesis (Cox et al., 
1983; O’Connor et al., 1985). Therefore, the cited studies have not found that supposedly 
fearless individuals actually experience lower levels of fear, but only that their visceral 
reactions to stress, that is, heart rate responses, were lower. Interpreting these studies as 
supportive of the fearlessness hypothesis fails to acknowledge the crucial difference between 
the threat response and conscious experience of fear. These reactions stem from separate 
neurobiological systems, as the brain network that identifies and responds to threat is 
different from the system that enables subjective feelings of fear (Hoppenbrouwers, Bulten, 
& Brazil, 2016; LeDoux, 2013, 2014). Therefore, although the threat response and feeling 
afraid often go together, they are indeed independent. When built-in bodily threat reactions 
are put in motion, that does not necessarily mean they also result in feeling afraid.  
Similarly to the previous explanations, the fearlessness hypothesis is also founded on 
questionable assumptions regarding its causal effect on committing crime. The claim that 
antisocial behaviour requires a lack of fear has not been backed by any evidence, and 
certainly there are situations where people do feel afraid but commit crimes nevertheless. 
Furthermore, the explanation is fundamentally probabilistic, as it postulates that those who 
are more fearful are less likely to engage in antisocial and criminal behaviours. It does not 
provide a robust mechanism of how fearlessness causes crime, nor it accounts for the 
individual differences between people in their propensity to commit crimes. More 
specifically, this reasoning does not consider the fact that not all people are equally motivated 
and willing to commit crimes. In effect, the deterrent quality of fear is relevant just for a 
minority of people who are motivated and actively deliberate committing crimes (Wikström, 
2008, 2014; Wikström, Tseloni, & Karlis, 2011). The fearlessness hypothesis does not 
account for this, but rather implies that the deterrence is equally relevant for everyone which 
is not the case. For example, in many instances when people need more money, the majority 
will not steal not because they will actively decide to restrain themselves from committing 
theft due to their fear of consequences, but because it will not even cross their minds as an 
option. This is not to say that fear will never be a factor in crime causation, as there are 
indeed instances when individuals who consider committing a crime decide after some 
deliberation not to follow through due to the deterrent effects of fear. However, for the 





committing crime, and this will also be true in cases of persistent offenders who habitually 
commit crime in criminogenic settings without putting much thought into it. Therefore, the 
presumption that people abide by the law due to their fear of consequences oversimplifies 
complex motivation behind human behaviour, and does not apply to the majority of people 
for most of the time.  
Furthermore, it is assumed that a lack of fear in childhood leads to poor socialization 
and deficient conscience (Raine, 1993b, 1996). However, there are two main issues with this 
argument. Firstly, it is not clear from the provided explanation whether this disruption is 
caused by poor fear conditioning (as mentioned in e.g., Raine, 2002), which is a form of 
Pavlovian classical conditioning, or a low fear of punishment (as noted in e.g., Raine, 1996a), 
which is associated with a type of operant conditioning, alongside positive and negative 
reinforcement (LeDoux, 2014; Skinner, 1965). These are two very different types of learning 
and cannot be used interchangeably. Secondly, even if a child has poor fear conditioning or 
does not react to punishment, this will not necessarily lead to inadequate socialization as 
there are many other processes of learning, such as different types of conditioning, 
reinforcement techniques, observational learning, trial and error, and following instructions 
(Domjan, 2015). Therefore, the idea that low fear leads to antisocial behaviour through 
disrupted socialization is imprecise and dubious.  
In sum, the fearlessness hypothesis is characterised by certain inconsistencies and 
unsupported core assumptions which diminish its usefulness in explaining the link between 
low heart rate and crime. Moreover, it is not supported by data either, including the empirical 




Raine (1993b, 2002) has suggested that reduced noradrenergic functioning may 
explain the link between low heart rate and crime. The rationale behind such proposal is that, 
on one hand, noradrenaline is associated with heart rate, and on the other, it shows a negative 
link with antisocial behaviour. In support of this hypothesis, a meta-analysis and two 
empirical studies have been provided as evidence (Raine, 2002).  
The meta-analysis involving 32 effect sizes aimed to compare levels of noradrenaline 
in antisocial populations against that in control groups (Raine, 1993b). However, the results 





the antisocial groups did not differ from the comparison groups on levels of noradrenaline. It 
was only when the analysis was restricted to studies measuring noradrenaline from 
cerebrospinal fluid that a significant negative effect emerged (d = - 0.41, p < .05). 
Furthermore, when the analysis was limited only to studies measuring noradrenaline from 
urine samples, a significant positive effect size was reported (d = 0.19, p < .05). Therefore, 
the results of the cited meta-analysis are far from conclusive and do not lend the necessary 
support for the claim that antisocial populations have reduced levels of noradrenaline. 
The hypothesis was also backed by two other studies (Rogeness, Javors, Mass, & 
Macedo, 1990; Rogeness, Cepeda, Macedo, Fisher, & Harris, 1990) which were reported to 
have “found both reduced heart rate and reduced noradrenaline in conduct disordered 
children” (Raine, 2002, p. 420). However, the first study (Rogeness et al., 1990a) only 
compared age, heart rate, systolic, and diastolic blood pressure between two groups of 
children and adolescents admitted to a psychiatric hospital, those diagnosed with conduct 
disorder and those diagnosed with other disorders (such as depression, anxiety, and 
psychosis). Although heart rate was labelled as resting, it was actually measured on the day 
when the children were admitted to the hospital which was most likely a very stressful event 
for them. Therefore, it is questionable whether this measure represents a resting heart rate, or 
rather a heart rate reactivity to stress. Nevertheless, the results showed that children with 
conduct disorder indeed had lower heart rate in comparison to the other psychiatric patients, 
but noradrenaline level was not measured, and therefore this study cannot be taken as an 
evidence to support the hypothesis in question.  
The second study (Rogeness et al., 1990b) used a sample of boys admitted to the 
psychiatric hospital who were split into groups with high and low dopamine-β-hydroxylase 
(DβH) activity, which is an enzyme responsible for converting dopamine into noradrenaline. 
The groups were then compared with regards to psychiatric diagnoses, symptoms, and 
catecholamine levels. The results showed that indeed the low DβH group had more diagnosis 
of under-socialised conduct disorder and lower levels of several noradrenaline metabolites. 
However, this study cannot be taken as a proof in favour of the noradrenaline hypothesis. 
Firstly, the study did not include a measure of heart rate. Secondly, the ratios which were 
utilised as a proxy for noradrenaline function had not been previously verified as valid 
measures. Thirdly, the study did not test for an association between noradrenaline and 
symptoms of conduct disorder irrespective of the levels of DβH activity. Therefore, the 
evidence presented as supportive of the noradrenaline hypothesis does not seem to hold up 





noradrenaline accounts for the link between low heart rate and crime. Overall, the 
noradrenaline hypothesis seems to have little to offer to the explanation of the heart rate-
crime relationship in its current version. 
 
2.1.4. Right Hemisphere Functioning 
 
It has been proposed that the right hemisphere functioning may underlie both low 
heart rate and antisocial behaviour (Ortiz & Raine, 2004; Raine, 2002). The right hemisphere 
has been reported as dominant in regulating autonomic functions, along with findings of low 
heart rate accompanying reduced right hemisphere functioning. On the other hand, it has also 
been argued that poor functioning of the right hemisphere had been found in antisocial and 
violent individuals. The underlying mechanism connecting such brain deficits with criminal 
behaviour has been based on the approach-withdrawal model of the affect lateralization 
(Davidson, 1984, 1987, 1992). According to the model, the left anterior brain regions are 
associated with positive emotions and approach-related motivation, whereas the right anterior 
functioning is linked to the aversive emotions and withdrawal motivation. Therefore, it has 
been suggested that poor right hemisphere functioning is associated with low heart rate and 
deficient withdrawal system which would make people less cautions about potentially risky 
situations that could lead to antisocial behaviour. 
However, the right hemisphere hypothesis too has failed to provide a viable 
explanation of the relationship between heart rate and crime. The approach-withdrawal model 
is not widely accepted in neuroscience and it remains at a level of speculation (Gainotti, 
2019b, 2019a; Shankman & Klein, 2003). In fact, it has been subjected to much criticism, 
both on a theoretical and empirical level. The aspect of a model wherein it equates positive 
emotions with approach and negative emotions with withdrawal has been considered overly 
simplistic. For example, anger is a negative emotion, but it is related to the approach response 
and it has been associated with the left hemisphere activation which is not in line with the 
model’s predictions (Gainotti, 2019a; Russell & Barrett, 1999). On the empirical level, it has 
been argued that, on one hand, the majority of the studies supportive of the approach-
withdrawal model suffer from certain methodological issues, and on the other, there have 
been many findings from experimental and clinical studies which cannot be explained by the 
model (Gainotti, 2019a, 2019b; Killgore & Yurgelun-Todd, 2007). Therefore, the main 





even if the approach-withdrawal model would be somehow proven to be true, the right 
hemisphere hypothesis still does not provide a clear explanation how a deficient withdrawal 
system leads to criminal behaviour. 
Moreover, the two core assumptions of the hypothesis, that heart rate is controlled by 
the right hemisphere, and that antisocial individuals are characterized by decreased right 
hemisphere functioning, are also problematic. Although it has been indeed suggested in the 
past that the right hemisphere is dominant for the control of autonomic responses, heart rate 
included, the evidence seems to suggest that such view oversimplifies in fact a more complex 
model of regulation involving both parasympathetic and sympathetic responses which are 
drawing upon both hemispheres (Beissner, Meissner, Bär, & Napadow, 2013; Ghchime et al., 
2016; Hagemann, Waldstein, & Thayer, 2003; Oppenheimer, Gelb, Girvin, & Hachinski, 
1992; Wittling, Block, Genzel, & Schweiger, 1998). Similarly, there is ample evidence that 
antisocial behaviour and aggression are associated with brain deficits scattered across both 
hemispheres (Perach-Barzilay et al., 2013; Raine, Buchsbaum, & LaCasse, 1997; Yang & 
Raine, 2009). Therefore, the right hemisphere hypothesis seems unable to provide a viable 
underlying causal explanation of the relationship between low heart rate and antisocial 
behaviour. 
 
2.1.5. Vagal Tone 
 
Another proposed explanation of the link between low heart rate and crime is based 
on an increased vagal tone, which refers to the activity of the vagus nerve, a component of 
the parasympathetic nervous system which innervates the cardiac sinoatrial node (Raine, 
1993b, 2002). It had been suggested that high vagal tone causes low heart rate which was in 
turn a marker of passive coping reaction to a stressor. However, in the light of subsequent 
empirical data showing that antisocial behaviour was in contrast associated with a reduced 
vagal functioning, it was later hypothesized that low heart rate might be a result of the 
sympathetic underarousal given that all else being equal low vagal response would result in 
high heart rate (Raine, 2002). Therefore, the vagal tone hypothesis is flimsy and is neither 
supported by the empirical data, nor it provides a mechanism by which the vagal tone is 
associated with antisocial behaviour. 
However, recently there has been an attempt to revive the increased vagal activity 





occasion, a high heart rate variability, presumed to be a measure of vagal tone, and affiliated 
increases in the prefrontal executive functioning and inhibition have been put forward as an 
underlying mechanism of the association between low heart rate and crime. In sum, it has 
been hypothesised that antisocial individuals with low heart rate paradoxically have increased 
levels of inhibition and self-control. Presumed that such an account is correct, it has been 
suggested that low heart rate is in fact associated with proactive aggression, which, as it is 
premeditated and calculated, requires a high self-control. However, empirical data does not 
seem to support this hypothesis. Firstly, if anything, low heart rate seems to be associated 
with increased impulsivity, lower inhibition, and poorer cognitive ability (Bennett et al., 
2014; Bibbey et al., 2016; Choy et al., 2015; Gao, Borlam, & Zhang, 2015; Ginty, Phillips, 
Der, Deary, & Carroll, 2011; Mathias & Stanford, 2003; Schmidt et al., 2013). Secondly, low 
heart rate is associated with a range of antisocial behaviours, and not just premeditated crime 
and proactive aggression (see sections 1.2. and 1.3.). Finally, a study conducted with a 
specific aim to test the hypothesis by which a pattern of low resting heart rate and high heart 
rate variability is associated only with the proactive type of aggression only partly supported 
this prediction (Brzozowski et al., 2018). In a sample of 92 female university students, 
perpetrators of  interpersonal violence indeed exhibited lower resting heart rate and higher 
heart rate variability, as well as higher aggressive behaviour. However, contrary to the 
hypothesis, the relationship between resting heart rate and proactive aggression was non-
significant when reactive aggression was accounted for, and vice versa. Therefore, these 
findings seem to suggest that resting heart rate is associated with a general aggressive 
behaviour, and not solely with proactive aggression as the increased vagal tone hypothesis 
predicts. Overall, this review seems to indicate that this is an improbable description of the 
relationship between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour. 
 
2.1.6. Lower Limbic Hypoactivity and Autonomic Feedback  
 
Armstrong has suggested two explanations to account for the negative link between 
heart rate and antisocial behaviour (Armstrong, 2011). According to one model, the link is 
spurious with both variables being caused by a third factor, and the other model proposes that 






 2.1.6.1. Lower limbic hypoactivity. 
 
The first hypothesis states that both low resting heart rate and certain cognitive and 
affective features associated with antisocial behaviour are caused by a hypoactivity in the 
limbic areas, namely the amygdala, insular cortex, and anterior cingulate cortex (Armstrong, 
2011). Specifically, Armstrong argued that these areas are associated with heart rate on one 
hand, and on the other hand with both antisocial behaviour and a set of characteristics that, if 
deficient, may contribute to insensitivity to negative consequences for others, such as 
empathy for pain, fear conditioning, and emotion recognition. 
The rationale for the hypothesis was based on the central autonomic network, an 
internal regulation system in charge of the central control of autonomic activity, including the 
heart rate, as a function of maintaining homeostasis and responding to stress (Benarroch, 
1993, 1997; Thayer, Hansen, Saus-Rose, & Johnsen, 2009). It includes a system of 
interconnected brain areas that range from the prefrontal cortex, through the limbic system, 
down to the brain stem, including the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, insula, the central 
nucleus of the amygdala, hypothalamus, and the ventrolateral medulla. These areas control 
heart rate by sending inputs to the sinoatrial node, the heart’s natural pacemaker, through 
efferent neurons of the autonomic nervous system. Out of all the areas comprising the central 
autonomic network, Armstrong chose the amygdala, insular cortex, and anterior cingulate 
cortex, as key to understanding the low heart rate – antisocial behaviour link. He argued that 
empirical data had showed these regions were associated with both heart rate on one hand, 
and antisocial behaviour, psychopathy, and callous-unemotional traits, on the other hand. 
Furthermore, as hypoactivity of these central autonomic network structures had been linked 
to deficits in empathy, recognition of emotional expressions, experiencing one’s own 
emotions, fear conditioning, and sensitivity to another’s pain, Armstrong argued that the 
resulting insensitivity to the negative consequences for others was the underlying mechanism 
linking these affected brain areas to crime.  
In comparison to the previous hypotheses, Armstrong’s (2011) proposition is overall 
better developed, more detailed, and attempts to integrate research findings from different 
fields which is necessary if we seek to explain biosocial findings. However, his arguments 
have several major weaknesses. Firstly, a lack of sensitivity to other people’s pain is not a 
general cause of crime, and hence it cannot be a mechanism explaining the link between the 
brain, heart rate, and antisocial behaviour. There are many different types of antisocial 





is not a good explanatory mechanism even solely for the interpersonal antisocial behaviours 
(e.g., if a person is indeed insensitive to other people’s pain it does not mean he or she will be 
motivated and consider inflicting pain on others). Secondly, the rationale for excluding the 
prefrontal areas of the central autonomic network from the set of brain structures whose 
functioning may underlie the heart rate-crime link is unconvincing. Despite acknowledging 
that the prefrontal cortex is associated with both heart rate and antisocial behaviour, 
Armstrong (2011) argued it did not underlie the association between these variables for the 
following reasons: 
1. The prefrontal cortex was not associated with fear conditioning  
2. The prefrontal cortex was not part of the neural overlap between experiencing 
one’s own pain and observing pain in others 
3. The prefrontal cortex was not related to some of the features of psychopathy, 
such as a lack of concern for others 
4. Some studies had showed that psychopathic individuals may actually have 
increased prefrontal functioning 
5. Although dysfunction of the medial prefrontal cortex was associated with 
impulsive antisocial behaviour, it did not lead to the instrumental type which 
is “the hallmark of the psychopath” (Armstrong, 2011, p. 55) 
 
Putting aside the debate, although an important one, about the difference between fear 
conditioning and threat conditioning (see Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016; LeDoux, 2013, 2014) 
which was not acknowledged in the paper, the presented arguments do not make a case for 
excluding the prefrontal cortex, especially its orbitomedial2 area, as a potential neural 
underpinning linking low heart rate and antisocial behaviour. With regards to the first 
argument, this region of the prefrontal cortex has been in fact found to have an important role 
in fear/threat conditioning (Alvarez, Biggs, Chen, Pine, & Grillon, 2008; Birbaumer et al., 
2005; Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016; Hugdahl, 1998). Even more importantly, it is not at all 
clear why involvement in fear conditioning and experience of pain are the necessary features 
 
2 The terms orbitofrontal cortex and ventromedial prefrontal cortex have not been used consistently 
across the literature. They have been used interchangeably (e.g., Lough & Hodges, 2002; Zelazo & Müller, 
2002), to refer to distinct brain regions (e.g., Bouret & Richmond, 2010; Suchy, 2009), or, in some cases, the 
orbitofrontal cortex has been considered as a part of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (e.g., Rosenbloom et al., 
2012; Treiber, 2011). Therefore, it has been decided to use the term orbitomedial prefrontal cortex throughout 
this work as a compromise solution to label the orbital and medial regions of the prefrontal cortex. This term 






the brain structure must have to be eligible as a confounding factor explaining the heart rate-
antisocial behaviour link. Not only has the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex been associated 
with the cognitive and affective features emphasized by Armstrong, such as fear 
conditioning, empathy (Bzdok et al., 2012; Masten, Morelli, & Eisenberger, 2011; Rankin et 
al., 2006), and emotion recognition (Adolphs, 2002; Heberlein, Padon, Gillihan, Farah, & 
Fellows, 2008; Hornak et al., 2003), but it has also been related to the variables even more 
causally relevant to the criminal behaviour, such as decision-making (Bechara, 2004; 
Damasio, 1994; Wallis, 2007), moral reasoning (Boccia et al., 2017; Ciaramelli, Muccioli, 
Làdavas, & Di Pellegrino, 2007; Fumagalli & Priori, 2012; Koenigs et al., 2007; Raine & 
Yang, 2006), emotion regulation (Etkin, Büchel, & Gross, 2015; Hiser & Koenigs, 2018; 
Motzkin, Philippi, Wolf, Baskaya, & Koenigs, 2015; Quirk & Beer, 2006), guilt (Krajbich, 
Adolphs, Tranel, Denburg, & Camerer, 2009; Mclatchie, Giner-Sorolla, & Derbyshire, 2016; 
Wagner, N’Diaye, Ethofer, & Vuilleumier, 2011), and behavioural and cognitive inhibition 
(Horn, Dolan, Elliott, Deakin, & Woodruff, 2003; Hornberger et al., 2011; Szatkowska, 
Szymańska, Bojarski, & Grabowska, 2007).  
As with regards to the last three arguments, it seems that the author erroneously 
treated antisocial behaviour as identical to psychopathy. Even if the purpose was indeed to 
explain the link between heart rate and psychopathy, these arguments are misleading. 
Regarding the third argument, although one of the reviews cited in support of it (Blair, 
2007a) stated that the core functional impairments of psychopathy were more likely to be 
associated with the amygdala damage, rather than the orbitofrontal cortex impairments, the 
overall conclusion of the presented (supposedly) supportive reviews was that the disruption in 
integrated functioning of both the amygdala and the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex led to 
psychopathy (Blair, 2007a, 2007b). In addition, there is ample empirical evidence showing 
that psychopathy is indeed associated with structural and functional deficits in this specific 
brain area (Koenigs, 2012; Poppa & Bechara, 2015). 
As to the fourth argument, some studies have indeed found an increased prefrontal 
functioning in psychopathic individuals (Glenn & Raine, 2008), but this finding applies only 
to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex which is not a part of the central autonomic network, and 
hence it is irrelevant for the discussion. Finally, the fifth argument is erroneous, as 
psychopathy has been associated with both reactive and instrumental types of aggression  
(Blais, Solodukhin, & Forth, 2014). 
Most importantly, besides being inaccurate, the last three arguments are also 





antisocial behaviour, whereas these arguments refer to psychopathy instead. Although 
antisocial behaviour is arguably a part of psychopathy and these two phenomena are related, 
it would be a mistake to treat them as identical (Hare, 1996; Leistico, Salekin, DeCoster, & 
Rogers, 2008; Venables, Hall, & Patrick, 2014). In addition, criminality per se is not even a 
component of the psychopathy construct, although it might be associated with the 
psychopathic personality traits (Hare & Neumann, 2010). Therefore, the presented hypothesis 
has been a step forward in the overall discussion about factors that may explain the 
relationship between heart rate and crime. However, due to imprecise description of the 
underlying causal mechanisms and flawed choice of potential neural confounders, it does not 
offer a reasonable explanation of the relationship of interest. 
 
2.1.6.2. Autonomic feedback. 
 
This hypothesis proposes that low heart rate causes antisocial behaviour through the 
feedback regarding the peripheral bodily state that afferent neurons carry to the brain stem, 
limbic system, and the prefrontal cortex where it is then applied to the emotional and 
cognitive processes that influence behaviour (Armstrong, 2011). Specifically, the model 
outlines that the low heart rate causes crime through a lack of concern for others due to the 
inability to understand how one’s behaviour affects them. Failure to anticipate how would 
other people feel was attributed to a missing link between autonomic arousal that would 
normally accompany personal negative emotions and the signs of these emotions in others. It 
was further suggested that the reduced autonomic feedback might stem from the deficiencies 
in three potential sources: the amygdala, anterior cingulate cortex, and insular cortex, as areas 
responsible for generating autonomic arousal; afferent neurons of the autonomic nervous 
system which carry the feedback from periphery to the higher cortical structures; brain stem 
and cortical structures responsible for the central representation of autonomic feedback. 
In a subsequent article (Armstrong & Boutwell, 2012), the hypothesis was further 
specified such that the relationship between low heart rate and crime was suggested to be 
explained by a reduced autonomic feedback to the insular cortex, where the central 
representation of bodily state is taking place. As the insular cortex had been associated with 
empathy for pain and fear conditioning, it was argued that reduced arousal may lead to a 
reduction of anticipated unpleasant autonomic states which would follow the encounter with 





understand how one’s behaviour may influence other people and therefore lead to antisocial 
behaviour. 
The argumentation in favour of the causal effect of low heart rate does not seem 
compelling. Firstly, Armstrong (along with Boutwell in the subsequent article) constantly 
refers throughout both papers to the “reduced feedback”, when in fact there is only evidence 
that the heart rate is reduced, not the autonomic feedback. Secondly, the hypothesis is based 
on many unfounded assumptions. Although physiological arousal is indeed an important part 
of emotional experience, it is overly simplistic to equate autonomic bodily reactions with 
conscious feelings (LeDoux, 2013; LeDoux & Hofmann, 2018; LeDoux & Pine, 2016). There 
are many studies showing that an aversive stimulus can induce a physiological arousal in 
people without them experiencing negative emotions or even being aware of the stimulus 
itself (LeDoux, 2014, LeDoux & Pine, 2016). Similarly, individuals can significantly differ in 
their autonomic responses to stressful tasks without showing differences in emotional 
responses, that is, they would consciously experience the task as equally stressful (Bennett et 
al., 2014; Cox et al., 1983; Fairchild et al., 2008; O’Connor et al., 1985). Therefore, the 
underlying notion that physiological arousal causes emotions (and therefore behaviour) is too 
reductionistic. In addition, it completely disregards the role of cognitive processing in 
emotional experiences. Emotions arise from a cognitive evaluation of a situation that a person 
is a part of, wherein their autonomic arousal represents only one of many informational 
inputs that are being processed (LeDoux & Hofmann, 2018). Therefore, autonomic feedback 
only contributes to subjective feelings, but does not determine them. In addition, research 
does seem supportive of the role of the insular cortex in central representation of autonomic 
state, but there is no definitive proof for the notion that it in turn generates emotions (LeDoux 
& Hofmann, 2018).  
Similarly, the notion that people cannot understand how their antisocial actions affect 
others without experiencing attendant autonomic arousal is completely unfounded. Even if 
some people do not have an emotional reaction to the fact that their behaviour may result in 
negative consequences for others, there is no reason to believe that they cannot understand 
this on a cognitive level. Put differently, they may not care whether their antisocial actions 
hurt other people, but they would still be able to understand that such behaviour has adverse 
consequences for them (Cima, Tonnaer, & Hauser, 2010). 
Therefore, this hypothesis seems untenable, as its two core assumptions, that 





understand consequences of their behaviour without experiencing physiological 
arousal/emotions, are simply incorrect. 
 
2.2. Empirical Testing of the Proposed Theoretical Hypotheses 
 
Research regarding the link between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour has been 
predominantly focused on replicating the results of their association across different 
methodological designs. Unfortunately, there has been little effort to empirically verify the 
potential theoretical explanations accounting for the existence of this relationship. Out of all 
proposed mechanisms, only the stimulation-seeking and fearlessness hypotheses have gained 
ground in the field and are often presented as potential explanations in the literature, but 
without a strong empirical backing. Thus far, there have been only five studies exploring 
which personality trait mediates the link between low heart rate and crime. Out of these, four 
studies have concluded it was the stimulation-seeking that accounted for the link (Hammerton 
et al., 2018; Portnoy et al., 2019, 2014; Sijtsema et al., 2010), and one study reported in 
favour of the fearlessness hypothesis (Armstrong & Boutwell, 2012). However, certain 
methodological concerns and the actual statistical results make these findings unconvincing. 
The first study (Sijtsema et al., 2010), which reported that stimulation-seeking and not 
fearlessness explained the link between low heart rate and rule-breaking behaviour, used an 
inappropriate measure as a proxy for fearlessness. Specifically, it used a measure of 
behavioural inhibition even though such an instrument would be more suitable for an 
assessment of self-control. Furthermore, no mediation effects were found in a female 
subsample. In a male subsample, out of six models testing the mediation effects of 
stimulation-seeking and fearlessness measured at three different time points (at ages 11, 13.5, 
and 16), only one model yielded statistically significant results, showing that stimulation-
seeking partially mediated the link between heart rate and rule-breaking behaviour at age 16.  
The subsequent study aimed to compare the mediation effects of sensation-seeking 
and fearlessness in a relationship between antisocial behaviour and heart rate measured at rest 
and in response to a social stress task and a cognitive task (Portnoy et al., 2014). Both tasks 
failed to elicit autonomic responses and therefore all heart rate measures were combined into 
a single latent variable. The study concluded that the only significant mediator was 





explained only 36% and 27% of the total effect3 of heart rate on aggression and non-violent 
delinquency, respectively. The indirect effect of heart rate on aggression rendered the direct 
effect non-significant, but in case of the model predicting non-violent delinquency, the direct 
effect of heart rate remained significant. Furthermore, the measure of stimulation-seeking 
used in the study has been criticised for including impulsivity items and therefore does not 
represent a valid measure (Steinberg et al., 2008). 
Thus far, there has been only one study which concluded that its results were 
supportive of the fearlessness and not the stimulation-seeking model of the relationship 
between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour (Armstrong & Boutwell, 2012). In this study, 
participants were given three scenarios describing situations in which a person committed a 
crime, namely an assault, drunk driving, or a theft, after which they were asked to assess the 
likelihood they would commit each of the crimes as the protagonists in the scenarios did. 
Given that the mediators were considered in light of the rational choice theory, tendency to 
underestimate costs and overvalue benefits of antisocial behaviour were used as proxy 
measures for fearlessness and stimulation-seeking, respectively. Specifically, fearlessness 
was measured using questions in which participants assessed the likelihood of getting 
arrested and convicted should they commit the crime and the extent to which the arrest and 
conviction would cause problems to them, as well as whether they would experience guilt or 
shame should they commit the crime and the extent these emotions would impose a problem 
for them. Stimulation-seeking was assessed by asking participants to assess how much fun 
would it be to commit the crimes as described in the scenarios. The results showed that low 
resting heart4 was associated with lower perceived likelihood of arrest and conviction 
aggregated across all scenarios, but not with the tendency to anticipate committing the 
described crimes as fun. The anticipated guilt and shame significantly mediated the link 
between low heart rate and likelihood to commit the assault as described in the scenario. On 
the basis of these results, the authors concluded that the study was supportive of the 
fearlessness hypothesis. 
 
3This is not to suggest a causal effect of heart rate on antisocial behaviour. Phrases such as “total effect 
of heart rate on antisocial behaviour” used here and throughout the thesis should be considered solely in the 
context of describing statistical relationships within a mediation model. 
4 Resting heart rate was not used as a continuous variable in the analyses. Instead, the authors created 
two groups of participants based on their heart rate and used this binary variable in the further analyses. Low 
resting heart rate consisted of participants who had an average resting heart rate under one standard deviation 
below the sample’s mean (n = 26), and the remainder of the participants were allocated to the other group (n = 





However, certain features of the study design inherently limit the conclusions drawn 
by the authors. Firstly, the choice of the theoretical framework the study was based upon is 
arguable, as the rational choice theory has been heavily criticised from both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives (Kahneman, 2011; Kroneberg, Heintze, & Mehlkop, 2010; Treiber, 
2017a; Wikström & Treiber, 2016). Secondly, the validity of the instruments used to measure 
the mediators, especially fearlessness, is highly questionable. There has been no evidence 
offered to support the assumption that fearless individuals tend to underestimate the costs of 
their actions. Fearlessness refers to a lack of emotional response to an aversive situation, 
which does not necessarily imply that a fearless person is not cognitively aware of the 
potential consequences associated with committing a crime. The assumption that the 
anticipation of low guilt and shame reflects fearlessness is also highly problematic. Finally, 
generalizability of the findings is arguable as they were based on a relatively small sample of 
undergraduate students attending criminology courses (N = 151). Therefore, this study does 
not seem to provide a significant support for the fearlessness hypothesis given the 
methodological concerns outlined here. Furthermore, the statistically significant associations 
between low heart rate and anticipated costs of committing crimes were not replicated across 
all scenarios and measures of cost. 
Finally, two recent studies have also explored the role of other potential mediators, 
namely self-control and callous-unemotional traits (Hammerton et al., 2018; Portnoy et al., 
2019). One study explored fearlessness, stimulation-seeking, and self-control as potential 
mediators of the relationship between heart rate and antisocial behaviour (Portnoy et al., 
2019). The results showed that both stimulation-seeking and self-control, but not fearlessness, 
mediated the link. However, the study assessed only academic dishonesty as an outcome 
variable, a very niche type of antisocial behaviour. Furthermore, the sample included a small 
number of undergraduate students (N = 137) and the mediation analyses were conducted only 
in a female subsample (n = 90). In addition, the measure of stimulation-seeking was 
inadequate as it has been criticised for including impulsivity items (Steinberg et al., 2008). 
Another notable finding from this study was that the resting heart rate showed a significant 
positive association only with self-control, whereas it was unrelated to stimulation-seeking 
and fearlessness.  
The final study explored the role of stimulation-seeking and callous-unemotional 
traits as potential mediators of the relationship between resting heart rate and antisocial 
behaviour in a large sample of more than 4000 people (Hammerton et al., 2018). Lower 





the effect of heart rate on antisocial behaviour in mid-adolescence was significantly mediated 
through stimulation-seeking. However, the indirect effect of stimulation-seeking on the 
relationship between heart rate in childhood and antisocial behaviour in early adulthood was 
not statistically significant.  
As demonstrated throughout this chapter, none of the existing proposals have been 
able to provide a viable explanation of the relationship between low heart rate and antisocial 
behaviour. In addition, there has been little attempt to empirically verify these theoretical 
explanations, as the scarce empirical research primarily targeted stimulation-seeking and 
fearlessness hypotheses as the most prominent models in the literature. The limited data 
available thus far have yielded mixed results, which is unsurprising given the theoretical 
drawbacks of these hypotheses. Overall, these findings seem to favour the stimulation-
seeking theory, but they are far from conclusive as they either only partly explain the 
relationship between heart rate and antisocial behaviour, or have certain methodological 
characteristics which make their interpretation ambiguous. Therefore, this review of 
theoretical and empirical aspects of the proposed explanations suggests that there is a need to 
develop a better model of the relationship between heart rate and crime. In the next chapter, 
this association will be critically assessed and placed within the context of a criminological 
theory which offers a satisfactory model of crime causation. This will represent the 
foundation of a new model of the relationship between low heart rate and crime which will 
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3.1. Low Heart Rate: A Cause or Correlate of Crime? 
 
One of the most important features of any heart rate-crime relationship model is 
whether it positions heart rate as a cause or merely a correlate of crime. In some hypotheses, 
low heart rate is considered as a marker of a presumed cause of crime. For example, the 
fearlessness hypothesis views heart rate as an indicator of a factor that leads to crime. 
Specifically, heart rate is a marker of a lack of fear which facilitates antisocial and criminal 
behaviours. On the other hand, some hypotheses have proposed that low heart rate itself 
causes crime through different mechanisms. For instance, in the stimulation-seeking and 
autonomic feedback hypotheses, low heart rate causes crime by inducing a need for thrill-
seeking behaviour and an inability to understand negative consequences that antisocial 
behaviour can cause for others, respectively.  
Correct specification of whether the low heart rate represents a marker or a cause of 
crime is not only important for theoretical purposes, but also because it has profound 
implications for designing intervention techniques to tackle antisocial behaviour. For 
example, one of the proposed clinical implications of the possibility that low heart rate causes 
crime is that underaroused children with conduct disorder could benefit from a stimulant 
treatment as it has been found to reduce antisocial behaviour and increase heart rate (Ortiz & 
Raine, 2004). Similarly, it has been proposed that a biofeedback technique which aims to 
increase heart rate could be used as an intervention strategy to reduce aggression (Raine, 
1996b; Raine & Liu, 1998). With regards to the stimulation-seeking hypothesis, some authors 
have suggested that an intervention programme addressing antisocial behaviour in individuals 
with low heart rate should focus on teaching them prosocial methods to increase their arousal 
and satisfy the need for stimulation without engaging in illegal acts (Hammerton et al., 2018; 
Portnoy et al., 2014). It is hence necessary to correctly specify the relationship between heart 
rate and crime, in order to avoid promoting inaccurate intervention and prevention 
programmes. If an intervention method is based on wrong assumptions, at best it can be 
ineffective and waste financial resources and time. However, consequences may be more 
severe, especially if proposed interventions involve use of unnecessary and potentially 
harmful medications. Therefore, it is essential that an explanatory model correctly specifies 
whether heart rate is a cause or just a correlate of antisocial behaviour. 
It has been suggested before (Wikström, 2014), and it will be further argued here, that 
low heart rate cannot be a cause of crime. At best, it can only be a marker of a cause. If 





crime as well. In addition to establishing causation through experimental procedures, a 
theoretical analysis should be able to provide an explanation of such a link, that is, to outline 
a plausible underlying mechanism (Wikström, 2012). If low heart rate indeed causes crime, 
then when someone’s heart rate decreases (due to good fitness levels, medication, 
mindfulness, etc.), it should result in a higher individual tendency towards committing crime. 
From everyday experience, we know this is not the case. Professional athletes in general have 
a low resting heart rate due to the enlarged and hence more efficient hearts (Oakley, 2001; 
Serra-Grima, Puig, Doñate, Gich, & Ramon, 2008), but there is no evidence that they are 
more likely to engage in antisocial and criminal behaviours. Similarly, hypnosis and 
meditation have been found to decrease heart rate (De La Cruz et al., 2019), but there have 
been no reports that such practices lead to criminal behaviour. Moreover, some studies have 
actually suggested that practising meditation could reduce antisocial behaviour and criminal 
recidivism (Bleick & Abrams, 1987; Himelstein, 2011; Jones, Clayborne, Grant, & 
Rutherford, 2003; Orme-Johnson, 2011). 
 Furthermore, alcohol has been a known correlate of antisocial behaviour and research 
has repeatedly shown that a significant number of offenders had been intoxicated at the time 
of committing crime (Felson & Staff, 2011; Martin, 2001; Pajevic, Batinic, & Stevanovic, 
2017). Experimental manipulation has also confirmed that increased alcohol intake is 
followed by a higher aggressive behaviour in both women and men (Duke, Giancola, Morris, 
Holt, & Gunn, 2011). However, alcohol also stimulates the sympathetic nervous system 
activity and increases heart rate levels which is quite the opposite of what the idea of low 
heart rate as a cause of crime would predict (Brunner et al., 2017; Sagawa et al., 2011; Spaak 
et al., 2008). 
Similarly, use of medication which causes heart rate to decrease, such as beta 
blockers, should also result in an increased antisocial behaviour as a side-effect amongst the 
medicated patients. Not only this is not the case, but if anything beta blockers have been 
found to reduce aggressive behaviour (Haspel, 1995; Silver et al., 1999). A similar argument 
would apply to certain medical conditions associated with low heart rate as well. For 
example, hyperthyroidism is an endocrinological disorder caused by excessive production of 
thyroid hormone which also includes symptoms of rapid heart rate (World Health 
Organization, 1992). However, increased thyroid hormone levels have been associated with 
higher criminal recidivism and aggression, even though it also increases resting heart rate 





In sum, there are no experimental data showing that change in heart rate leads to a 
change in personal propensity to commit crimes, nor there is a viable theoretical model that 
could offer a mechanism through which heart rate causes crime. Therefore, there is a strong 
case that heart rate should be explored only as a marker, and not the cause, of antisocial and 
criminal behaviour. 
 
3.2. Choosing a Theoretical Framework: Why Situational Action Theory? 
 
In order to interpret research findings and propose a model that would provide a 
viable explanation of the link between heart rate and crime, we need the guidance of a well-
developed and empirically supported theoretical framework which offers a precise 
description of causal processes leading to crime. However, criminology offers an abundance 
of theories given equal attention yet which cannot possibly all be valid. Thirty years ago, it 
was noted that “despite the enormous volume of quantitative research, there has been no 
substantial progress in falsifying the criminology theories that existed 20 years ago” 
(Bernard, 1990, p. 347). Fast forward decades later and criminology is still a fragmented 
discipline which has not made significant scientific progress as it has neither advanced in 
negative learning, that is, falsifying theories and rejecting those which are not viable, nor in 
positive learning, that is, accumulating supportive knowledge in context of another theory to 
a point where it is no longer questioned and becomes a generally accepted theoretical 
framework (Bruinsma, 2016; Weisburd & Piquero, 2008). Criminological theories are 
characterised by several major problems that have hindered the emergence of a common 
theoretical framework which would explain crime and offer much needed means of 
separating causal from correlational relationships. 
Firstly, there is not even an agreement about what criminology aims to explain, 
simply put, what crime actually is (Wikström, 2010, 2012, 2017; Wikström, Oberwittler, 
Treiber, & Hardie, 2012). The starting point of any theory should be a clear statement about 
what is the object of explanation. Without this prerequisite, it is hard to imagine how a theory 
would be able to explain why crime happens and what the relevant causal factors are. The 
surprising lack of a generally accepted definition of crime is a consequence of the fact that 
criminological theories have rarely found it necessary to include a clear definition of crime. 
Few of those which have put effort into defining their object of interest have offered a 





of force and fraud undertaken in the pursuit of self-interest” (Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990, p. 
15), which is not an acceptable definition of crime for several reasons. Firstly, a motivation 
for committing crime should not be incorporated into the definition of crime (i.e., it confuses 
explanation and definition). Secondly, as the authors argue that all human action is conducted 
in self-interest, this does not represent a distinguishing feature of criminal behaviour. Next, it 
is hard to argue that all crimes are conducted in self-interest (e.g., taking part in a fight to 
defend a friend, aiding and abetting). Finally, there are other crimes which do not involve 
elements of fraud and force (e.g., drug possession/trafficking, probation violation, 
solicitation, drunk driving; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). It is hard to imagine how a theory 
would explain any phenomenon without firstly defining what it aims to explain. 
Secondly, most criminological theories do not address the question of how crime 
happens, that is, by which causal processes (Wikström et al., 2012; Wikström, 2010). If a 
theory does not specify an action mechanism that brings about crime, it cannot answer what 
causes crime and how to prevent it. Therefore, it is not surprising that most theories are 
fundamentally probabilistic. In essence, they list factors that increase the likelihood of crime 
occurrence without actually explaining what moves people to engage in breaking the law 
(Treiber, 2017a). Even though the majority of criminological theories have not outlined the 
process which explains how crime happens, several prominent theories have adopted a 
rational choice perspective as their chosen action mechanism (Treiber, 2017a). However, this 
comes with its own problems. Specifically, such an approach deals only with the process of 
choice in a way which disregards the fact that people do not make a choice between all 
objectively possible options, but only between those which they personally perceive. 
Therefore, understanding how people come to see their action options and when a crime 
becomes an action alternative are more fundamental questions to the explanation of crime as 
the relevance of choice process depends on it. Furthermore, decision-making is not an 
unidimensional process, but rather consists of two distinct systems referred to as rational 
choice and habitual choice (Evans & Frankish, 2009; Kahneman, 2011; Treiber, 2017a). 
Rational choice theory focuses only on the former, whereas the latter process, which is 
automatic, fast, and used more frequently in everyday life, is completely neglected. Finally, 
the rational choice approach is based on the assumption that people’s actions are driven 
solely by self-interest, which represents a gross oversimplification of human motivation (for 
details, see Treiber, 2017a; Wikström & Treiber, 2016). Therefore, criminological theories 
mostly do not specify action mechanism that brings about crime, and those that do focus only 





occasionally and under specific conditions, and hence cannot represent a general action 
mechanism. 
Thirdly, in general, criminological theories aim to explain one of two core empirical 
findings; that the distribution of crime in a population is highly skewed such that a small 
number of people commit majority of crimes, and that there are crime hotspots (i.e., crimes 
are concentrated in space and time; Wikström, Mann, & Hardie, 2018). Therefore, there is a 
division in criminology between person-oriented theories that aim to explain the former and 
the environment-oriented theories which focus on the latter (Wikström et al., 2012; 
Wikström, 2010). Person-oriented theories aim to explain why some people are more likely 
to engage in criminal activities than others, but fail to acknowledge the necessity of certain 
environmental features to trigger the criminogenic characteristics of a person (e.g., 
Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). On the other hand, the environment-oriented theories focus on 
why some settings are more criminogenic than others, but neglect the role of an individual 
and relevant personal factors (e.g., Sampson, 2006). However, every action is a result of an 
interaction between a person and a setting, and neither approach can explain crime by 
focusing on only one side of the coin. As crime happens only when certain people come into 
contact with certain settings, there is a need to integrate the knowledge from both types of 
theories. 
Next, criminological theories usually lack a precise delineation between direct and 
indirect causes of crime. Many theories operate on very different levels of explanation, and 
therefore it is necessary to bridge micro and macro levels of explanation by making a 
theoretical system which will feature a clear distinction between a situational level of 
explanation where the interplay between personal and environmental factors directly causes 
crime, and a developmental level which involves wider social factors and individual life 
history features that affect crime indirectly, through their effects on the direct causes of crime 
(i.e., the causes of the causes). The latter cannot account for what causes crime, but they can 
help explain critical questions such as how people acquire different crime propensities, why 
some settings become more criminogenic than others, and how different people come to be 
exposed to different environments (Wikström, 2006; Wikström et al., 2012). Therefore, 
indirect causal factors are indispensable to understanding the emergence, development, and 
change in the direct causes of crime. In order to understand how crime happens and how to 
prevent it, it is necessary to develop insights about both direct and indirect causal factors 





Finally, empirical testing remains a sore spot for criminological theory. A majority of 
theories have never been subjected to empirical verification (Bruinsma, 2016). Very often it 
is impossible to falsify them as they are described in vague terms from which precise 
predictions cannot be derived, with even the key concepts defined ambiguously (e.g., as in 
routine activity theory). If a falsification attempt has been made, it is rare that theories are 
tested using studies specifically designed for that purpose which raises a question of how 
valid the measures are of their core concepts (Bruinsma, 2016). Given the level of 
fragmentation in criminology and disinterest in falsification, it is not surprising that most 
theories do not have a good track record of explaining crime. An analysis of studies aiming to 
test criminological theories published between 1968 and 2005 has shown that most of the 
variance in crime remains unexplained, with a quarter of the studies explaining less than 20% 
of variation (Weisburd & Piquero, 2008). Such a low explanatory power was found despite 
the fact that many studies artificially inflated R2 values through model overspecification, 
statistical manipulation5, and inclusion of control variables. However, even more troubling is 
that it seems that there had not been any improvement in explaining crime over the course of 
almost 40 years. The finding that theories have often left around 80% to 90% of variance in 
crime unexplained, could be interpreted as another call for criminology to integrate its 
dispersed knowledge.  
Given the overall state of criminological theory and research, the frequent confusion 
of causes and correlates is not surprising. It is hard to disentangle which few of all the 
hundreds of crime correlates have causal properties without relying on a precise analytical 
framework which delineates a complete system of direct causal factors and how they bring 
about crime. However, there is a theory that can offer a productive analytical framework for 
understanding the relationship between heart rate and crime. Namely, situational action 
theory is a general theory of crime causation which has been specifically designed to address 
all of the above-mentioned problems in criminology (Wikström, 2006, 2010; Wikström et al., 
2012). It offers a viable definition of crime; it is centred around an action mechanism which 
integrates personal and environmental causal factors; it makes a distinction between direct 
and indirect causes of crime. Furthermore, this theory has not only integrated the person- and 
environment-oriented perspectives in criminology, but it has also incorporated insights from 
other disciplines, including neuroscience and biology, which is particularly important if we 
 
5 An example of statistical manipulation would be adding prior crime involvement in a model, even 






are to understand the findings from biosocial research (Treiber, 2013, 2017; Wikström & 
Treiber, 2007).  
In addition, as falsification was one of the main concerns in the development of 
situational action theory, it offers a detailed and testable framework where all the concepts 
and their relationships are precisely defined so that specific predictions can be derived 
(Wikström & Treiber, 2016). The theory was developed alongside a large longitudinal study, 
Peterborough adolescent and young adult development study (PADS+), which was 
specifically designed to test its core premises (Wikström et al., 2012). The study has followed 
a random sample of 716 young people from Peterborough, which represented a third of that 
age cohort, since 2003 when they were 12 years old. In the first wave, participants’ parents 
were interviewed to collect data about the family’s social situation at the time and 
retrospective data about participants’ childhood. Participants were then interviewed in the 
next eight waves, starting with the first wave in adolescence (at age 13), and having the latest 
wave in their early adulthood (at age 24). The study is characterised by high retention rates 
(97% up to 2010; 91% up to 2015), innovative methodology (specifically the use of the 
space-time budget, see Wikström, Ceccato, Hardie, & Treiber, 2010; Wikström et al., 2012), 
and excellence in data quality (questionnaire data were collected in interviewer-led small 
groups of four students; psychometric tests and space-time budget were conducted in one-to-
one sessions; data were supplemented with information from the official sources, including 
criminal justice agencies). Data referred to participants’ personal characteristics, 
environmental features, and their interaction (i.e., participant’s exposure to settings with 
specific characteristics), and were collected from different sources using many types of 
instruments. Figure 3.1. depicts an overview of methodology used in PADS+. The results of 
the subsequent analyses involving PADS+ data have offered a firm support for the theory 







Figure 3.1. Overview of Peterborough adolescent and young adult development study 
methodology. Adapted from “Social disadvantage and crime: A criminological puzzle” by P. 
O. H. Wikström and K. Treiber, 2016, American Behavioral Scientist, 60(10), p. 1238. 
 
Furthermore, the theory has received empirical support from other studies conducted 
either independently or as full replications across several countries (Hirtenlehner & Hardie, 
2016; Hirtenlehner & Kunz, 2016; Pauwels, Svensson, & Hirtenlehner, 2018; Serrano-
Maíllo, 2018; Svensson, Pauwels, & Weerman, 2010; Wikström & Svensson, 2010). In 
addition to explaining different types of crimes, from shoplifting to terrorism, it has also 
proven useful for understanding other criminological phenomena, such as radicalization, 
political extremism, gender gap in crime, cross-national differences in violence, and the 
paradoxical relationship between social disadvantage and crime (Hirtenlehner & Treiber, 
2017; Perry, Wikström, & Roman, 2018; Schils & Pauwels, 2014, 2016; Wikström & 
Bouhana, 2017; Wikström & Svensson, 2008; Wikström & Treiber, 2016b). Therefore, 
situational action theory promises to offer a suitable theoretical framework through which the 
relationship between low heart rate and criminal behaviour can be explained. 
 
3.3. Analysing Crime: Situational Action Theory 
 
Situational action theory (Wikström, 2006, 2010, 2012, 2014, 2019b; Wikström et al., 
2012; Wikström & Treiber, 2007, 2016a) is a dynamic (i.e., emphasises the situational 





which aims to provide an explanation for all types of crimes. Although there has been some 
scepticism regarding whether a general theory is possible at all in criminology given the stark 
differences between various crimes (Wilson & Herrnstein, 1985), situational action theory 
has provided a rather elegant solution to this issue. Namely, the theory defines crime as 
actions that breach moral rules of conduct defined in law, wherein the concept of moral rules 
refers to rules regarding what is right or wrong to do, or not to do, in particular circumstances 
(Wikström, 2006, 2010, 2014). Crime is therefore analysed as a moral action, not a specific 
content. It represents a part of a wider category of moral rule breaches which refer to both 
formal and informal rules established by different sources (e.g., parliament, family, gangs, 
different clubs, societies, and associations). Law is one of many sets of moral rules that can 
guide people’s actions and it covers various acts with little in common. In addition, crimes 
also differ across countries, jurisdictions, and time (e.g., cannabis possession for personal use 
has been decriminalised in the Netherlands since the 1970s, but it had been criminalised 
beforehand, and is still criminalised in the majority of other countries; Graham, 2001; Reuter, 
2010). The only thing that all crimes in all places and at all times have in common is that they 
are acts of breaking rules stated in law. By focusing on what all crimes have in common (i.e., 
the process of rule-breaking), instead of what makes them different (i.e., the content of 
different crimes), situational action theory is able to explain any type of crime. Therefore, 
explaining why crime happens means explaining why people follow and breach rules of 
conduct, not why they do specific acts (e.g., steal a phone, sell drugs, or assault someone). 
The major advantage of having a general theoretical framework is that it can be applied to 
any type of crime, from shoplifting to genocide, as the causal process is always the same 
(Hirtenlehner & Treiber, 2017; Schils & Pauwels, 2014, 2016; Wikström, 2019b; Wikström 
& Treiber, 2009a; Wikström et al., 2011). 
 
3.3.1. The Core Framework 
 
Crime is an outcome of a perception-choice process which results from the interaction 
between a person’s crime propensity and exposure to criminogenic places (Wikström, 2010, 
2012, 2014; Wikström et al., 2012; Wikström & Treiber, 2017). It will happen once a person 
sees crime as an option and then chooses to act upon it either automatically or after some 
deliberation in a particular situation. People vary in their crime propensity, that is, tendency 





the same setting, a person with high crime propensity is more likely to commit a crime than a 
person with low crime propensity. In addition, the same individual can have different 
propensities for different crimes. For example, they may have a high tendency to steal, but a 
low propensity for violence. However, even a very high crime propensity is not enough to 
cause crime on its own. People are indeed the sources of their actions, but the causes of 
criminal acts are always situational, in the sense that they happen at the point of convergence 
between a person and environment (Wikström, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019b; Wikström & 
Treiber, 2016a). Crime propensity needs to be triggered by exposure to a criminogenic 
setting; and criminogenic exposure is only significant in an interaction with a person with 
adequate crime propensity. People with high crime propensity will not commit crimes in 
every single setting, but only when exposed to those with a certain level of criminogenic 
features; and people with low propensity are unlikely to commit crimes even when they take 
part in a highly criminogenic environment. In certain situations, crime propensity will be a 
more influential factor, and at other times it will be the criminogenic exposure, but there will 
always be at least a minimal interaction between the two. Therefore, crime is never a result of 
either personal or environmental features, but it is always a consequence of their interaction. 
The perception-choice process provides an analytical framework to determine which 
factors can have the capacity to cause and, in a like manner, prevent crime. The causes of 
crime are only those variables that can directly influence a person to see and choose an act of 
crime as an action alternative in a specific situation (Wikström, 2006, 2012, 2017; Wikström 
et al., 2012). Therefore, only individual crime propensity and criminogenic features of 
settings can be considered as causes of crime. Crime propensity depends on an individual’s 
morality and ability to exercise self-control. A setting is as criminogenic as its (perceived) 
moral norms and their enforcement (monitoring and sanctioning of moral norm violations) 
encourage, or at least do not discourage, criminal activity. This is not to say that the influence 
of higher-level social factors (e.g., inequality), and developmental processes and life history 
of an individual (e.g., neurocognitive factors) is not relevant. These factors can affect the 
perception-choice process indirectly through their effect on crime propensity and exposure to 
criminogenic settings, and therefore are best analysed as the “causes of the causes” 
(Wikström, 2014, 2019a; Wikström et al., 2012; Wikström & Treiber, 2007, 2009b). In the 
subsequent paragraphs, only features of situational action theory related to individual factors 
will be explored in more detail as it is expected that the heart rate link to crime is through 





3.3.2. Crime Propensity 
 
An individual’s crime propensity is comprised of their moral rules and attached moral 
emotions, and the ability to exercise self-control (Wikström, 2004, 2010, 2014; Wikström et 
al., 2012, 2011; Wikström & Svensson, 2008, 2010; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). The more 
one’s personal moral rules match the rules of law, the lower will be their tendency to commit 
crime. However, it is not only important what one thinks is right and wrong to do in 
particular circumstances (i.e., what moral rules they hold), but also how much one cares 
about adhering to such norms. If one holds a moral rule but would not feel bad if 
transgressing, then such moral rule could be easily breached if an appropriate environmental 
inducement appeared. Therefore, the strength of moral rules depends on the intensity of 
accompanying moral emotions of guilt and shame. The more one would feel bad in front of 
oneself (guilty) or others (ashamed) in case of breaching a moral rule one holds, the less 
likely it will be that the person will violate the norm in question.  
Although morality represents the core of crime propensity, the ability to exercise self-
control is important in situations when criminogenic features of a setting strongly encourage 
breaking a moral rule a person holds (Hirtenlehner & Hardie, 2016; Wikström et al., 2012; 
Wikström & Svensson, 2010; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). The stronger a person’s ability to 
exercise self-control, the more likely it will be that the person will follow their moral rules 
even in situations when there is a strong external incitement to do the contrary. The ability to 
resist environmental pressure to act against one’s moral norm mainly depends on one’s 
executive functions, but it can be also temporarily diminished by certain factors such as drug 
or alcohol intoxication, strong emotions, or prolonged period of stress. The term “executive 
functions” has been loosely applied across the literature to a number of top-down cognitive 
functions supported by the prefrontal cortex, such as inhibition, selective attention, working 
memory, interference control, and abstract reasoning (Diamond, 2013; Wikström & Treiber, 
2007). In situational action theory, executive capabilities have been specifically defined as a 
set of cognitive functions that enable a person to create and apply internal representations to 
decision-making process, where the concept of internal representations refer to an 
informational framework composed of an integration between a person’s internal knowledge 
stemming from past experiences and external sensory information coming from the 






3.3.3. Crime as Situational Action: The Perception-Choice Process 
 
A perception-choice process is always initiated by motivation. There are two types of 
crime-related motivators: a temptation, which is a result of interaction between one’s desires 
(or commitments) and opportunities to satisfy a desire (or fulfil a commitment), and a 
provocation, which happens when an external interference makes one angry or annoyed with 
its perceived source or a substitute (Wikström, 2004, 2014; Wikström et. al., 2012; Wikström 
& Treiber, 2007, 2009a, 2016a). As a general rule, temptations are followed by positive 
emotions, whereas provocations are associated with negative emotions. However, motivation 
is necessary to trigger the causal process, but it is not a sufficient factor in crime causation as 
it cannot explain why crime happens. If a person is not motivated to commit a crime, it will 
certainly not happen. A person needs to be motivated to commit a crime in the first place in 
order for it to occur, but the motivation itself can only be a reason for an act, not its cause. 
There are no particular motives that always cause a specific crime or that are unique to a 
specific crime (e.g., aggravated assault can happen for many different reasons), and there are 
usually different ways to satisfy the same motive with crime being only one of the possible 
means (e.g., assaulting a person who spilt a beer over us is only one of many possible 
reactions to such a situation).  
Appropriate motivation will set the ground for crime, but it will only be realised if a 
person sees crime as an action alternative and then chooses to act upon it. What a person sees 
as a viable response to a particular motivation depends on an interaction between their 
personal morality and perceived moral norms of a place in which the person takes part. This 
interaction creates a moral filter which determines what action alternatives a person will 
perceive (Wikström, 2010, 2014, 2019b; Wikström et al., 2012). If an actor’s personal 
morality and perceived moral norms of their environment both discourage breaking the law 
when reacting to a particular temptation or provocation, then it is unlikely they will see crime 
as an option. However, if moral aspects of both an individual and their setting encourage 
breaking the rule of conduct, then the person will most probably see crime as a viable 
response to a particular motivation. This relationship is referred to in situational action theory 
as a principle of moral correspondence (Wikström, 2010, 2014, 2019b; Wikström et al., 2012; 
Wikström & Treiber, 2009a). 
If a person does not even see crime as a viable course of action in response to a 





for such an outcome (Wikström, 2014, 2019b; Wikström et al., 2012). Perception of response 
options precedes and determines the relevance of the process of choice, and it is, therefore, 
more fundamental to the crime causation. In fact, the main reason why the majority of people 
do not commit crimes in response to temptations and provocations they encounter is that they 
do not perceive crime as an option in the first place, and not because they actively choose not 
to commit a crime or because they refrain themselves from breaking the law (Wikström, 
2004, 2006; Wikström et al., 2012, 2011). If, however, a person sees crime as an action 
alternative, whether crime will happen or not will depend on the process of choice. 
Integrating and building up on the knowledge base from criminology, behavioural sciences, 
and neuroscience, situational action theory proposes that there are two types of choice 
processes: a habitual choice and a rational deliberate choice (Treiber, 2011; Wikström, 2004, 
2014 2019b; Wikström et al., 2012). When people act out of habit, they perceive only one 
action alternative and automatically choose to carry it out without any deliberation (Treiber, 
2011; Wikström, 2014, 2019b; Wikström et al., 2012; Wikström & Treiber, 2007, 2016a). 
Essentially, a person automatically reacts to an external cue which triggers previously learned 
associations through repeated exposure to the same or similar circumstances. Therefore, a 
habitual choice is most likely to happen in familiar circumstances when there is a 
correspondence between personal moral rules and perceived moral norms of the setting. It is 
also possible that intense emotions or high stress nudge a person into reacting in such a way, 
regardless of the familiarity of a setting. As such, habitual choice is always oriented towards 
the past as it relies on previous experience to guide present actions. In essence, it is a 
behavioural shortcut based on an association between a past action and a subsequent 
outcome. Therefore, it is highly time-efficient, mostly unconscious, and does not require 
cognitive effort. However, this comes at a cost of a lack of reflection which can sometime 
lead people to choose actions they would not consider in their best interest had they thought 
about it beforehand. Habits can be broken by anything that could drive a person to refocus 
their attention and consider other action alternatives, such as appearance of a strong deterrent 
in a setting or a change in person’s morality (Wikström & Treiber, 2009).  
In case of rational deliberation, an individual perceives several action responses to a 
particular motivation, where at least one includes breaking a rule of law (Treiber, 2011; 
Wikström, 2014, 2019b; Wikström et al., 2012; Wikström & Treiber, 2007, 2016a). 
Deliberation refers to weighing potential costs and benefits of the perceived options in order 
to choose the one which would satisfy the particular motivation in the best way (as the actor 





option would unfold, it is future-oriented and requires more time and cognitive power, but it 
allows a more comprehensive analysis of the situation. People will most likely deliberate in 
unfamiliar or uncertain situations and when there is a conflict between personal moral rules 
and perceived rules of a surrounding setting. Whether crime will eventually happen or not 
will depend on the outcome of deliberation. 
 
3.3.4. The Principle of the Conditional Relevance of Controls 
 
Self-control and deterrence are relevant factors in crime causation only when people 
deliberate over several action alternatives to a particular motivation, where at least one option 
includes breaking the law (Hirtenlehner & Hardie, 2016; Wikström, 2012, 2014; Wikström et 
al., 2012, 2011). If a person does not even see crime as an option, or chooses crime habitually 
as the only perceived course of action, then both internal and external controls will be 
irrelevant as there is nothing to control for. If a person deliberates, which type of control will 
be relevant depends mainly on the nature of a conflict between personal moral rules and 
perceived moral rules of a setting. Self-control is relevant in situations when there is an 
external pressure on a person to break a moral rule they personally hold (e.g., a peer pressure 
to shoplift when that conflicts with the person’s moral rules). Deterrence is relevant in 
situations where a person’s moral rules favour breaking the law, but the features of a setting 
discourage doing so by creating fear of consequences (e.g., a person is deterred from the 
intent to shoplift after seeing security guards). Therefore, self-control enables people to 
adhere to their own personal rules, whereas deterrence compels people to follow the moral 
rules of a setting. 
Self-control refers to a success in following one’s own personal rules despite the 
external pressure to transgress (Treiber, 2011; Wikström, 2010, 2014; Wikström et al., 2012; 
Wikström & Svensson, 2010; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). As a success or failure to exhibit 
self-control arises from a situation in which an individual responds to a particular setting, 
self-control is a situational factor and not a personality trait. Ability to exercise self-control 
will depend on the outcome of the interaction between one’s executive functions (and other 
more temporary personal factors such as intoxication, intense emotions, or stress) and their 
environment. In different places and circumstances, an individual will exhibit diverse levels 
of self-control, and therefore it does not depend only on personal characteristics. Similarly, 





environment, namely monitoring of its moral rules and sanctions for their transgressing 
(Wikström, 2010, 2014; Wikström et al., 2012, 2011). If a person sees monitoring to be 
efficient and sanctions to be harsh in a particular setting, then the person could be deterred 
from choosing crime as an option (Wikström, 2007). There is also a link between external 
and internal controls such that executive functions determine how sensitive a person is to 
deterrent cues in an environment (i.e., how strong a deterrent cue must be to become a factor 
in deliberation; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). For example, if in the same setting, a person 
with a more efficient executive functioning will be able to process more environmental cues 
and take into account their significance when deliberating, whereas a person with poor 
executive functions may be more susceptible to provocations or frictions, and overlook some 
deterrent indicators, especially subtle ones. People with deficient executive functions may 
also fail to comprehend how certain environmental features could affect the course of action 
they want to take, or to take into consideration the risks of various negative consequences, 
legal and other, when deliberating. Therefore, there should be a negative association between 
one’s executive functions and the threshold that strength of an environmental deterrent cue 
has to pass in order for it to affect deliberation (Wikström, 2008; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). 
The functioning of the complete framework centred around the perception-choice 
process suggests that perception and personal morality are more fundamental to crime 
causation than the process of choice and ability to exercise self-control, respectively (Treiber, 
2017a; Wikström, 2004, 2014, 2019b; Wikström, Oberwittler, Treiber, & Hardie, 2017; 
Wikström & Svensson, 2010). Namely, perception of action alternatives precedes the process 
of choice and determines its relevance (i.e., if a person does not see crime as an option, the 
process of choice will be of no relevance in explaining why the person did not break the law). 
Similarly, even though both personal morality and ability to exercise self-control determine 
crime propensity, the former comes as the principal individual crime cause as it determines 
the outcome of a perception process through its role in the moral filter. As the ability to 
exercise self-control is only relevant to crime causation through its influence in the process of 
choice, its effect in crime causation is dependent on personal morality (or more specifically, 
the interaction between personal morality and moral context of a setting; Wikström & 
Svensson, 2010; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). If a person does not see crime as an action 
alternative to a particular motivation, the ability to exercise self-control will not be a relevant 
factor as there will be nothing to control. The ability to exercise self-control will also be an 
insignificant factor in the process of choice when a person decides to abide by or break the 





only one potent action alternative that is executed automatically. Therefore, there is no room 
for self-control in such a scenario. Finally, if a person’s moral norms do not conflict with 
breaking the law (i.e., they do not think it is wrong to commit a particular crime in specific 
circumstances), again self-control will not be a relevant factor in crime causation as there is 
nothing to control for. The only relevant control in such a case is deterrence, as certain 
features of a setting (such as effective monitoring or severe sanctions) may deter a person 
from committing a crime even though their own personal morals would not prevent them 
from doing so. Therefore, personal morality is always a significant factor in crime causation 
as it affects perception of action alternatives in response to a temptation or provocation. The 
ability to exercise self-control will have a role in crime causation only in instances where a 
person is externally encouraged to break their moral norms and actively deliberates whether 
to do so. In sum, even though a personal crime propensity is determined by both the ability to 
exercise self-control and personal morality, the latter is more fundamental factor in crime 
causation. This is not to say that the ability to exercise self-control is not important, quite the 
contrary; it can be a decisive factor whether a person will commit a crime or not, but only in 




Figure 3.2. Perception-choice process. Adapted from “Breaking Rules: The Social and 
Situational  Dynamics of Young People’s Urban Crime” by P. O. H. Wikström, D. 







3.4. Crime Propensity as a Mediator Between Heart Rate and Crime 
 
Situational action theory has been chosen as a theoretical framework to explain the 
link between low heart rate and crime for two main reasons. Firstly, it has addressed the 
problems that had plagued criminological theory for decades. It has offered solutions to all 
major issues in criminological theory (see section 3.2.): the lack of a suitable definition of 
crime (crime as acts of breaking moral rules of conduct); the need for an action mechanism 
which explains how crime happens (the perception-choice process); division between person-
oriented and environment-oriented theories (crime as a result of an interaction between an 
individual’s crime propensity and their exposure to criminogenic settings); confusion caused 
by theories explaining crimes on very different levels of explanation (integrating micro and 
macro levels of explanation though the concepts of causes of crime and causes of the causes); 
falsifiability and testability (all key concepts are precisely defined and there have been a 
number of studies specifically designed to test the theory’s assertions; Treiber, 2017b; 
Wikström, 2006, 2010, 2017, 2019b; Wikström et al., 2012). Secondly, the theory has been 
put under heavy empirical scrutiny which has overall provided supportive results thus far. Its 
core hypothesis have been confirmed not only by PADS+ (Haar & Wikström, 2010; Hardie, 
2019; Treiber, 2014; Trivedi-Bateman, 2019; Wikström, 2009, 2014; Wikström et al., 2010, 
2018, 2011; Wikström & Treiber, 2016b), which was specifically designed to test situational 
action theory, but by a number of other studies across different countries as well (Antonaccio, 
Botchkovar, & Hughes, 2017; Craig, 2019; Hirtenlehner & Hardie, 2016; Hirtenlehner & 
Kunz, 2016; Hirtenlehner, Pauwels, & Mesko, 2014, 2015; Hirtenlehner & Treiber, 2017; 
Kokkalera, Marshall, & Marshall, 2020; Pauwels, 2018; Serrano-Maíllo, 2018; Svensson et 
al., 2010; Wikström & Svensson, 2008, 2010). Therefore, there are strong arguments to 
believe that situational action theory will offer appropriate means to explain the link between 
low heart rate and crime, and place this empirical correlate within a theoretical framework. 
Although low heart rate has been established in biosocial criminology as one of the 
best replicated correlates of crime for more than a decade, a viable explanation for such a 
relationship is still lacking. Considering this association from the perspective of situational 
action theory as a general theory of crime should offer a promising way forward. According 
to its analytical framework, and in line with the analysis at the beginning of this chapter (see 
section 3.1.), heart rate cannot be a cause of crime as having a slow heart rate cannot move 





show an inverse link with antisocial behaviour, and therefore a possible explanation for this 
relationship is that it is associated with a cause of crime, and thereby, crime itself.  
As heart rate represents a biological variable, it is more reasonable to expect that it is 
a correlate of causes of crime related to person and not a setting. Therefore, it is hypothesised 
that low heart rate correlates with high crime propensity which, in turn, mediates the link 
between heart rate and crime. Low heart rate may be an indicator of a blunted emotional 
response, and it is therefore expected that moral emotions will explain the bulk of the 
relationship between heart rate and crime. This is also in line with the theory as it has 
established morality as the fundamental cause that moves people to break law (or adhere to 
it). However, it is also feasible that heart rate is associated with the ability to exercise self-
control, which would then explain the remaining variance of the link. Therefore, it is 
proposed that heart rate cannot be a cause of crime, and that it is only a correlate of crime 
propensity. It is hypothesised that so far elusive relationship between heart rate and crime can 
be fully explained by the mediating effect of personal morality and ability to exercise self-
control. 
However, in order to provide a comprehensive and detailed explanation of the link 
between low heart rate and crime, it is necessary to go beyond the mediating effects of this 
relationship, and explain how heart rate is associated with crime propensity. Low heart rate 
cannot be a cause of the causes of crime as there is no viable explanation of how it could 
cause people to have weak morality or poor ability to exercise self-control (or indeed, to be 
exposed to criminogenic settings). Given that the certain brain regions located in the 
prefrontal cortex and the limbic system have causal influence on both heart rate and personal 
crime propensity, it is proposed that low heart rate is a marker of a central dysfunction which 
is a “cause of the cause” of crime. Specifically, it is hypothesised that deficient functioning of 
the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and amygdala may lead 
to low heart rate and engagement in criminal behaviour through its effect on crime 
propensity. Therefore, the model suggests that the link between heart rate and crime is 
spurious and caused by the same causal factor. Although the current study will primarily 
focus on assessing the mediating effects of crime propensity on the relationship between 
heart rate and crime, the theoretical support for the neurocognitive aspects of the model and a 
preliminary test of the full model will be presented in detail in Chapter 6. 
Apart from theoretical feasibility, the newly proposed model of the underlying 
mechanism linking heart rate to crime can be indirectly supported by the readily available 





between impulsivity (i.e., failure to exercise self-control), measured either via questionnaires 
or behavioural tasks, and low heart rate measured at rest and in response to stress (Allen, 
Hogan, & Laird, 2009; Bennett et al., 2014; Bibbey et al., 2016; Mathias & Stanford, 2003; 
Schmidt et al., 2013). Furthermore, due to the conflation of impulsivity and stimulation-
seeking measures (see section 2.1.1.), it is a reasonable possibility that some of the positive 
results reported by the studies which concluded that impulsive stimulation-seeking mediated 
the link between heart rate and antisocial behaviour is due to the impulsivity items (Portnoy 
et al., 2019, 2014). Finally, a recent study examined for the first time self-control as a 
possible mediator of the link between resting heart rate and antisocial behaviour (although 
measured through academic dishonesty, a very niche type of antisocial behaviour; Portnoy et 
al., 2019). The results showed that the relationship was indeed significantly mediated by self-
control. Furthermore, only self-control exhibited a significant association with resting heart 
rate, whereas the other two mediators, fearlessness and stimulation-seeking, did not. Overall, 
these studies have been supportive of the positive link between heart rate and the ability to 
exercise self-control. 
As for the other component of crime propensity, thus far empirical studies have not 
shown much interest for the association between heart rate and personal morality. However, a 
study examining the link between heart rate and crime from the perspective of the rational 
choice theory has paradoxically provided support for the mediating effect of moral emotions 
(Armstrong & Boutwell, 2012). Namely, the study has explored the links between resting 
heart rate, perceived costs and benefits of committing an assault as described in a given 
scenario, and a likelihood of committing the assault, wherein one of the measures of costs 
was anticipated shame/guilt should a person commit the assault. The results have shown that 
the participants with low heart rate were less likely to anticipate feeling guilty or ashamed 
should they commit the assault as described in the scenario. Moreover, anticipated moral 
emotions mediated the link between resting heart rate and the intent to commit the assault. 
Therefore, these results are clearly supportive of the proposition that moral emotions may 
represent a mediating factor in the relationship between heart rate and antisocial behaviour. 
In general, there has been some indirect empirical support for the model in which the 
link between low heart rate and crime is mediated by weak personal morality and low ability 
to exercise self-control. However, in order to put this model under a proper empirical 
scrutiny, it is necessary to conduct a new study specifically designed to test its hypotheses. 





next chapter, has been set up with aim to directly test the new model of explanation of the 








































































4.1. Aims and Objectives of the Study 
 
The Cambridge adolescent behaviour study was designed with the aim to test the new 
model of the relationship between low heart rate and crime with criminal propensity as a 
mediating variable, and to compare it with other, well-established models. Although many 
potential explanations have been put forward, only the stimulation-seeking and fearlessness 
hypotheses have become widely accepted in the literature and are often cited as variables that 
are likely to account for the relationship between heart rate and crime, either independently or 
jointly (e.g., Latvala et al., 2015; Portnoy & Farrington, 2015; Scarpa et al., 2008). However, 
neither has received sufficient empirical backing due to a limited number of studies which 
have yielded inconclusive results (see section 2.2.). Therefore, the main objective of this 
study is to test and compare the three proposed models of the link between low heart rate and 
crime, with crime propensity, stimulation-seeking, and fearlessness as mediating variables. 
Apart from this principal goal, the study aimed to address the methodological issues 
featuring in a number of prior empirical studies on the subject of the relationship between 
heart rate and antisocial behaviour identified in the previous chapters. Firstly, as noted in 
Chapter 1 (see section 1.3.), heart rate has often been discussed as having been measured in 
resting state, when it was actually measured under circumstances which were likely to trigger 
anticipatory anxiety (e.g., Latvala et al., 2015; Raine, Venables, et al., 1997). Furthermore, a 
significant portion of studies have measured resting heart rate in unstandardised conditions by 
instructing participants to sit still and relax, which people tend to experience differently (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2009; Portnoy et al., 2014). Therefore, very often it is unclear whether a 
study included a measure of heart rate assessed in resting state or under the influence of stress 
or some other emotion or condition, despite being labelled as a resting heart rate. The 
importance of this matter is further highlighted by the observation that many of the non-
significant results pertaining to the relationship between heart rate and antisocial behaviour 
have been found in studies which utilized a standardised protocol for inducing baseline heart 
rate (e.g., Prätzlich et al., 2019; Wilson & Scarpa, 2014). Some of these studies have also 
included a stress-inducing protocol, and their findings have demonstrated that only heart rate 
reactivity inversely correlated with antisocial behaviour, whereas a properly measured resting 
heart rate did not (e.g., Bimmel et al., 2008; Van Zonneveld et al., 2017). In addition, it has 
been recommended that a heart rate should be measured for at least a minute in order to 
obtain a reliable baseline measure, which has been violated in many studies (e.g., Armstrong 





rate measure, it is currently uncertain whether antisocial behaviour correlates with both 
resting heart rate and heart rate reactivity, or just the latter. Therefore, in order to clarify this 
essential methodological ambiguity, the current study will use reliable measures of both 
resting heart rate and heart rate reactivity to stress, each measured for the recommended 
duration in response to standardised protocols for inducing resting and stressful conditions, 
respectively. These measures will be then examined individually in relation to involvement in 
criminal behaviour. 
Secondly, as explained in Chapter 2 (see section 2.1.1.), stimulation-seeking is often 
conflated with impulsivity (i.e., a failure to exhibit self-control), which is then reflected in 
their flawed operationalisation. Namely, even though they are independent constructs with 
different developmental trajectories and neural underpinnings, many stimulation-seeking 
measures contain items tapping into impulsivity, and vice versa (e.g., Burt et al., 2014; 
Steinberg et al., 2008; Vazsonyi & Ksinan, 2017). This conflation has also been present in 
research exploring mediation effects of the relationship between low heart rate and antisocial 
behaviour. Out of four studies that have been supportive of the stimulation-seeking 
hypothesis, two (Portnoy et al., 2019, 2014) have used an impulsive sensation-seeking 
subscale of a personality questionnaire (Zuckerman et al., 1993). As the name indicates, this 
instrument directly taps into both impulsivity and stimulation-seeking, wherein many items 
refer to a lack of planning and tendency to act without thinking (Zuckerman et al., 1993). 
Conclusions stemming from such studies are therefore inherently limited as it is impossible to 
disentangle unique relations between stimulation-seeking and impulsivity, on one hand, and 
heart rate and antisocial behaviour, on the other, due to the conflation of the first two 
constructs. The other two studies have not used appropriate measures of stimulation-seeking 
either. One study (Hammerton et al., 2018) used only the intensity subscale of the Arnett’s 
Inventory of Sensation-seeking (Arnett, 1994), and therefore disregarded other, equally 
important aspects of stimulation-seeking referring to novelty and complexity of stimulating 
experiences (Ferrando & Chico, 2001; Zuckerman, 1994). Furthermore, the intensity subscale 
is chiefly related to the disinhibition subscale of the Zuckerman’s sensation-seeking scale 
(SSS-V; Zuckerman, 1994) which includes impulsivity items (Ferrando & Chico, 2001). In 
addition, the Arnett’s Inventory of Sensation-Seeking suffers from significant methodological 
flaws, specifically low internal reliability and weak factor structure (Arnett, 1994; Ferrando 
& Chico, 2001). The fourth study (Sijtsema et al., 2010) did not use a stimulation-seeking 
instrument, but instead utilised the adventurism facet from the Revised Neuroticism-





characterised by a low reliability. Therefore, as these studies have assessed stimulation-
seeking through instruments of questionable validity, it is not clear whether obtained 
mediating effects indeed stem from the thrill seeking behaviour or items tapping into other 
constructs. In order to address this research question, the aim of this study was to test the 
stimulation-seeking hypothesis using a reliable and valid measure which does not include 
impulsivity items. 
Thirdly, the study aimed to introduce some clarity when defining the outcome 
variable. Namely, heart rate has been explored in relation to a number of antisocial variables, 
including both personality traits (e.g.., psychopathy, impulsivity, callous-unemotional traits; 
e.g., Bibbey et al., 2016; Choy et al., 2015; Fanti et al., 2017; Kavish et al., 2017) and 
behaviours anywhere on a spectrum ranging from minor misbehaviours within legal limits to 
the most serious crimes (e.g., academic dishonesty, hostility, lying, aggression, drug offences, 
convictions for violent and non-violent crimes; e.g., Choy et al., 2017; Dierckx et al., 2014; 
Jennings et al., 2013; Portnoy et al., 2019, 2014). Studies frequently use vaguely defined 
concepts, such as antisocial behaviour, delinquency, externalising, and disruptive behaviours, 
where there is no clear consensus on what they encompass or how to measure them. 
Operationalisation of such variables often involves a mixture of items tapping into various 
criminal and legal behaviours. As an illustrative example, one of the widely used measures of 
aggression in research regarding heart rate (e.g., Brzozowski et al., 2018; Portnoy et al., 
2014; Raine et al., 2014), the Reactive-Proactive Questionnaire, contains items with very 
distinct legal connotations, such as “Used force to obtain money or things from others” (i.e., 
robbery) and “Yelled at others when they have annoyed you” (i.e., misbehaviour) (Raine et 
al., 2006, p. 170). The usefulness of this approach depends on the goals of the study. 
However, one of the aims of the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study was to establish 
whether heart rate correlates with criminal behaviour specifically. Measuring crime as 
defined by situational action theory allows for an assessment of various criminal acts, but it 
excludes “antisocial behaviours” which involve morally dubious, but not necessarily illegal 
acts. Apart from conceptual clarity, using a clearly defined variable has a benefit of enabling 
a precise operationalisation and measurement. 
Finally, the study intended to improve the operationalisation of crime by introducing 
items measuring cyber-crime, which has been largely neglected in criminology despite its 
importance. During the last two decades, there has been a significant increase in the 
frequency of cyber-crimes followed by a reduction in numbers of more traditional types of 





appeared, but rather changed its form (Office for National Statistics, 2015; Weulen 
Kranenbarg, Holt, & van Gelder, 2019). In 2015, when the Office for National Statistics 
added for the first time items pertaining to cyber-crime to its Crime Survey for England and 
Wales, the overall crime rate doubled. The rate of traditional crimes showed a fall of eight 
percent to an estimated 6.5 million offences (compared with the estimate of seven million for 
the previous year), whereas cyber-crime accounted for 5.1 million online fraud offences and 
2.5 million computer misuse offences, leading to a total of 14.1 million offences. 
Determining the exact costs associated with cyber-crime is a particularly challenging task. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the estimated annual costs to the United Kingdom 
government range from £1.2 million to £3 billion per year (Home Office, 2018). According 
to the Detica and Cabinet Office research report, estimated cyber-crime costs to the United 
Kingdom are £27 billion per year, with the lion’s share (£21 billion) affecting its business 
sector (Detica, 2011). Cyber-crime has also emerged as one of the top priorities tackled by 
the national security strategies across different countries, often emerging as a more serious 
threat than organised crime and fraud (Wall & Williams, 2013).  
Despite the relatively high prevalence of cyber-crime and associated hefty costs, 
criminology has been lagging behind in addressing this topic from both theoretical and 
empirical perspectives. For example, a search for articles mentioning cyber-crime in 
Criminology, the field’s flagship journal, has returned only six hits. Out of these, only two 
articles have actually explored cyber-crime related topics, while the other four were false 
positives.6 Indeed, such a problem is also evident in biosocial criminology, where none of the 
aforementioned articles in the previous chapters exploring the link between heart rate and 
antisocial behaviour has included measures which included cyber-crime items. Therefore, this 
study set a goal to explore the link between low heart rate and crime which was considered 





6 The search was conducted in September 2019 using Wiley Online Library. Two articles reported 
about research regarding a cyber-crime topic, with one exploring means of deterring unauthorised access to 
computers, and the other investigating the link between self-control and cyber victimisation (amongst other 
types of victimisation) in a meta-analysis (Maimon, Alper, Sobesto, & Cukier, 2014; Pratt, Turanovic, Fox, & 
Wright, 2014). Other four articles were false hits as they have not explored a topic related to cyber-crime 
(Button & Worthen, 2017; Holtfreter, Reisig, & Pratt, 2008; Maimon, Antonaccio, & French, 2012; 





4.2. Study Hypotheses 
 
Before an attempt to uncover the underlying process linking low heart rate to crime, it 
is first necessary to establish the exact nature of this relationship. Namely, in Chapter 1 and 
the previous section, a concern was raised that some of the findings of a negative relationship 
between low heart rate and crime may have been wrongly attributed to resting heart rate 
instead of heart rate reactivity. The concern was further substantiated by the non-significant 
results obtained in the studies that have used a valid measure of resting heart rate (i.e., heart 
rate measured in response to a standardised protocol for inducing resting state). Therefore, it 
is hypothesised that after obtaining valid measures of both resting heart rate and heart rate 
reactivity to stress crime will demonstrate a significant inverse association only with the latter 
variable.  
After determining which of the heart rate measures are associated with crime, the next 
step is to explain this result. Crime propensity, stimulation-seeking, and fearlessness models 
of the underlying mechanism state that the relationship between low heart rate and criminal 
behaviour is mediated by increased crime propensity (i.e., conceptualised as weak morality 
and poor ability to exercise self-control), high stimulation-seeking, and low fear, respectively. 
Drawing from the review of theory and empirical findings regarding the three models 
presented throughout Chapters 2 and 3, it is expected that only crime propensity will fully 
mediate this association. As to its individual components, it is anticipated that all three 
variables will significantly mediate the relationship, wherein moral rules and moral emotions 
will demonstrate significantly stronger mediation effects in comparison to the ability to 
exercise self-control. It is further hypothesised that fear will be a non-significant mediator of 
the relationship between heart rate and crime, whereas stimulation-seeking will exhibit only 
partial mediation due to the confounding effects of impulsivity. Namely, the rationale for the 
latter hypothesis is based on the fact that stimulation-seeking and impulsivity are distinct but 
correlated constructs (Ellingson, Verges, Littlefield, Martin, & Slutske, 2013; Magid et al., 
2007; Quinn & Harden, 2013; Steinberg et al., 2008), and that impulsivity is expected to be a 
significant mediator as per crime propensity hypothesis. It is therefore further anticipated that 
stimulation-seeking will exhibit non-significant mediating effect once the ability to exercise 







4.3. Cambridge Adolescent Behaviour Study: Methods 
 
The Cambridge adolescent behaviour study was specifically designed to bring to light 
the underlying factor connecting low heart rate to crime, and to ascertain which of the three 
proposed mediating models accounts for this relationship. The research proposal was 
reviewed and approved by the Institute of Criminology’s Ethics Committee in May 2018, and 
the study itself was conducted from September 2018 to January 2019. It involved a sample of 
4877 Year 12 students recruited from 14 schools located across four East of England counties, 
namely Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Norfolk, and Suffolk. The schools were randomly 
selected from the official register of schools produced by the Department for Education8. In 
order to target only mainstream schools in the chosen areas, the list was firstly filtered across 
four categories: county (Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Norfolk, and Suffolk), students’ age 
(Year 12 students), type of establishment (all types of schools except independent and special 
schools), and students’ gender (only mixed gender schools, excluding boys- and girls-only 
schools). The refined list consisted of 141 schools out of which 80 were randomly selected to 
be invited to take part in the research. Letters of invitations were sent by post to the 
headteachers at the beginning of the school year, followed by e-mail reminders two weeks 
later in cases of no reply, and telephone calls as the last resort. Out of all contacted schools, 
16 replied affirmatively to the invitations to take part in the study. The final sample consisted 
of 14 schools, as two schools had to drop out due to technical difficulties in accommodating 
research at their schools (specifically, lack of staff and a suitable room with computers). Six 
schools were located in Hertfordshire, three schools each in Suffolk and Norfolk, and two 
remaining schools were based in Bedfordshire. This distribution of schools across the 
counties was proportionate to the number of schools in these areas. Out of 141 schools 
eligible for the study, 64 were located in Hertfordshire, 30 in Norfolk, 25 in Suffolk, and only 
22 in Bedfordshire. Therefore, the sample of schools followed the general trend of school 
allocation across these East of England counties. 
According to the research proposal, in each school 50 Year 12 students would be 
randomly selected from the school register to be invited to participate in the study. This 
requirement was largely met, except in one case where a school could not implement random 
 
7 The total sample consisted of 493 participants, but six cases were omitted from the analyses as they 
clearly contained untruthful answers found across the questionnaires (e.g., reporting carrying bombs or shotguns 
to school, answering affirmatively to every crime question and reporting random frequencies for each crime). 





selection of students. Instead, all of their students who had taken Psychology and/or 
Sociology as their A-levels participated in the study (n = 32). They represented a third of the 
entire cohort and, according to the school, did not differ from the other students in terms of 
demographic characteristics and academic ability. Descriptive statistics confirmed that this 
group of students performed on all key variables within the range of scores set by other 
schools, and therefore were retained in the sample. The number of recruited students from 
each school ranged from 14 to 50, with an average of 35 participants per school (M = 34.79, 
SD = 10.43). Two schools had small sixth forms with just 17 and 27 Year 12 students in total 
(with 14 and 22 students attending the school on the day of the testing, respectively), and in 
one school testing was conducted on an open day when 21 selected students could not attend 
the testing. Across all the schools, only seven students declined to take part in the research. 
The pre-selected students who were not in the school on the day of the testing were not 
replaced by other students. Follow-up of the pre-selected students who did not take part in the 
research was unattainable as the schools could not accommodate another testing session due 
to the impact it had on school resources, specifically in terms of time taken out of lessons and 
very limited staff and room availability. 
After the headteacher’s approval of the study, arrangements were made with the 
school staff about technicalities of implementing the research protocol during the lesson 
hours. Selected students were usually divided into two groups to take part in the research, 
with a few instances when there was only one group. The size of the groups ranged from 12 
to 32 participants (M = 20.29, SD = 4.97). At each school, the study was implemented in a 
computer room with internet access and with a researcher and a teacher present. The 
researcher began the session by explaining the research process which consisted of two parts, 
after which the students had the opportunity to ask questions. Following that, students opened 
an online platform on allocated computers which began with an informed consent form. If a 
student agreed to take part in the study after reading the information sheet, the platform 
would then proceed to the set of questionnaires for them to fill in. They firstly completed a 
few introductory demographic questions, followed by a set of neurocognitive tasks, after 
which they filled in self-report questionnaires regarding their morality, crime involvement, 
self-control, fearfulness, stimulation-seeking, and health and lifestyle. Completing the tasks 
and questionnaires presented on the online platform usually took about 45 minutes to an hour. 
The second part of the research process involved measuring heart rate. This was completed in 
groups of four students in the same computer room, but in a separate area with four tablets. 





monitors to put on their upper arms. After a short introduction by the researcher, the students 
proceeded to watch a two-minute long relaxing video, followed by a stressful task which 
lasted for three minutes. After the last task had finished, the students received a debriefing 
note which contained the explanation of the stress task. Their heart rates were continuously 
monitored throughout both tasks. As participation in the study was completely anonymous, 
each student was given a unique identifying code so that their answers on the online platform 
could be matched with their heart rate measures. After all the students had completed both 
parts of the study, the researcher addressed the group and debriefed participants regarding the 




The sample included 487 16- and 17-year-old students attending Year 12. This 
particular age was chosen as the most suitable given the age-crime curve phenomenon, the 
observation that crime rate sharply increases in early adolescence up to a peak in mid to late 
adolescence, after which it decreases (Farrington, 1986; Loeber et al., 2015; Shulman, 
Steinberg, & Piquero, 2013). Academics have not yet reached a consensus about what causes 
this occurrence, but the correlation between age and crime is widely accepted as robust. 
When expressed graphically across the life-span, it takes an asymmetrical, positively skewed 
bell shape, indicating that there is an increase in the proportion of offenders throughout 
adolescence, which after reaching a peak, starts to drop off in late adolescence or early 
adulthood (Loeber & Farrington, 2014). As a general rule, the age-crime curve is unimodal 
with a peak between the ages of 14 and 17, after which it subsides (Wikström et al., 2012). 
There are some differences in findings across the studies regarding peak time of offending, as 
it changes depending on the type of crime (e.g., property crime peaks earlier than violent 
offences) and the method of assessing crime (e.g., self-reported crimes peak earlier than 
official crime records), but the overall trend remains the same (Farrington, 1986; Loeber, 
2012; Moffitt, Caspi, Rutter, & Silva, 2001; Shulman et al., 2013; Wikström, 1990). 
According to the PADS+ data, offender prevalence peaked at the age of 13 to 14 years 
followed by a downturn, whereas the overall crime rate peaked at age 15 to 16 years old 
(Wikström et al., 2012). Therefore, a decision to recruit Year 12 students was made primarily 
because this age fits within the age range when crime engagement peaks. Alternatively, the 





much smaller as the students are involved in heavy preparations during this period for the 
General Certificate of Secondary Education examination being sat at the end of Year 11.  
The sample contained a slightly higher proportion of female students, with 273 (56%) 
female students and 214 (44%) male students. As the study was conducted during the first 
term of Year 12, the majority of the participants were aged 16 at the time of the testing         
(n = 379, 78%), and the remainder had turned 17. In total, 29 students (6%) reported 
receiving free school meals. The information regarding their ethnicity and parents’ education 
is presented in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1. 
Frequencies of Ethnicity and Parents’ Educational Level 
Variable Frequency Percentage 
Ethnicity   
  White 400 82.1 
  Asian 46 9.4 
  Black 11 2.3 
  Mixed 22 4.5 
  Other 8 1.6 
  Total 487 100 
Mothers’ education   
  Not completed compulsory school 27 5.5 
  Completed compulsory school (GCSE)  190 39.0 
  Completed A-levels 122 25.1 
  Completed University degree 148 30.4 
  Total 487 100 
Fathers’ education   
  Not completed compulsory school 39 8.0 
  Completed compulsory school (GCSE) 185 38.0 
  Completed A-levels  115 23.6 
  Completed University degree 146 30.0 
  Total 485 99.6 
Note. Mothers’ education = the highest completed level of education by mothers; Fathers’ education = 















The online platform containing the questionnaires began with an informed consent 
form, and if consent was given, the participants were presented with a short demographics 
questionnaire (see Appendix 1). Afterwards, participants completed two neurocognitive tasks, 
namely working memory and emotion recognition tasks. Finally, they completed self-report 
questionnaires tapping into different constructs as follows: moral rules, crime, shame, guilt, 
ability to exercise self-control, fearfulness, stimulation-seeking, and health and lifestyle. 
Table 4.2. contains the descriptive statistics for all measures used, and further details 
regarding each measure are presented throughout the following paragraphs. Reported 
descriptive statistics were calculated using IBM SPSS Statistics for Windows, Version 26.0, 
and the graphs were produced in R version 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019) using the packages 
ggplot2 3.1.0 (Wickham, 2016).  
 
Table 4.2. 
Descriptive Statistics of the Measures Used in the Cambridge Adolescent Behaviour Study 
Variable Mean Median SD Min Max Range n α 
Working memory 8.13 8.00 2.58 0 14 0-14 484 NA 



















Moral rules 3.10 3.11 0.38 1.00 3.95 1.00-4.00 487 .84 
Shame 2.50 2.56 0.45 1.00 3.00 1.00-3.00 487 .88 
Guilt 2.34 2.44 0.43 1.00 3.00 1.00-3.00 487 .85 
AtE self-control 2.73 2.75 0.48 1.38 4.00 1.00-4.00 486 .68 
Fearfulness 2.86 2.75 0.75 1.00 4.75 1.00-5.00 486 .81 
Stimulation-seeking 3.34 3.36 0.71 1.00 5.00 1.00-5.00 485 .85 
Note. SD = Standard deviation; α = Cronbach’s alpha; Min = Minimal score obtained in the sample; Max = 
Maximal score obtained in the sample; Range = Minimum and maximum scores of the scales; n = size of the 
subsample used to calculate descriptive statistics for each variable; AtE self-control = Ability to exercise self-
control. 
 
4.3.2.1. Working memory. 
 
Working memory refers to a neural system responsible for maintenance of 
information in an active state in a temporary storage and manipulation of these mental 
representations (Baddeley, 1998; Baddeley, 1992; Levy & Goldman-Rakic, 2000). These 





planning, learning, and language comprehension. The prefrontal cortex represents the neural 
seat for the working memory functions, specifically its dorsolateral region (Barbey, Koenigs, 
& Grafman, 2013; Curtis & D’Esposito, 2003; D’Esposito, Postle, & Rypma, 2000; Levy & 
Goldman-Rakic, 2000).  
In this study, working memory was assessed using a version of the Digit Span 
Backwards task adapted for computer use. It represents a common method of assessing 
working memory (Ramsay & Reynolds, 1995), which is often used as a subtest in many 
neuropsychological batteries, including Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 2008). 
It taps into both maintenance and manipulation of information, and it relies heavily on the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex as shown in neuroimaging, repetitive transcranial magnetic 
stimulation, and human lesion studies (Aleman & Van’T Wout, 2008; Barbey et al., 2013; 
Gerton et al., 2004; Hoshi et al., 2000). Participants were presented with a sequence of 
numbers on a computer screen with an instruction to repeat them in a reverse order from the 
initial presentation. All numbers were typed in black font against a white background. Each 
number in a sequence was presented for one second, but the participants had unlimited time 
to provide an answer. Before the task started, participants firstly engaged in a practise trial 
consisting of two sequences of numbers to make sure they understood the instructions. The 
task consisted of seven trials, each involving two sequences of numbers of equal length. In 
the first trial, participants were presented with two different sequences consisting of two 
numbers. If answered correctly on at least one of the two sequences, they were presented with 
the next trial involving two different sequences consisting of three numbers. The sequences 
increased progressively for one number in every following trial as long as the participant 
correctly repeated at least one of the two sequences. After participant failed to repeat the 
numbers in a reverse order to both sequences in a trial, the task terminated. For each correctly 
answered sequence participants would be awarded one point, and therefore their total score 
could range from zero to 14 as there were seven trials each consisting of two sequences of 
numbers. The average capacity of participants’ working memory was about five units         
(M = 4.74, SD = 1.49), which is in line with the results of prior studies involving the same 
age group (Grégoire & Van der Linden, 1997; Hooper, Luciana, Conklin, & Yarger, 2004). 
As can be seen in histogram presented in Figure 4.1, scores were relatively normally 
distributed. The sequences of numbers used in this study are listed in the Appendix 2, 






Figure 4.1. Frequency distribution of the Digit Span Backwards task. Dashed line represents 
the mean value of working memory (n = 484). 
 
4.3.2.2. Emotion recognition. 
 
Ability to recognise emotional expressions in other people was assessed with the 
Facial Emotion Recognition Task (Wolf, Philippi, Motzkin, Baskaya, & Koenigs, 2014). 
Each trial began with a fixation cross presented for 4 ± 1 seconds, after which participants 
were shown a photograph of a person’s face with an emotional expression for three seconds. 
Participants then had an unlimited time to choose the emotion shown from a list of six 
emotions. Stimuli consisted of photographs of ten actors and ten actresses, each showing two 
different emotions, which were chosen from the Karolinska directed emotional faces set 
(Lundqvist, Flykt, & Ohman, 1998). The photographs were converted to greyscale, cropped 
to include only faces, matched for size, and presented so that the tip of the nose would always 
appear at the same spot where the fixation cross had appeared beforehand. There were 40 
photos in total, with seven photos each of anger, sadness, happiness, fear, and disgust, and 
five photos showing neutral expressions. Stimuli were presented in a random order. 
Participants received one point for each correctly recognised emotion, and could therefore 
achieve a sum score between zero and 40. The histogram presented in Figure 4.2. suggests a 





Emotion Recognition Task is in line with other studies measuring the ability to recognise 
emotion using either the same (Wolf et al., 2014) or a different instrument (Lawrence, 
Campbell, & Skuse, 2015; Pajevic, Vukosavljevic-Gvozden, Stevanovic, & Neumann, 2018; 
Voyer, Russell, & McKenna, 2002; Wright, Riedel, Sechrest, Lane, & Smith, 2018). Further 
descriptive statistics about the emotion recognition task are presented in Table 4.2. 
 
 
Figure 4.2. Frequency distribution of the Facial Emotion Recognition Task. Dashed line 





Engagement in criminal behaviour was assessed using an adapted and extended 
PADS+ crime questionnaire (Wikström et al., 2012). The original PADS+ questionnaire 
explored 10 different crimes: shoplifting, theft from a person, theft from a car, theft of a car, 
residential burglary, non-residential burglary, robbery, assault, vandalism, and arson. In 
addition to the original items, three new items9 were added which tapped into some of the 
most common types of cyber-crime: unauthorised access (to a computer system or an online 
 
9 The items were developed in collaboration with Dr Alice Hutchings, University Lecturer in the 





account), malware10 (its distribution or development), and denial of service attack11. These 
acts are criminal in the United Kingdom under the Computer Misuse Act from 1990. 
Therefore, the crime scale measured 13 different types of crimes in total.  
As PADS+ was a longitudinal study, its questions regarding criminal engagement 
referred to a one year period. However, as the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study is a 
cross-sectional study, all the questions were rephrased to cover longer periods. Specifically, 
participants were firstly asked whether they had committed each of the crimes since they had 
started secondary school (hence the questions covered a five year period). If answered 
affirmatively, they were presented with an additional question which inferred how many 
times had they committed the crime in question during the same period. Two total crime 
scores were then calculated for each participant, one for crime versatility based on answers to 
the first question, and the other for crime frequency based on answers to the second question. 
They each measured the same 13 crimes, with an exception that crime versatility score 
included an additional item regarding carrying weapons12 and therefore tapped into 14 
different crimes. 
Crime can be measured using frequency or versatility scores, with each having their 
own specific advantages and disadvantages. Crime frequency, measured as a sum of numbers 
of times a participant had committed each crime, represents a more nuanced measure as it 
distinguishes between people who had engaged in crime once, a few times, or who are 
frequent offenders. On the other hand, it may be difficult for some people to provide a correct 
number of times they had committed crime since the question applies to a relatively long 
period of time, especially if they had offended often. Crime versatility refers to a number of 
types of crimes an individual had engaged in, regardless of their individual frequency. 
Versatility scores in general show higher reliability and are less skewed than frequency 
scores, but on the other hand they are less precise as they fail to make a crucial difference 
between people who have committed a crime once and those who offend regularly 
(Hirtenlehner & Kunz, 2016). For example, a crime frequency score would be more 
 
10 Malicious software, or malware, refers to computer programs used for breaking into, or 
compromising, computer systems (The Crown Prosecution Service, 2020). 
11 Denial of service attack is a cyber-attack in which the perpetrator seeks to make a machine or 
network resource unavailable to its intended users by disrupting services of a host using incoming traffic 
originating from many different sources flooding the victim (The Crown Prosecution Service, 2020). 
12 In the original PADS+ data, items measuring carrying knives or other weapons were not part of the 
crime questionnaire, but another set of questions. The question tapping into the frequency of carrying weapons 
had a four point Likert-type response scale with  “always”, “most times”, “sometimes”,  and “not very often” as 
answer options. Therefore, it was not possible to add carrying weapons to the total crime frequency score due to 





informative than a crime versatility score for a person who frequently commits only one type 
of crime (e.g., if they had committed 15 assaults, their crime frequency score would be 15, 
whereas their crime versatility score would be one). In such a case, crime frequency would 
accurately describe the level of crime involvement of that particular person, whereas the 
crime versatility score would undervalue the extent of their criminal behaviour.  
In crime frequency questions, participants were asked to enter a number of times they 
had committed the crime in question since they had started secondary school. This method is 
more informative than simply using a multiple choice format based on categorical answers 
which merges very different values into the same category. However, it can also create a 
problem with outliers as no restrictions were placed on possible answer values. Indeed, in 
several cases participants gave answers which were clearly imprecise crime frequencies (e.g., 
some participants reported they had committed a particular crime a million times, 100 000 
times, 999 times, etc.). Therefore, these values had to be dealt with either by capping the 
values or excluding these participants from the analyses. In case of each participant who 
reported an unusual crime frequency, their answers to all questionnaires were carefully 
examined. As a result, information obtained from six participants were omitted from the 
analyses as they gave dubious answers throughout the questionnaires. For participants whose 
answers looked legitimate, their crime frequency was capped in cases of extreme values. 
According to the PADS+ data, between the ages of 12 and 16, a subsample of most frequent 
offenders committed on average one crime per week. Drawing from these results, any 
extreme crime frequency value was capped to 265, which is the number of crimes the 
participants would have committed had they committed one crime per week between the start 
of their secondary school until the time of the testing. Twelve values were capped in total, 
wherein five values were capped for vandalism, three for shoplifting, two for assault, and one 
value each for robbery and malware use. These capped values belonged to nine participants 
in total, two female and seven male students. 
Both crime frequency and, to a lesser extent, crime variability, were positively 
skewed. The piling up of low scores in the crime distribution is a common finding in 
criminological studies (e.g., Bushway, Paternoster, & Brame, 2003; Grasmick, Tittle, Bursik, 
& Arneklev, 1993; Moffitt, Krueger, Caspi, & Fagan, 2000; Vazsonyi, Clifford Wittekind, 
Belliston, & Van Loh, 2004; Wikström et al., 2012), and is expected given that crime is a 
relatively rare phenomena. Therefore, both variables were log transformed in order to bring 
them closer to a normal distribution. Crime variables were expressed through log transformed 





results of which are shown in Table 4.2. For the ease of presentation, only analyses wherein 
crime was measured using log transformed crime frequency scores will be reported here. 
However, all the analyses were replicated using log transformed crime versatility scores and 
will be reported in case there were significant differences in results. Otherwise, they will be 
omitted to avoid unnecessary repetitions. Distribution of crime frequency before and after log 
transformation is presented in Figure 4.3. Crime questionnaire is presented in Appendix 3. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Frequency distribution of crime frequency. Figure on the left denotes the 
histogram of untransformed crime frequency scores. Figure on the right denotes the 
histogram of log transformed crime frequency scores. Dashed lines represent the mean values 
of crime frequency and logged crime frequency on the left and right histograms, respectively 
(N = 487). 
 
In total, more than a half of the participants (n = 288, 59%) reported having 
committed at least one crime since they had started secondary school, which is slightly lower 
than what was found in the PADS+ sample (70%; Wikström et al., 2012). About 23%           
(n = 111) committed only one type of crime, whereas more than a third (n = 177, 36%) 
committed two or more types of crime. The most versatile offenders (n = 4, 1%) engaged in 
seven out of 14 listed crimes. Amongst those who reported criminal behaviour                       
(n = 28513, 59%), the crime frequency ranged from one to 795 crimes per person (M = 24.33,              
Mdn = 4.0014, SD = 76.36). About 12% (n = 59) of the entire sample committed a crime only 
 
13 In total, 288 participants responded positively to at least one crime versatility question. Out of those, 
two reported carrying weapons as their only crime which was not followed up by a frequency question (i.e., how 
many times they had done it), and one participant did not respond to a crime frequency question that followed 
after he reported having committed a crime. Therefore, using a crime frequency variable 285 participants 
reported committing at least one crime, whereas according to the crime versatility variable this number is 288.  
14 Taking into account the skewed nature of crime data, the median was included as an additional 





once. The most common types of self-reported crimes were assault (n = 129, 27%), 
unauthorised access to computer material (n = 125, 26%), theft from a person (n = 87, 18%), 
vandalism (n = 86, 18%), and arson (n = 85, 18%). None of the students responded 
positively to the questions whether they had ever committed residential burglary and theft 
from a car. A similar pattern of the most prevalent offences was found in the PADS+ data as 
well, but their prevalence rates were higher. The most common types of crimes in PADS+ 
were assault (56%), vandalism (38%), arson (36%), shoplifting (34%), and theft from person 
(25%; Wikström et al., 2012).  
Descriptive statistics for all15 types of crime are presented in Table 4.3. Due to the 
positively skewed nature of crime (e.g., Falk et al., 2014; Wikström et al., 2012), the central 
tendency was described using two measures, mean and median. Taking into account both 
measures enables a more balanced description of participants’ crime involvement as they 
have specific advantages and disadvantages. The mean is calculated using every score, and is 
therefore also driven by extreme values, whereas the median is relatively unaffected by 
outliers but at a cost of discarding most of the scores (Field, 2018).  
The variable carrying a weapon reported in Table 4.3. requires a special note given 
the lack of its descriptive statistics. Information regarding its prevalence was calculated using 
data from the crime versatility question enquiring whether participants had ever carried a 
knife or other weapons when they went to school or outdoors. Participants who responded 
affirmatively were asked a frequency related follow-up question which measured how often 
they carried a weapon (n = 12, 3%). However, participants responded to this question by 
choosing one of four possible descriptive answers, namely “always”, “most times”, 
“sometimes”, and “not very often”. Therefore, descriptive statistics regarding frequency of 
carrying weapons could not be calculated as in case with other types of crime. Out of 12 
participants who reported carrying weapons, eight replied with “not very often”, and two 







15 Except for theft from a car and residential burglary, as none of the students reported affirmatively to 






Descriptive Statistics of Self-Reported Crime 
Crime Prevalence M  Mdn SD Min Max  




3 (0.6%) 5.33 3.00 5.86 1 12 
Theft from  
a person 
 
87 (17.9%) 5.79 2.00 12.82 1 100 
Theft of a car 
 
1 (0.2%) 1.00 1.00 NA 1 1 
Vandalism 
 
86 (17.7%) 21.83 2.00 62.89 1 265 
Arson 
 
85 (17.5%) 6.71 3.00 12.67 1 69 
Robbery 
 
21 (4.3%) 20.52 4.00 58.05 1 265 
Assault 
 
129 (26.5%) 8.71 2.00 34.92 1 265 
Carrying a weapon 
 




125 (25.7%) 6.62 2.00 16.29 1 100 
Malware 
 
8 (1.6%) 52.33 7.50 104.83 1 265 
Denial of service 
 
12 (2.5%) 3.00 1.00 6.00 1 22 
Note. M = Mean; Mdn = Median; SD = Standard deviation; Min = Minimal reported value of crime frequency; 
Max = Maximal reported value of crime frequency.  
Prevalence of crime was calculated using the crime versatility data from the full sample (N = 487). The 
remainder of descriptive statistics refers to crime frequency data from the offender sub-samples. Specifically, M, 
Mdn, SD, Min, and Max were all calculated using crime frequency data from sub-samples of participants who 
reported they had committed a crime for which the descriptive statistics are reported. The number of participants 
in each sub-sample ranged from n = 1 for theft of a car to n = 129 for assault.  
 
 As cyber-crime items were new and exploratory, they were followed up by additional 
questions. Participants who reported having accessed another person’s computer or an online 
account without permission were asked what type of material they had accessed and by what 
means (n = 125, 26%). Most often participants accessed another person’s social networking 
account (n = 65, 13%), e-mail (n = 47, 10%), and computer files, such as photos, videos, and 
documents (n = 33, 7%). In a few instances, participants would access paid services, such as 





(n = 2, < 1%). In only one case a participant reported accessing another person’s bank 
account. Most often participants would gain unauthorised access to an account by using non-
sophisticated measures such as guessing a password (n = 48, 10%), entering an account after 
the owner had forgotten to log out (n = 42, 9%), or watching the owner enter their log-in 
details (n = 30, 6%). Only three participants had used a more advanced methods involving a 
brute force attack (n = 2, < 1%) and keylogger (n = 1, < 1%).16 
 Participants who reported having used malware were asked about the type of malware 
they usually used (n = 8, 2%). The participants reported using different malicious software, 
including spyware (n = 4, < 1%), viruses (n = 3, < 1%), worms (n = 2, < 1%), spam programs 
(n = 1, < 1%), and malware specialised to disrupt Android mobile operating system (n = 1,     
< 1%). None of the participants reported using ransomware software or Trojans.  
Finally, participants who admitted to deploying a denial of service attack were asked 
about their motivation behind these acts (n = 12, 3%). Seven participants reported having 
committed these attacks for fun, three said it was a retaliatory measure, two had done it due 
to social or political reasons (i.e., hacktivism), and four reported other reasons such as to test 
programs or “show authority”. None of the participants reported having committed a denial 
of service attack to win in an online game or for financial gain. 
 
4.3.2.4. Moral rules. 
 
Personal moral rules were assessed using an extended version of the PADS+ 
generalised morality scale (Wikström et al., 2012). The original scale included 16 questions 
tapping into different acts of breaking rules, both legal and illegal, which differed by the level 
of seriousness. As with the crime scale, the morality scale was enriched by adding three new 
items tapping into personal morals regarding committing three cyber-crimes, namely 
unauthorised access, distribution or development of malware, and deployment of denial of 
service attack. Each item asked participants to assess how wrong it would be for someone 
their age to do a specific act. They gave their answers on a four point Likert-type response 
scale where answers ranged from “not wrong at all” to “very wrong”. The total score was 
calculated as a mean across all scores, and could be in range between one, indicating a low 
 
16 Brute force attack is a more sophisticated mean of guessing password, whereby the attacker 
consecutively generates a large number of possible passwords until the correct one is identified. Keylogger is a 
surveillance program which records the keys struck on a keyboard, and thereby provides a mean of accessing 





morality, and four, indicating high morality. Descriptive statistics of the moral rules scale are 
presented in Table 4.2., whereas the distribution of scores is showed on a histogram depicted 
in Figure 4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4. Frequency distribution of moral rules. Dashed line represents the mean value of 
moral rules (N = 487). 
 
 The moral rules scale and distribution of participants’ answers to each item are 
presented in Table 4.4. On average, participants showed a relatively high morality (M = 3.10, 
SD = 0.38), which is slightly higher in comparison to the PADS+ finding for the same age 
group (M = 1.83, SD = 0.65; wherein the range of scores was between zero and three; 
Wikström et al., 2012). There was a very similar pattern of results regarding the average 
“wrongfulness” rankings across the items in the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study and 
PADS+. Acts perceived as most wrong on average by both samples were using a weapon or 
force to get money or things from another person, breaking into a building to steal something, 
smashing streetlights for fun, spraying graffiti on a house wall, and stealing a CD from a 
shop. Acts perceived as the most morally permissible by both groups were getting drunk with 
friends, skipping homework, and stealing a pencil. Committing selected cyber-crimes was 








Frequencies of Answers on Moral Rules Scale 
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Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation. 
Distribution of scores was calculated using the full sample (N = 487). 
 
4.3.2.5. Moral emotions: Shame and guilt. 
 
Tendency to experience shame and guilt after a wrongdoing were assessed using 
extended versions of the shame and guilt scales used in PADS+ (Wikström et al., 2012). The 
shame and guilt scales utilised in this study had nine items each, after three cyber-crime items 
were added to each of the original six item measures. Table 4.2. contains the descriptive 
statistics pertaining to the moral emotions scales. 
The shame scale measured how much the participants would feel ashamed in front of 
others if caught shoplifting, breaking into a car, or accessing someone’s computer without 
permission. There were three questions for each offence measuring how much the 
participants would feel ashamed in front of their best friends, teachers, and parents. 





at all”, “yes, a little”, and “yes, very much” response options. The total score was calculated 
as a mean of all items, and could range from one, indicating low tendency to experience 
shame, to three, indicating high tendency to experience shame. The distribution of scores was 
negatively skewed to some extent as can be seen in Figure 4.5. 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Frequency distribution of tendency to experience shame. Dashed line represents 
the mean value of shame (N = 487). 
 
 The shame scale and the distribution of participants’ answers to each item are 
presented in Table 4.5. Participants on average reported relatively strong tendency to 
experience shame (M = 2.50, SD = 0.45) should they break certain rules, which is similar to 
the results obtained in PADS+ (M = 56.5, SD = 13.4, wherein the maximum value was 72; 
Trivedi-Bateman, 2004). As can be seen, participants’ experience of shame differs as a 
function of who found out about their wrongdoings. There was a general trend amongst 
participants to feel least ashamed if caught by their best friends, more ashamed if caught by 
their teacher, and most ashamed if caught by their parents for committing the same crime. 
Overall, participants anticipated feeling least ashamed if their best friends learnt they 
accessed another person’s computer or an online account without a permission. They reported 
they would feel most ashamed if they shoplifted or broke into a car and their parents found 







Frequencies of Answers on Shame Scale 
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Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation. 
Distribution of scores was calculated using the full sample (N = 487). 
 
The guilt scale assessed how much the participants would feel guilty had they broken 
certain moral rules. The original six item scale was enriched for three new cyber-crime items 
tapping into unauthorised access, development or distribution of malware, and deployment of 
 
17This full sentence was: “If you were caught accessing someone else's computer, email or an online 





a denial of service attack. Participants gave their answers on the same three point Likert-type 
response scale as in the case of the shame scale, and the total score was calculated in the 
same manner, with low scores indicating low tendency to experience guilt and high scores 
indicating high tendency to experience guilt. The histogram of scores on the guilt scale shows 
a somewhat negatively skewed distribution as presented in Figure 4.6.  
 
 
Figure 4.6. Frequency distribution of tendency to experience guilt. Dashed line represents the 
mean value of guilt (N = 487). 
 
The guilt scale and the distribution of participants’ answers to each item are presented 
in Table 4.6. Participants on average reported relatively strong tendency to experience guilt 
(M = 2.34, SD = 0.43) should they break certain rules, which is similar to the results obtained 
in PADS+ (M = 50.7, SD = 13.2, wherein the maximum value was 72; Trivedi-Bateman, 
2004). Regarding their answers on the guilt scale, participants would feel least guilty if they 
cheated on a test or hit another person who made a rude remark. They would feel most guilty 
if they broke into a car, teased another student so they started to cry, or deliberately damaged 
or infected another person’s computer with malware.  
Moral emotions were somewhat negatively skewed in both the Cambridge adolescent 
behaviour study and PADS+, with shame exhibiting more pronounced skew in the 
distribution of scores. Furthermore, in both studies participants reported lower average 
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Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation.  
Distribution of scores was calculated using the full sample (N = 487). 
 
4.3.2.6. Ability to exercise self-control. 
 
The ability to exercise self-control was assessed using a version of the low self-
control scale (Grasmick et al., 1993) modified to fit the definition of poor ability to exercise 
self-control as defined by situational action theory (Wikström et al., 2012). The original low 





(Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990). It contains 24 items tapping into six components of low self-
control: impulsivity, preference for simple tasks, risk-seeking, preference for physical 
activity, self-centredness, and volatile temper (i.e., low frustration tolerance; Grasmick et al., 
1993).  
However, according to situational action theory, self-control is a situational concept 
which is the product of an interaction between a person’s ability to exercise self-control and 
their environment (Wikström & Treiber, 2007). That is, self-control refers to a behaviour, 
something that a person does (or does not do) in a specific setting, and not what they are. The 
scale was therefore modified to capture self-control as the ability to manage conflicting rule-
guidance and to uphold personal morality in the face of pressure to do otherwise. It captures 
the general need to exercise self-control by asking about experiences of exhibiting self-
control generally. This was achieved by selecting some of the fitting items from the original 
scale and developing some new items. The modified scale disregards self-centredness and 
preference for physical activity as they are not relevant to situational action theory’s 
definition of self-control, and taps only into impulsivity, risk-taking, and orientation towards 
the future.  
The modified scale consists of eight statements describing poor ability to exercise 
self-control. Participants were asked to state how well each item described them by using a 
four point Likert-type response scale ranging from “strongly agree” to “strongly disagree”. 
The total score was measured as a mean across all items, and it could range between one, 
indicating a poor ability to exercise self-control, and four, indicating strong ability to exercise 
self-control. The scores were relatively normally distributed as shown in the histogram 
presented in Figure 4.7. The mean value of the total sample (M = 2.73, SD = 0.48) was in line 
with the findings from PADS+ (M = 1.32, SD = 0.37; wherein the range of scores was 
between zero and three, with high score indicating poor ability to exercise self-control; 






Figure 4.7. Frequency distribution of ability to exercise self-control. Dashed line represents 
the mean value of the ability to exercise self-control (n = 486). 
 
The distribution of the participants’ answers to each item of the ability to exercise 
self-control scale is presented in Table 4.7. The pattern of mean scores across the items is 
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Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation.  








4.3.2.7. Crime propensity. 
 
As mentioned in Chapter 3, a person’s crime propensity consists of personal morality 
and the ability to exercise self-control. In PADS+ the composite measure for crime 
propensity was calculated by adding standardised scores of the scales measuring moral rules 
and ability to exercise self-control, wherein the former was previously rescaled so that high 
scores reflected low morality (Wikström et al., 2012). However, given the importance of the 
moral emotions for the explanation of the relationship between heart rate and crime as 
explained in Chapter 3 (see section 3.4.), the crime propensity score was calculated using the 
total scores of moral rules, moral emotions, and the ability to exercise self-control. The crime 
propensity score was therefore calculated in a similar manner as to that in PADS+, with the 
addition of the moral emotions measure. A step by step procedure of calculating crime 
propensity score is presented below. 
Firstly, moral rules, moral emotions, and ability to exercise self-control were rescaled 
so that high scores represented weak personal morality and poor ability to exercise self-
control. Secondly, z-scores were calculated for each of the rescaled variables. Finally, these 
three z-scores were summed to create a composite measure of crime propensity. High score 
represented high crime propensity, that is, low ability to exercise self-control and weak 
personal morality, both in terms of moral rules and moral emotions. As can be seen in Figure 
4.8., the resulting crime propensity variable had a relatively normal distribution, which is in 






Figure 4.8. Frequency distribution of crime propensity. Dashed line represents the mean 




The tendency to experience fear was measured using a fearfulness facet of the 
emotionality factor from the HEXACO Personality Inventory Revised (Lee & Ashton, 2006). 
The inventory measures a six dimensional model of personality structure named HEXACO18, 
a widely used framework to capture variations in human personality which has consistently 
shown considerable advantages over other models (Ashton & Lee, 2007, 2008, 2018; Ashton, 
Lee, & de Vries, 2014; Lee & Ashton, 2014). The fearfulness facet measures tendency to 
experience fear in different situations. It consists of eight statements which participants were 
asked to respond how much they agreed with. Answers were given using a five point Likert-
type response scale where the provided options ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly 
agree”. The total score was computed as a mean across all items, after reverse-keyed items 
were recoded. It could range between values of one and five. Participants who score low on 
the scale tend to feel little fear and are relatively insensitive to physical harm, whereas those 
who have high scores are fearful and tend to avoid situations that could be potentially 
 
18 H stands for Honesty–Humility, E for Emotionality, X for Extraversion, A for Agreeableness, C for 





dangerous (Ashton et al., 2014). The histogram in Figure 4.9. shows a relatively normal 




Figure 4.9. Frequency distribution of fearfulness. Dashed line represents the mean value of 
fearfulness (n = 486). 
 
On average, participants were relatively neutral to fearfulness items, not showing 
extreme fearfulness nor fearlessness (M = 2.75, SD = 0.75). This result is in line with the 
normative descriptive statistics found in a college student sample (M = 3.00, SD = .76,          
N = 887), which were sent along with the instrument by the authors of the inventory. The 
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36 (7%) 3.35 1.19 
Note. M = Mean score; SD = Standard deviation. Distribution of scores was calculated using n = 486. 
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Stimulation-seeking was measured with items drawn from the widely used impulsive 
sensation-seeking scale from the Zuckerman-Kuhlman Personality Questionnaire 
(Zuckerman et al., 1993). This scale consists of 19 items that tap into both impulsivity and 
stimulation-seeking. In the interest of addressing the problem of conflation of these two 
distinct concepts in the research of the relationship between low heart rate and crime, this 
study used only 11 items which measured stimulation-seeking, omitting eight impulsivity 
items. Each item consisted of a statement to which participants responded how well it 
described them. In the original version, respondents would give an answer using a 
dichotomous scale which includes only “true” and “false” options. However, in order to 
maximise variance across the scale and avoid technical issues resulting from a forced-choice 
format, the response scale was modified into a five point Likert-type response format wherein 
the answers ranged from “strongly disagree” to “strongly agree” (Anastasi, 1988; Whiteside 
& Lynam, 2001). The total score was calculated as a mean score across all items, and could 
take a value between one, which indicates a low stimulation-seeking tendency, and five, 
which indicates a strong stimulation-seeking tendency. As seen in Figure 4.10., the 
distribution of scores has a bell-shaped form indicating a normal distribution. Descriptive 









Figure 4.10. Frequency distribution of stimulation-seeking. Dashed line represents the mean 
value of stimulation-seeking (n = 485). 
 
On average, participants scored in the upper half of the response distribution             
(M = 3.34, SD = 0.71), indicating a somewhat higher stimulation-seeking. This result was 
expected given that a heightened stimulation-seeking during adolescence is a well-established 
finding (Collado, Felton, MacPherson, & Lejuez, 2014; Kong et al., 2013; Shulman, Harden, 
Chein, & Steinberg, 2015; Steinberg, 2005, 2010). This is also in line with other research 
findings measuring stimulation-seeking using the same instrument in this specific age group 
(Kong et al., 2013; Steinberg, 2010; Steinberg et al., 2008, 2018), although direct 
comparisons are not as straightforward due to the use of force-response choice in the original 
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Note. M = Mean score; SD = Standard deviation.  
Distribution of scores was calculated using n = 485. 
 
4.3.2.10. Lifestyle and health covariates. 
 
In order to take into account effects of possible cofounding variables on the 
relationship between heart rate and crime as recommended in the literature (Armstrong et al., 
2009; Murray et al., 2016; Portnoy et al., 2014; Prätzlich et al., 2019), the following 
covariates were examined: sex, race, socioeconomic status (measured using parental 
education and receiving free school meals as proxy measures), physical fitness, body mass 
index, smoking, caffeine intake, drug use, and alcohol consumption. Sex, race, and 
socioeconomic status variables were measured using the demographics questionnaire (see 
Appendix 1), whereas the remainder of the covariates were measured using a lifestyle and 
health questionnaire presented in Appendix 4. 
Level of physical fitness was assessed using a scale which measured how many times 
during a typical week participants engaged in mild, moderate, and vigorous exercise for 
longer than 25 minutes (Armstrong et al., 2009). For each category, participants would 
respond using a five point Likert-type response scale where answers ranged from “never” to 
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mild, moderate, and vigorous exercise by a factor of 1, 2, and 3, respectively. It could take a 
value within a range between zero and 24, wherein higher values indicate more frequent 
engagement in physical activity. Participants on average scored in the lower third of the 
spectrum (M = 6.59, SD = 4.86). In total, about 65% of the participants had a score between 
zero and seven points, 29% between eight and 15, and only 5% scored 16 or higher. The 
distribution of participants’ responses to each item is represented in Table 4.10. 
 
Table 4.10. 
Frequencies of Answers on Physical Fitness Scale 
During a typical week,  
how many times do you  
do the following exercises  


















Mild exercise that requires 
minimal effort where you 
could easily sing while 
doing the activity, such as 
yoga, fishing, bowling, 













Moderate exercise that is 
not exhausting where you 
could easily carry on a 
conversation while doing 
the activity, such as 
jogging, non-competitive 
sports, leisure dancing, 













Vigorous exercise where 
you become winded or 
too out of breath to carry 
on a conversation while 
doing the activity, such as 
running, competitive 
sports games (soccer, 
football, basketball, etc.), 













Note. M = Mean; SD =  Standard deviation. 
Distribution of scores was calculated using n = 482. 
 
As for the body mass index, the participants were asked to report their current height 





of the height expressed in units of kg/m2. On average participants had a normal weight        
(M = 21.49, SD = 3.43), with around 16% of the participants being underweight and 11% 
being overweight or obese. 
Smoking was assessed using a one item measure asking how many cigarettes a person 
smoked during a typical day. The answers were presented on a six point Likert-type response 
scale ranging from “none/I do not smoke” to “more than 20”, where higher scores indicate 
higher frequency of smoking. A big majority of the participants did not smoke (n = 453, 
93%), whereas those who smoked would usually have five or less cigarettes per day (n = 18, 
4%), and less than a dozen would smoke more frequently (n = 11, 2%).  
The participants were also asked to report their caffeine consumption 12 hours prior 
to the testing. About 44% (n = 213) did not take any caffeinated drink, 50% (n = 241) had 
between one and three drinks, and about 6% (n = 28) had more than three drinks.  
Drug use was assessed with a two item scale used in PADS+ (Wikström et al., 2012). 
If participants responded affirmatively to the question enquiring about whether they had ever 
tried any drugs, they would be then asked about the frequency of use for each of the 15 listed 
drugs. In total, less than a third of the participants reported they had tried drugs (n = 130, 
27%). When a follow-up question enquired about specific types of substances used, cannabis 
emerged as the by far most popular choice whereby 25% (n = 123) of the participants had 
tried it at least one, followed by ecstasy (n = 19, 4%), ketamine (n = 9, 2%), cocaine (n = 8, 
2%), amphetamines (n = 7, 1%), and tranquilisers (n = 5, 1%). 
Alcohol use was measured with the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test – 
Consumption (AUDIT-C), a widely used, standardised three item screening tool for active 
alcohol abuse and dependence (Bush, Kivlahan, McDonell, Fihn, & Bradley, 1998). On each 
question about their drinking habits participants gave an answer on a five point response 
scale. Each response was awarded a point between zero and four. The total score was 
calculated as a sum of scores on all three items, and therefore it could be in a range between 
zero and 12, whereby higher scores indicate increased risk drinking. On average, participants 
scored three points (M = 3.07, SD = 2.77), and about a third of the sample (n = 154, 32%) 
scored five or above which was a cut-off point signifying increased risk drinking. The 










Frequencies of Answers on AUDIT-C 
Note. M = Mean; SD = Standard deviation. 
Distribution of scores was calculated using n = 482. 
 
4.3.2.11. Heart rate measures. 
 
Heart rate was measured using Polar® OH1 optical heart rate monitors. These consist 
of an optical heart rate sensor attached to an adjustable elastic strap that participants wore 
snugly around the upper arm of their non-dominant hand. The sensor tracks heart rate 
continuously using photoplethysmography, a new technology which optically measures the 
volumetric changes of blood vessels under the skin. It consists of six light-emitting diodes 
Items Scoring system 
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that shine light onto the skin and a photodiode that measures the amount of light reflected 
back into it and uses this information to calculate heart rate readings. Research has shown 
that OH1 monitor provides a valid measure of heart rate which is in excellent agreement with 
the results stemming from electrocardiography, the gold standard for measuring heart rate 
(Hermand, Cassirame, Ennequin, & Hue, 2019; Hettiarachchi, Hanoun, Nahavandi, & 
Nahavandi, 2019; Schubert, Clark, & De La Rosa, 2018). 
As soon as the participants were seated in front of the tablets, they immediately put on 
the heart rate monitors before listening to the instructions. They therefore wore the monitors 
for a few minutes before the actual heart rate measurement commenced, which allowed the 
participants to adjust to wearing the strap in order to get the most accurate measurements for 
the research. The protocols for inducing baseline and stress conditions were presented using 
Lenovo Miix 320-10ICR tablets with a 10.1" display and Vogek on-ear headphones. After 
listening to the instructions, the participants were firstly exposed to the protocol for inducing 
baseline heart rate. They watched a relaxing aquatic video with calming music (“Coral Sea 
Dreaming’, Small World Music, Inc.) for 125 seconds. This method has been recommended 
as superior for achieving a baseline level of heart rate compared to the traditional method of 
resting quietly, as this minimally demanding task controls for the confounding effects of 
anxiety, anticipation, or reminiscence (Cornet, 2015; Piferi et al., 2000). Average resting 
heart rate was 77 beats per minute (bpm; M = 77.15, SD = 12.10). Male participants had a 
lower resting heart rate (M = 74.43, SD = 12.40) than female participants (M = 79.28,         
SD = 11.43), which is in line with the well-replicated finding about sex differences in resting 
heart rate (Aladin et al., 2014; Valentini & Parati, 2009). 
After the relaxing video was finished, participants were presented with a short 
instructive video which explained the stress task that followed. The Montreal Imaging Stress 
Task (MIST; Dedovic et al., 2005) was used as a stress inducing protocol, as its experimental 
condition has been found to significantly increase physiologic, endocrinologic, and self-
reported indicators of stress reactions as compared with rest and control test conditions 
(Gossett et al., 2018; Voellmin et al., 2015; Wheelock et al., 2016). It is a standardised 
computer-based task which presents a series of challenging mental arithmetic problems that a 
participant has to solve within a limited time period, with an additional element of social 
evaluative threat. As can be seen in Figure 4.11., the computer program consists of a window 
showing an arithmetic task, a response dial with 10 numbers from zero to nine, a text box 
which generates feedback on the submitted answer (“correct” or “incorrect”), a time bar 





indicators, one of the participant’s success rate and the other of the average performance of 
the entire sample.  
 
 
Figure 4.11. Graphical user interface of the Montreal Imaging Stress Task. On the top of the 
page there is a performance bar with two indicators, followed by a field presenting the 
arithmetic task, and a time limit bar below. On the bottom left, there is a feedback field, and 
on the bottom right, there is a rotary where participants entered their response. 
 
The MIST has three conditions: rest, control, and experimental. The first two are 
control conditions of relevance to neuroimaging studies, and only the last condition induces 
stress and was therefore relevant to this study. The experimental condition was administered 
to each participant for 180 seconds. The participants were required to solve and submit a 
response to each arithmetic task within the imposed time limit. The underlying algorithm 
created an arithmetic problem using up to four numbers ranging from zero to 99 and up to 
four basic operations (addition, subtraction, multiplication, and division). The resulting 
problem always had a one-digit solution so that participants could answer with a single stroke 
on the touch-screen display. There were five difficulty levels of the arithmetic tasks 
depending on the number of elements in the task, size of the integers, and types and number 
of the operations used (e.g., an addition of two one-digit integers, a multiplication of two one-





participants’ average response time and success rate, and then used this information to adjust 
the enforced time limit for the subsequent tasks. If a participant correctly solved three 
arithmetic problems in a row, the time limit for the following tasks would be reduced to 10% 
less than the average response rate for the previous three tasks. On the other hand, if a 
participant failed to solve three arithmetic problems in a row, the time limit for the 
subsequent tasks would be increased by 10%. Therefore, no matter the mathematical ability 
of the participants, their success rate was forced to be roughly in a range from 20% to 45%.  
In addition to elicited failure, this task induced stress by using a social evaluation 
element as well. Specifically, the performance bar shown to the participants contained two 
indicators, one for the participants’ individual success rate, and the other supposedly 
indicating average performance of the entire sample. However, the participants’ personal 
performance indicator usually appeared in the red area of the bar, signifying a poor outcome, 
whereas the indicator showing their peers’ success appeared in the green or yellow area, 
indicating a high performance. According to the original protocol (Dedovic et al., 2005), 
between the experimental trials the researcher tells each participant about their individual 
performance and reminds them that the average success rate for the entire sample is 80% to 
90% successfully solved tasks, and that their performance must be close or equal to the 
average if their data are to be used in the study. In addition, the participants are informed that 
the entire research team is following their performance in an adjacent room, after which the 
researcher leaves the room and another experimental trial commences. However, due to the 
technical difficulties of implementing verbal instructions between the tasks in the current 
study, analogous instructions were given to the participants at the beginning of the task. 
Participants were presented with an instruction video explaining the task wherein they were 
informed that their peers had solved about 80% to 90% of the tasks correctly, and that they 
were expected to do the same. They were told it was very important to perform the 
calculations accurately so that their performance indicator would stay in the green area of the 
bar as otherwise their data could not be used in the study. Finally, the participants were told 
that the study leader was following the experiment remotely to check if everyone’s 
performance was within the green area. However, due to the underlying algorithm adjusting 
the difficulty of the tasks tailor-made for each participant, they would not be able to perform 
at the required level irrespective of their math skills and effort. The exact wording of the 
instructions is shown in Appendix 5. After the experiment ended, each participant was given 





The average heart rate during the stress task was 85 bpm (M = 85.33, SD = 13.38). 
Heart rate reactivity was calculated as resting heart rate subtracted from the stress heart rate. 
On average, the stress task increased heart rate eight bpm (M = 8.19, SD = 7.22), which is 
higher than in other similar studies (Portnoy et al., 2014). Heart rate reactivity ranged from    
-11 to 45 bpm, where a negative sign indicates that a participant’s heart rate was lower during 
the stress task compared to the baseline measure, and vice versa for a positive sign. In total, 
there were 39 participants (8%) whose stress heart rate was lower than their resting heart rate, 
which is in line with findings from other relevant studies (De Vries-Bouw et al., 2011; 
Sijtsema et al., 2013). Resting heart rate and heart rate reactivity were both fairly normally 
distributed, as can be seen in Figure 4.12. A paired-samples t-test was conducted in order to 
test whether the stress task significantly increased participants’ heart rates. The difference 
between the means of resting heart rate and stress heart rate, - 8.19, BCa19 95% CI [- 8.84,      
- 7.57], was statistically significant, t (481) = - 24.91, p < .001, with a medium to large effect 
size of d = 0.68. 
 
 
Figure 4.12. Frequency distribution of heart rate measures. Dashed lines in the left and right 
histogram represent the mean value of resting heart rate (n = 483) and heart rate reactivity     
















Findings and Discussion: Uncovering the Relationship 






























5.1. Is There a Relationship Between Resting Heart Rate and Crime? 
 
Before advancing to the task of explaining the relationship between low heart rate and 
crime, it is firstly necessary to determine exactly which heart rate measure is associated with 
crime, the baseline or heart rate reactivity. Although low resting heart rate is considered as 
one of the best replicated correlates of antisocial behaviour (Ortiz & Raine, 2004; Portnoy & 
Farrington, 2015), a careful examination of methodology used to measure heart rate across 
the studies raises doubts whether the inverse relationship applies to resting heart rate or heart 
rate reactivity, or possibly both. In the following paragraphs, studies using different methods 
of assessing heart rate will be scrutinised in detail and implications of their results in relation 
to antisocial behaviour will be discussed. Next, the statistical results of the Cambridge 
adolescent behaviour study regarding the link between heart rate measures and crime will be 
presented. Finally, a discussion about these findings and their ability to offer new insight into 
the nature of this relationship will follow. 
 
5.1.1. Different Methods of Measuring Heart Rate and Their Implications 
 
There is an abundance of studies showing a significant negative link between resting 
heart rate and different types of antisocial behaviour that have accumulated over the years 
(see section 1.2.1.).  However, labelling heart rate measures as resting is dubious in many 
studies, and therefore it is unclear whether these results indeed refer to a resting heart rate, or 
heart rate reactivity instead. A large number of studies have utilised an unstandardised 
protocol to measure “resting” heart rate wherein they instructed a person to sit still, relax, and 
keep their eyes open or closed (e.g., Brzozowski et al., 2018; Choy et al., 2017; Gao et al., 
2017; Jennings et al., 2013; Raine et al., 1990). The main issue with the silent resting is that it 
cannot ensure that participants spend this time in the same manner, as individual differences 
between them affect the way they implement such instructions (Piferi et al., 2000). Some 
people may be anxious due to unfamiliar research environment or anticipation of what comes 
next, some may be thinking about different things that could affect their autonomic measures, 
others may be bored or sleepy, and so forth. Therefore, it is difficult to determine whether 
heart rate measure obtained using such protocol represents a resting heart rate, or heart rate in 





A highly cited study published in Criminology in 2014 (Portnoy et al., 2014) can 
serve as an illustration of the problems that arise from using an unstandardised protocol to 
obtain baseline measure and the overlooked issue of correctly labelling heart rate measures. 
Namely, the authors measured heart rate continuously during different tasks in the following 
order: a first resting period (three minutes), a social stressor task (four minutes), a cognitive 
task (eight minutes), and a final resting period (three minutes). In both resting periods, 
participants were instructed to sit still and close their eyes. The results showed that the 
average heart rates were very similar across all four tasks20, and therefore it was decided to 
use these observed variables to generate a latent variable which was then applied in all 
subsequent analyses. However, this raises a question of what the latent heart rate variable 
actually represented and how to interpret these results. Either heart rate during resting periods 
did not tap into resting heart rate, but rather heart rate reactivity to stress, or the subsequent 
stress task did not elicit a stress response, but instead represented a resting heart rate. 
Therefore, without answering these questions it is hard to draw firm conclusions from the 
study’s findings as it is unclear whether they refer to resting or stress heart rate. 
Another potential problem affecting some of the studies using silent resting 
instructions is a short duration of cardiac measurement. Namely, even though it is 
recommended to measure heart rate continuously for at least a full minute to get a reliable 
baseline measure (Cornet, 2015; Pickering, 2013; Smith et al., 2003), some studies have used 
a heart rate measure obtained in a matter of seconds (Armstrong & Boutwell, 2012; 
Armstrong et al., 2009; Raine et al., 2014). For example, a frequently used CONTEC CMS 
50D finger pulse oximeter generates a result after only one to two seconds following its 
application (according to Armstrong & Boutwell, 2012). Measuring heart rate for a very short 
period in a novel situation right after an unfamiliar researcher has applied a heart rate monitor 
to a participant would hardly result in a resting heart rate. Instead, it could be described better 
as a heart rate in reaction to such a situation. Other irregularities have been noticed as well. 
For example, in one of the studies which used the above-mentioned finger pulse oximeter, 
heart rate has been measured twice, once after the participants were seated and again after 
five minutes had elapsed (Armstrong et al., 2009). However, instead of calculating an 
average of those two measures, the authors have used just the first measurement in the 
subsequent analyses as it showed a stronger association with antisocial behaviour. This is a 
 
20 First resting period: M = 68.28, SD = 10.24. Cognitive task: M = 68.21, SD = 10.06. Stress task: M = 





questionable decision for two principle reasons. Firstly, it is unadvisable practice to change 
research plans after taking into account which result suits your agenda better, and secondly, it 
would be more reasonable to assume that the second measure represented a better 
approximation of resting heart rate as it was taken after the participants had more time to 
acclimate to the situation. 
Furthermore, several studies have reported a significant negative link between resting 
heart rate and offending using data from military conscription and prison health examination 
files (Koegl et al., 2018; Latvala et al., 2015; Van de Weijer et al., 2017). However, it is 
arguable whether heart rate measured during medical examination for conscription purposes 
or prison transfers could be indeed considered as a true baseline measure. Medical 
examination is perceived as stressful by many people, especially if decision regarding their 
conscription depends on it. In addition, the precision of heart rate measurements in these 
situations is not a priority and usually an approximation is enough (Van de Weijer et al., 
2017). Finally, some people may even tamper temporarily with their health in order to avoid 
joining the army. Indeed, a study which used data from medical examinations conducted in a 
prison reported that their sample had a higher average heart rate than what was usually found 
in other studies involving participants of similar age (Koegl et al., 2018). 
 In recent years, however, there has been an increasing number of studies which used a 
standardised protocol for measuring resting heart rate developed to eliminate individual 
differences amongst participants and decrease the variability of their experiences during rest 
(Piferi et al., 2000). This is normally achieved by engaging participants in a minimally 
demanding task, such as watching a relaxing video followed by soothing music. Although 
this has not yet become a standard research practice, many studies that have measured heart 
rate in this manner have failed to find a link between resting heart rate and different antisocial 
measures (Colasante & Malti, 2017; Oldenhof et al., 2019; Prätzlich et al., 2019; Wilson & 
Scarpa, 2014). Similarly, studies which have engaged their participants in other minimally 
demanding tasks whilst measuring their resting heart rate have also reported a non-significant 
link with antisocial behaviours (e.g., Bimmel et al., 2008; De Vries-Bouw et al., 2011). For 
instance, a study which has not found significant associations between resting heart rate 
measured in boys at age 12 (N = 160) and antisocial and violent behaviour measured cross-
sectionally and prospectively, measured heart rate continuously for five minutes while the 
participants were reading a magazine which ensured a valid measure of resting heart rate 





 On the other hand, although there have been fewer studies that have measured heart 
rate reactivity to stress, these studies seem to point to a stronger relationship with antisocial 
behaviours in comparison to the results pertaining only to the resting heart rate (Choy et al., 
2015; Ortiz & Raine, 2004). Furthermore, the results of some criminological studies which 
have recorded both resting heart rate and heart rate reactivity to stress, have found that only 
the latter measure showed significant negative relationship with various antisocial behaviours 
(Bimmel et al., 2008; De Vries-Bouw et al., 2011; Fairchild et al., 2008).  
 Therefore, before trying to explain why there is a link between low heart rate and 
crime, it is essential to first establish under which circumstances heart rate correlates with 
criminal behaviour. There are some indications that it is in fact heart rate reactivity that is 
inversely associated with antisocial behaviours, and not resting heart rate, but more research 
is needed to draw firm conclusions. It is necessary to devise new studies which would employ 
valid measures of both resting heart rate and heart rate reactivity that rely on appropriate 
standardised protocols for inducing resting and stress conditions, respectively. The 
Cambridge adolescent behaviour study was designed to address this research question, 
amongst others, and its results are presented in the following section. 
 
5.1.2. Cambridge Adolescent Behaviour Study: Heart Rate and Crime 
 
The hypotheses regarding the associations between heart rate measures and criminal 
behaviour were tested using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. The 
significance of a correlation coefficient was established using its p value and 95% confidence 
interval calculated using bias corrected and accelerated bootstrap method (Efron & 
Tibshirani, 1993). As the crime variables were positively skewed, the bootstrapped 
confidence intervals are important to consider when determining significance because they 
are robust and unaffected by the scores distribution (Field, 2018). They were derived from 
5000 bootstrap samples and are reported in square brackets. A correlation was regarded as 
significant if its p value was lower than the standard threshold of .05 and its confidence 
interval did not include or cross zero. All correlations were calculated in IBM SPSS 
Statistics, Version 26.0 and graphs were produced in R version 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019) 
using the packages ggplot2 3.1.0 (Wickham, 2016). 
Both resting heart rate and heart rate reactivity were normally distributed, and crime 





with the hypotheses outlined in the previous chapter (see section 4.2). There was no 
significant correlation between crime frequency and resting heart rate, r = - .06, 95% BCa CI 
[- .15, .04], p = .204, whereas heart rate reactivity did exhibit significant negative association 
with crime frequency, r = - .14, 95% BCa CI [- .21, - .05], p = .003. The former was 
calculated using a sample of n = 483, due to four missing values in resting heart rate, and the 
latter was based on a sample of n = 482 as five values were missing in the heart rate reactivity 
variable. The link between crime and heart rate reactivity is visually presented in Figure 5.1. 
The scatterplot shows a trend wherein as the crime frequency increases, the heart rate 
reactivity decreases.  
 
 
Figure 5.1. Scatterplot of the relationship between crime and heart rate reactivity. The blue 
line represents a linear regression line, while the surrounding grey area covers the 95% 
confidence interval (n = 482). 
 
 In order to explore how robust the relationship was between blunted heart rate 





effect of potential confounding variables. Firstly, correlations between each control variable 
and both crime frequency and heart rate reactivity were examined. Only control variables 
which were significantly correlated with both heart rate reactivity and crime were retained for 
later use in the partial correlations. The following control variables were examined: sex, race 
(white vs non-white), parental education21, whether a participant received free school meals, 
physical fitness, smoking, alcohol consumption, caffeine intake, drug use, and body mass 
index. As sex, race, and free school meals were discrete dichotomous variables, their 
correlations with heart rate reactivity and crime were calculated using point-biserial 
correlation coefficients. Correlations involving parental education were derived using a 
Kendall’s tau22 statistic as it is an ordinal variable. The links of the remainder of control 
variables with heart rate reactivity and crime were examined using Pearson’s product-
moment correlation.  
Out of all control variables, only sex and alcohol consumption showed significant 
associations with both heart rate reactivity and crime frequency. Sex significantly correlated 
with criminal behaviour, r = - .30, 95% BCa CI [- 0.37,  -0.22], p < .001, and heart rate 
reactivity, r = .12, 95% BCa CI [.03, .21], p = .008, such that, compared to female 
participants, males exhibited lower heart rate reactivity and higher criminal involvement. 
Alcohol consumption was also significantly associated with heart rate reactivity, r = - .13, 
95% BCa CI [-.21, - .04], p = .008, and crime, r = .27, 95% BCa CI [.16, .37], p < .001. All 
the other control variables either correlated with only one of the two variables, or were not 
associated with either (see Appendix 6 for the results). Finally, the unique relationship 
between heart rate reactivity and crime was examined using partial correlations which 
accounted for the two control variables. The association seemed robust as it remained 
significant when controlling for either sex (r = - .11, 95% BCa CI [- .18, - .03], p = .021) or 
alcohol consumption (r = - .11 , 95% BCa CI [- .19, - .02], p = .019). Therefore, the link 
between blunted heart rate reactivity and crime did not appear to be caused by confounding 




21 Participants were asked about their mothers’ and fathers’ highest completed level of education, and 
the parental education variable was calculated as a sum of standardised values (z-scores) of these variables. 
22 Kendall’s tau was used instead of Spearman’s rho as it has been found to provide a better estimate of 





5.1.3. Is Crime Associated with Resting Heart Rate or Heart Rate Reactivity? 
 
By addressing the methodological limitations of prior research, the Cambridge 
adolescent behaviour study sought to determine which heart rate measure was significantly 
associated with involvement in crime. The results obtained using valid measures of both 
resting heart rate and heart rate reactivity clearly supported the hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter 4 (see section 4.1.), whereby only the latter measure was found to be significantly 
associated with criminal behaviour.  
Furthermore, the robustness of this relationship was examined by exploring how it 
was affected by inclusion of control variables suggested as relevant in the literature (e.g., 
Armstrong et al., 2009; Jennings et al., 2013; Portnoy et al., 2014; Prätzlich et al., 2019; 
Valentini & Parati, 2009). The study included a range of possible confounding variables, out 
of which only sex and alcohol use correlated with both heart rate reactivity and crime. Both 
of these control variables somewhat attenuated the strength of the relationship between low 
heart rate reactivity and crime, but it still remained significant. This is not a surprising finding 
given that a number of studies have already demonstrated the robustness of the heart rate – 
antisocial behaviour link in the presence of different covariates, such as sex, age, race, 
physical fitness, body mass index, socioeconomic status, general cognitive ability (IQ), and 
alcohol intake (e.g.., Armstrong et al., 2009; Jennings et al., 2013; Latvala et al., 2015; 
Murray et al., 2016). 
  However, special attention should be given to the potential confounding effect of 
cigarette smoking, as it has been recently put forward as a particularly important covariate in 
criminological research pertaining to physiological measures (Prätzlich et al., 2019). The 
underlying reasoning was that smoking was associated with criminal behaviour and that it 
also affected brain and autonomic nervous system functioning. Indeed, the results of the 
study by Prätzlich and colleagues (2019) have shown that the correlations between resting 
measures of autonomic nervous system and antisocial behaviour ceased to be significant after 
taking into account the effects of age and smoking. This did not apply, though, to the resting 
heart rate measure as it was not significantly associated with antisocial behaviour to begin 
with23. Therefore, the authors concluded that smoking, best measured as a continuous 
 
23 This study used a valid procedure to obtain a resting heart rate measure. Namely, the electrodes 
measuring heart rate were firstly applied to the participant’s body after which they were given 10 minutes to 
acclimate to the experimental procedure. Only after the adjustment period had elapsed, the participants were 





variable, should always be controlled for in studies exploring the links between autonomic 
nervous system functions and antisocial behaviour.  
 At first such reasoning might seem legitimate, since smoking is indeed associated 
with both antisocial behaviour and heart rate. However, taking a closer look at these 
relationships demonstrates that smoking cannot explain the link between low heart rate and 
increased antisocial behaviour. Specifically, smoking indeed tends to be positively associated 
with antisocial behaviour (Jennings et al., 2013; Prätzlich et al., 2019; Talati, Keyes, & 
Hasin, 2016; Weiss, Nguyen, Trung, Ngo, & Lau, 2019), but it also causes heart rate to 
increase (Al-Safi, 2005; Cryer, Haymond, Santiago, & Shah, 1976; Gidding et al., 1995; 
Linneberg et al., 2015; Papathanasiou et al., 2013). As antisocial individuals tend to have 
lower heart rates, smoking can hardly account for such a connection as it is associated with 
higher heart rate. Therefore, it is not surprising that in a number of studies the link between 
low heart rate and various antisocial behaviours has remained significant despite being 
controlled for smoking (e.g., Jennings et al., 2013; Koegl et al., 2018; Murray et al., 2016), 
including the results from the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study. This is another 
illustration of the need to take an analytical approach in criminology, instead of blindly 
relying on statistical associations between variables without giving them much thought. 
 In sum, the results of the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study seem to suggest that 
it is actually heart rate reactivity to stress, and not resting heart rate, that is associated with 
various criminal behaviours. Importantly, this relationship proved robust as it stayed 
significant despite taking into account the relevant covariates. As the nature of the 
relationship between heart rate and crime was unravelled, the next step was to explain how 
heart rate reactivity is associated with crime. The following section will therefore review the 
results from the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study pertaining to the two well-established 
explanations of this relationship, namely the fearlessness and stimulation-seeking hypotheses, 







(Prätzlich et al., 2018). This finding provides further support for the hypothesis that resting heart rate is 





5.2. How is Heart Rate Reactivity Associated with Crime? 
 
This section will begin by outlining the data analysis plan for testing the fearlessness, 
stimulation-seeking, and crime propensity hypotheses. After the analysis plan is described in 
detail, the results from the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study regarding the bivariate 
relationships between each mediator on one hand and heart rate reactivity and crime on the 
other will be reported. Finally, the statistical results regarding mediation effects will be 
shown for each hypothesis, followed by a discussion in light of the relevant literature review 
to find the answer to the main research question: How is heart rate associated with crime? 
 
5.2.1. Data Analysis Plan 
 
Before testing the mediation effects, the bivariate relationships between each mediator 
on one hand and crime and heart rate reactivity on the other will be assessed. These 
relationships will be established using Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients. The 
coefficients will be reported along with their bias corrected and accelerated 95% confidence 
intervals calculated from 5000 bootstrap samples. 
The mediation effects of fearlessness, stimulation-seeking, and crime propensity will 
be assessed using structural equation modelling, specifically path analysis (Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2016). Before running the mediation analyses, each model will be tested for the 
violation of multicollinearity. This will be assessed by examining the correlations between 
the predictors in the model and the multicollinearity statistics, specifically tolerance statistics 
and variance inflation factor (VIF). A lack of multicollinearity will be demonstrated if there 
are no correlations higher than .80, and the tolerance statistics are above the threshold of .10 
and the VIF values are below 10.0 (Field, 2018; Kline, 2016). Initially, three mediation 
models will be run to test the mediation effects of each of the proposed mediators with heart 
rate reactivity and crime as the predictor and outcome variables, respectively. If stimulation-
seeking and crime propensity prove to be significant mediators, this will be followed-up with 
additional mediation models. In case of the stimulation-seeking hypothesis, a multiple 
mediation model with the stimulation-seeking and the ability to exercise self-control as 
mediators will be run in order to control for the effect of impulsivity. As for the crime 
propensity hypothesis, a multiple mediation model with moral rules, moral emotions, and 





effects of each crime propensity component. Residual variances of mediators will be allowed 
to covary as recommended in the literature on multiple mediation (Preacher & Hayes, 2008). 
Significance of path values will be determined by taking into account both their p 
values and 95% confidence interval. There will be no mediation if indirect effect proves non-
significant (i.e., p > .05 and/or 95% confidence interval crosses or includes a zero). Partial 
mediation will be established if both direct and indirect effects of heart rate reactivity on 
crime are significant (i.e., p < .05 and 95% confidence interval does not cross or include a 
zero). Finally, a full mediation will be declared if indirect effect of heart rate reactivity on 
crime through a mediator is significant, and the direct effect is non-significant. 
For each mediation model the parameter estimates will be derived using maximum 
likelihood method with robust, bootstrapped standard errors calculated from 5000 bootstrap 
samples due to violation of multivariate normality. For each path value and indirect effect, 
robust bias corrected and accelerated 95% confidence intervals using 5000 samples will be 
calculated. Across all variables used in these models, the number of missing values ranged 
from none in crime frequency to five in heart rate reactivity. Missing data will be imputed 
using the full information maximum likelihood method. All path analysis models will be 
produced in R version 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019) using the package lavaan 0.6-3 (Rosseel, 
2012). 
 
5.2.2. The Link Between Heart Rate Reactivity and Mediators 
   
Heart rate reactivity was significantly associated with stimulation-seeking and crime 
propensity, but not with fearfulness, r = .06, 95% BCa CI [-.04, .14], p = .230. Stimulation-
seeking was negatively correlated with heart rate reactivity, r = - .13, 95% BCa CI [-.22,        
-.04], p = .004. As for the crime propensity, heart rate reactivity was significantly associated 
with both the composite score, r = - .15, 95% BCa CI [- .24, - .07], p = .001, and each of its 
elements. Specifically, guilt exhibited the strongest correlation, r = .14 , 95% BCa CI [.05, 
.22], p = .003, followed by moral rules, r = .13, 95% BCa CI [.03, .22], p = .005, shame,        
r = .11, 95% BCa CI [.02, .19], p = .017, and the ability to exercise self-control, r = .11, 95% 
BCa CI [.02, .20], p = .017. Therefore, the lower the participants’ heart rate reactivity, the 
higher was their tendency towards stimulation-seeking and crime propensity. On the other 
hand, as the heart rate reactivity increased, so did the moral rules, ability to exercise self-





reactivity on one hand, and crime propensity and stimulation-seeking on the other are 




Figure 5.2. Scatterplot of the statistically significant relationships between heart rate 
reactivity and mediating variables. The scatterplot on the left represents the relationship 
between stimulation-seeking and heart rate reactivity (n = 480). The scatterplot on the right 
represents the relationship between crime propensity and heart rate reactivity (n = 481). The 
blue lines represent linear regression lines, while the surrounding grey area covers the 95% 
confidence interval. 
 
5.2.3. The Link Between Crime and Mediating Variables 
 
The results of the analyses pertaining to the associations between criminal 
involvement and the mediating variables were all statistically significant. Crime propensity 
showed the strongest link, r = .56, 95% BCa CI [.48, .63], p < .001, as it shared about a third 
(31%) of the variability in crime. This relationship is visually presented in Figure 5.3. Out of 
its constituent elements, guilt had the strongest correlation with criminal involvement,  
r = - .51, 95% BCa CI [- .58, - .43], p < .001, followed by moral rules, r = - .47, 95% BCa CI 
[- .56, - .38], p < .001, shame, r = - .42, 95% BCa CI [- .50, - .33], p < .001, and the ability to 
exercise self-control, r = - .41, 95% BCa CI [- .48, - .34], p < .001. The direction of 
correlations indicates that criminal behaviour increases as the crime propensity increases, or 







Figure 5.3. Scatterplot of the relationship between crime and crime propensity. The blue line 
represents a linear regression line, while the surrounding grey area covers the 95% 
confidence interval (n = 486). 
 
As for the other two potential mediators, fearfulness was negatively associated with 
crime, r = - .32, 95% BCa CI [- .39, - .24], p < .001, whereas stimulation-seeking showed a 
positive link, r = .27, 95% BCa CI [.18, .35], p < .001. The former is graphically presented in 
Figure 5.4., whereas the latter is depicted in Figure 5.5. Therefore, crime frequency increased 







Figure 5.4. Scatterplot of the relationship between crime and fearfulness. The blue line 
represents a linear regression line, while the surrounding grey area covers the 95% 







Figure 5.5. Scatterplot of the relationship between crime and stimulation-seeking. The blue 
line represents a linear regression line, while the surrounding grey area covers the 95% 
confidence interval (n = 485). 
 
5.2.4. Testing Mediation Models: The Fearlessness Hypothesis 
 
Firstly, the fearlessness hypothesis, which assumes that tendency to experience fear 
mediates the link between low heart rate reactivity and crime, was tested. Multicollinearity 
was of no concern in this model as the correlation coefficient between the independent 
variables, heart rate reactivity and fearlessness, was not significant, r = .05, p = .234, and all 
tolerance statistics were well above the threshold of .10 and all VIF values were well below 
10.0.  
The fearlessness hypothesis was not supported by the data. Although the tendency to 
experience fear significantly predicted criminal behaviour in a negative direction, b = - 0.248, 





b = 0.006, 95% BCa CI [- 0.004, 0.015], p = .208, and the indirect effect of heart rate 
reactivity on crime through fearfulness was non-significant, b = - 0.001, 95% BCa CI [- 
0.004, 0.001], p = .215. After accounting for the effect of tendency to experience fear, the 
direct effect of heart rate reactivity on criminal involvement remained significant, b = - 0.010, 
95% BCa CI [- 0.016, - 0.003], p = .003. The mediation model showing standardised path 
coefficients is presented in Figure 5.6. 
 
 
Figure 5.6. Mediation model of the fearlessness hypothesis. Standardised parameter estimates 
are shown for each path: a, b, c’, c, and ab (N = 487). Paths c and c’ refer to the total effect 
and direct effect of heart rate reactivity on crime, respectively. Path ab refers to the indirect 
effect. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
The failure of the fearlessness hypothesis to explain the relationship between low 
heart rate and crime is not surprising given its theoretical drawbacks explained in detail in 
Chapter 2 (see section 2.1.2.) The assumption that low heart rate in a testing situation equals 
to a lack of fear conflates visceral threat responses, heart rate reaction included, and 
conscious experience of fear, which are in fact independent constructs arising in different 
brain regions (Hoppenbrouwers et al., 2016; LeDoux, 2013, 2014). Furthermore, the notion 
that fearlessness facilitates involvement in crime is based on the unspoken assumption that all 
people are equally motivated to commit crimes, but the ones that are fearful do not act on it 





indeed true that in some situations a fear of consequences can deter a person who is already 
motivated and deliberates about committing crime, but fearlessness on its own cannot explain 
why crime happens. 
As expected given its theoretical problems, the fearlessness hypothesis has not 
received an unequivocal empirical support, even though it still dominates the literature as one 
of the probable explanations of the link between low heart rate and crime (e.g., Choy et al., 
2017; Koegl et al., 2018; Portnoy & Farrington, 2015). Out of four studies testing the 
fearlessness hypothesis, only one has interpreted its results as supportive of it (Armstrong & 
Boutwell, 2012; Portnoy et al., 2019, 2014; Sijtsema et al., 2010). However, this conclusion 
is doubtful once one takes a closer look into the study’s methodological decisions (Armstrong 
& Boutwell, 2012). As the fearlessness hypothesis has been viewed through the lens of the 
rational choice theory, it has been assumed that individuals who lack fear tend to 
underestimate costs associated with committing a crime, namely the likelihood of being 
arrested and convicted, the extent to which that would cause them problems, and anticipation 
of feeling guilty and/or ashamed should they commit the crime as described in a given 
scenario. The results have shown that anticipated guilt and shame mediated the link between 
low heart rate and an intent to commit the assault as described in one of the scenarios, which 
has been interpreted in support of the fearlessness hypothesis. However, such an 
interpretation is far-fetched as moral emotions of shame and guilt are different from fear, and 
cannot be used interchangeably. Moreover, measuring fearlessness through reduced 
likelihood of sanctions represents a contentious practice. It could be argued that, in fact, a 
fearless person is someone who decides to commit a crime despite the high likelihood of 
getting arrested and convicted, and the attached problems that go with it. Fearlessness refers 
to a lack of emotional response to potentially adverse consequences of an action, not 
necessarily a disability to anticipate them (McMillan & Rachman, 1988). Therefore, the only 
study which has been interpreted in favour of the fearlessness hypothesis actually does not 
provide evidence in support of it. In fact, these results are instead better interpreted as 
supportive of the crime propensity hypothesis, as the anticipated shame and guilt following a 
crime refer to one of its core components. 
The other studies which have explored fearlessness as a mediator of the relationship 
between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour have shown that this hypothesis is not 
supported by the data (Portnoy et al., 2019, 2014; Sijtsema et al., 2010). However, one study 
operationalised a lack of fear through behavioural inhibition and impulsivity (Sijtsema et al., 





therefore it is questionable how much can these results be generalised to criminal behaviour 
(Portnoy et al., 2019). Nevertheless, the remaining study explored mediating effects of state 
fear in relation to an effect of heart rate on non-violent delinquency and aggression, examined 
in separate models (Portnoy et al., 2014). Both models pointed to a non-significant indirect 
effect of state fear, and therefore the results did not support the fearlessness hypothesis. 
In comparison with the study by Portnoy and colleagues (2014), the Cambridge 
adolescent behaviour study utilised trait fear as a potential mediation variable. However, the 
results led to the same conclusion. Namely, although trait fear negatively predicted 
involvement in crime, it was not associated with heart rate reactivity and the indirect effect 
was not significant (see Figure 5.6.). Therefore, as both state and trait fear have failed to 
mediate the link between low heart rate and antisocial behaviours, it is time for the literature 
to acknowledge the results which have falsified the fearlessness hypothesis and consider 
different explanations. 
 
5.2.5. Testing Mediation Models: The Stimulation-Seeking Hypothesis 
 
 After discarding the fearlessness hypothesis, another well-established proposal in the 
literature, the stimulation-seeking hypothesis, was tested. The assumption of multicollinearity 
was not violated in the model. There was no extreme collinearity as the correlation between 
the predictors, heart rate reactivity and stimulation-seeking, was r = - .13, p = .004. A lack of 
multicollinearity was further confirmed by the collinearity statistics, as all tolerance statistics 
were well above the threshold of .10 and all VIF values were well below 10.0. The 
stimulation-seeking hypothesis was partially supported by the data. Specifically, stimulation-
seeking was significantly associated with both heart rate reactivity, b = - 0.013, 95% BCa CI 
[- 0.022, - 0.003], p = .007, and crime, b = 0.208, 95% BCa CI [0.138, 0.278], p < .001. It 
significantly mediated the link between heart rate reactivity and crime frequency, b = - 0.003, 
95% BCa CI [- 0.005, - 0.001], p = .017. However, despite its presence as a mediator in the 
model, direct effect of heart rate reactivity on crime frequency remained significant, b = - 
0.009, 95% BCa CI [- 0.015, - 0.002], p = .009. The results of the path analysis with 






Figure 5.7. Mediation model of the stimulation-seeking hypothesis. Standardised parameter 
estimates are shown for each path: a, b, c’, c, and ab (N = 487). Paths c and c’ refer to the 
total effect and direct effect of heart rate reactivity on crime, respectively. Path ab refers to 
the indirect effect. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
In order to test the hypothesis that the mediation effect of stimulation-seeking is 
confounded by impulsivity, a multiple mediation model with stimulation-seeking and the 
ability to exercise self-control as mediators was run. An examination of correlations between 
heart rate reactivity, stimulation-seeking, and ability to exercise self-control showed no 
extreme collinearity as the largest correlation was r = - .42, p < .001, found between 
stimulation-seeking and the ability to exercise self-control. A lack of multicollinearity was 
further confirmed by the collinearity statistics, as all tolerance statistics were well above the 
threshold of  .10 and all VIF values were well below 10.0. There was a statistically 
significant effect of heart rate reactivity on both stimulation seeking, b = - 0.013, 95% BCa 
CI [- 0.022, - 0.003], p = .007, and the ability to exercise self-control,  b = 0.007, 95% BCa 
CI [0.001, 0.013], p = .013. In turn, both stimulation-seeking, b = 0.081, 95% BCa CI [0.003, 
0.155], p = .033, and the ability to exercise self-control, b = - 0.448, 95% BCa CI [- 0.559,     
- 0.334], p < .001, significantly predicted crime frequency. However, once both variables 
were assessed simultaneously in the mediation model, only the indirect effect of the ability to 
exercise self-control was significant, b = - 0.003, 95% BCa CI [- 0.006, - 0.001], p = .017. 





b = - 0.001, 95% BCa CI [- 0.003, 0.000], p = .114. A sum of the indirect effects of both 
variables explained 38% of the total association between low heart rate reactivity and 
criminal behaviour. However, the direct effect of heart rate reactivity on criminal behaviour 
remained significant despite the presence of both mediators, b = - 0.007, 95% BCa CI           
[- 0.013, - 0.001], p = .024, signifying that the relationship was not fully explained by either 
self-control or stimulation-seeking and that another, unaccounted variable played an 
important role in the mediation. The results of the path analysis with standardised coefficients 
are presented in Figure 5.8. 
 
 
Figure 5.8. Multiple mediation model involving stimulation-seeking and the ability to 
exercise self-control. Standardised parameter estimates are shown for each path: a1, a2, b1, 
b2, a1b1, a2b2, c’, and c (N = 487). Paths c and c’ refer to the total effect and direct effect of 
heart rate reactivity on crime, respectively. Paths anbn refer to the indirect effects. Mediator 
residuals were allowed to covary in the model, but this was not shown graphically for the 
ease of presentation. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
The review of the stimulation-seeking hypothesis presented in Chapter 2 (see section 





main theoretical problems with the stimulation-seeking hypothesis are the unfounded core 
assumptions that low heart rate causes discomfort, and that committing crime is arousing and 
leads to a more pleasant physiological state. In addition, it falsely positions low heart rate as a 
cause of crime, as it states that low arousal drives people to commit crime in order to increase 
their physiological arousal. Unlike the fearlessness hypothesis, the stimulation-seeking 
hypothesis has received some empirical support. Namely, out of five relevant studies, four 
have found a significant indirect effect of heart rate on antisocial behaviours going through 
stimulation-seeking (Hammerton et al., 2018; Portnoy et al., 2019, 2014; Sijtsema et al., 
2010). However, a closer inspection of these studies show that their support for the 
stimulation-seeking hypothesis is not as solid as it may look initially. Firstly, the choice of 
instruments to measure stimulation-seeking in these studies is somewhat arguable. 
Specifically, two studies have used a measure which conflates stimulation-seeking and 
impulsivity, and therefore it is impossible to unambiguously interpret the results and 
disentangle the effects of these two independent constructs (Portnoy et al., 2019, 2014). 
Another study measured stimulation-seeking through related, but not identical constructs 
such as the high-intensity pleasure/surgency, behavioural activation system, and adventurism 
(Sijtsema et al., 2010). The final study used an instrument specifically designed to measure 
stimulation-seeking, but included only one of its subscales and disregarded other, equally 
important aspects of this construct (Hammerton et al., 2018).  
Even if the methodological issues affecting these studies are put aside, overall their 
statistical results are inconclusive. Some studies have assessed the indirect effect of 
stimulation-seeking using a few models which differed by the employed instruments, time 
points when the measurements were taken, or have simply used separate models for each sex. 
However, the results have been inconsistent even within the same studies as the significant 
mediating effects have been found in some but not in other models (Hammerton et al., 2018; 
Sijtsema et al., 2010). Moreover, even if the focus is only on the models which have found a 
significant mediating effect of stimulation-seeking, their results are unconvincing. In some 
studies, although a significant indirect effect has been reported, the direct effect of heart rate 
on antisocial behaviour has still remained significant despite the presence of stimulation-
seeking as a mediator in the model24 (Portnoy et al., 2019, 2014; Sijtsema et al., 2010). 
 
24 In a study by Portnoy and colleagues (2014), there were two mediation models, one predicted 
aggression, and the other non-violent delinquency. In both models, the indirect effect of stimulation-seeking was 
significant, but in the former the direct effect of heart rate was non-significant, and in the latter the direct effect 





Finally, even the mediation model which has yielded a significant mediating effect of 
stimulation-seeking, rendering the direct effect of heart rate non-significant, has explained 
only just above a third of the relationship between heart rate and aggression, therefore leaving 
more than 60% of the variance unaccounted for (Portnoy, et al., 2014). 
As the empirical support for the stimulation-seeking hypothesis has been somewhat 
equivocal, the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study was designed in order to address the 
limitations of the prior research. Firstly, stimulation-seeking was assessed using a valid 
instrument specifically designed for that purpose which excluded impulsivity items that 
would hinder subsequent interpretation of the findings. The results showed that although the 
mediating effect of stimulation-seeking was found to be significant, the direct effect of heart 
rate reactivity on crime also remained significant despite the presence of the mediator in the 
model. In fact, stimulation-seeking explained less than a quarter (23%) of the relationship 
between heart rate reactivity and crime. Therefore, the empirical support for this hypothesis 
was limited by the fact that stimulation-seeking only partially mediated the relationship 
between heart rate reactivity and criminal behaviour. 
Secondly, the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study included a measure of the ability 
to exercise self-control in order to test the hypothesis that the partial mediation of 
stimulation-seeking is due to its correlation with impulsivity. There has been only one study 
beforehand exploring mediating effects of both stimulation-seeking and self-control in the 
context of the relationship between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour (Portnoy et al., 
2019). Their results showed that, when analysed separately, both stimulation-seeking and 
self-control had significant mediation effects, but only the latter variable rendered the direct 
effect of heart rate non-significant25. Once these variables were entered simultaneously in a 
mediation model, their indirect effects did not differ significantly from one another, but 
besides that information, the authors did not provide any further details about the results of 
this particular model. In addition, the conclusions that can be drawn from this study are 
seriously limited by its methodological characteristics. Namely, the instrument used to 
measure stimulation-seeking included impulsivity items; the sample consisted of 
undergraduate psychology students and the mediation effects were tested using a small 
subsample of female participants (n = 90); the independent variable was academic 
 
25 In the model with self-control as a mediating variable, the direct effect of resting heart rate on 
academic dishonesty had a p-value higher than .05, but lower than .10. Unfortunately, the authors did not report 
bootstrapped confidence intervals, nor standardised coefficients, and therefore it is hard to draw any other 
conclusions than that the direct effect was non-significant in terms of its p-value being above the traditional 





dishonesty, a niche antisocial behaviour. However, the Cambridge adolescent behaviour 
study did not have these limitations and its results have provided a firm support for the 
hypothesis that the mediating effects of stimulation-seeking are due to its conflation with 
impulsivity. 
Taking stock of the review of relevant theoretical and empirical literature, as well as 
the results presented here, there does not seem to be enough support for the stimulation-
seeking hypothesis. Moreover, there are reasons to believe that the results which have been 
considered supportive may have been confounded by the unaccounted effect of impulsivity. 
Although results from the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study back this claim, more 
research is needed for a more definitive answer. Therefore, it is important that future studies 
use a valid measure of stimulation-seeking, untainted by impulsivity items, and account for 
the effects of self-control. 
 
5.2.6. Testing Mediation Models: The Crime Propensity Hypothesis 
 
 As shown in Chapter 2 and this section, the two most prominent explanations, the 
stimulation-seeking and fearlessness hypotheses, seem unfit to explain the relationship 
between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour, crime included. Therefore, there was a need 
for a new model that would be grounded in a well-developed and empirically supported 
theory. In response, a novel model based on situational action theory was developed and 
presented throughout Chapter 3. It was proposed that the central dysfunction of the certain 
brain regions causes both low heart rate reactivity and increased crime propensity that in turn 
leads to crime. It was therefore expected that the relationship between heart rate and criminal 
behaviour will be fully explained through the mediating effects of crime propensity. In the 
next paragraphs, the crime propensity hypothesis will be tested using the data from the 
Cambridge adolescent behaviour study and the findings will be reported, followed by a 
discussion of their relevance. 
 Before running the mediation model of the link between heart rate reactivity and 
crime with crime propensity as a mediator, it was established that there was no violation of 
the assumption of multicollinearity. There was no extreme collinearity as the correlation 
between the predictors, heart rate reactivity and crime propensity, was r = - .15, p = .001. The 
lack of multicollinearity was further confirmed by the collinearity statistics, as all tolerance 





crime propensity hypothesis was fully supported by the data. Heart rate reactivity negatively 
predicted crime propensity, b = - 0.053, 95% BCa CI [- 0.083, - 0.023], p < .001 , which in 
turn positively predicted frequency of criminal involvement, b = 0.137, 95% BCa CI [0.116, 
0.158], p < .001, yielding a significant indirect effect size, b = - 0.007, 95% BCa CI [- 0.012, 
- 0.003], p < .001. Inclusion of crime propensity as a mediator rendered the direct effect of 
heart rate reactivity on crime non-significant, b = - 0.004, 95% BCa CI [-0.010, 0.001],         
p = .145. The results of the path analysis with the standardised path coefficients are visually 
presented in Figure 5.9.  
 
 
Figure 5.9. Mediation model of the crime propensity hypothesis. Standardised parameter 
estimates are shown for each path: a, b, c’, c, and ab (N = 487). Paths c and c’ refer to the 
total effect and direct effect of heart rate reactivity on crime, respectively. Path ab refers to 
the indirect effect. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
 As crime propensity explained the relationship between low heart rate reactivity and 
criminal behaviour, the next step was to tease apart specific indirect effects that go through its 
components. Therefore, another multiple mediation model with the same specifications as the 
one before was run in order to test the mediation effects of moral rules, moral emotions26, and 
the ability to exercise self-control. The assumption of multicollinearity was not violated in the 
model. An examination of correlations between heart rate reactivity, moral rules, moral 
 





emotions, and ability to exercise self-control showed no extreme collinearity as the largest 
correlation was r = .61, p < .001, found between moral rules and moral emotions. A lack of 
multicollinearity was further confirmed by the collinearity statistics, as all tolerance statistics 
were well above the threshold of .10 and all VIF values were well below 10.0. All three 
indirect mediation effects going through moral rules, b = - 0.002, 95% BCa CI [- 0.005,         
- 0.001], p = .041, moral emotions, b = - 0.003, 95% BCa CI [-0.006, -0.001], p = .007, and 
the ability to exercise self-control, b = - 0.002, 95% BCa CI [-0.004, - 0.001], p = .035, were 
statistically significant. Direct effect of heart rate reactivity on criminal involvement was 
rendered non-significant, b = - .004, 95% BCa CI [- 0.010, 0.001], p = .152. In addition, three 
contrasts were specified in order to test whether there were significant differences between 
the sizes of the indirect effects. All results were non-significant, signifying that indirect 
effects of moral rules and moral emotions, b = 0.001, 95% BCa CI [- 0.002, 0.004], p = .460, 
moral rules and the ability to exercise self-control, b = .000, 95% BCa CI [- 0.003, 0.002],     
p = .763, and moral emotions and the ability to exercise self-control, b = - 0.002, 95% BCa 
CI [-0.005, 0.001], p = .240, did not differ from each other. Therefore, after accounting for 
the shared variance between the mediators, each crime propensity component uniquely 
mediated the relationship between low heart rate reactivity and criminal behaviour, rendering 
the direct effect of heart rate reactivity on criminal behaviour non-significant. The results of 







Figure 5.10. Multiple mediation model of the crime propensity hypothesis. Standardised 
parameter estimates are shown for each path: a1, a2, a3, b1, b2, b3, a1b1, a2b2, a3b3, c’, and 
c (N = 487). Paths c and c’ refer to the total effect and direct effect of heart rate reactivity on 
crime, respectively. Paths anbn refer to the indirect effects. Mediator residuals were allowed to 
covary in the model, but this was not shown graphically for the ease of presentation. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
As this is a newly developed theory, until now there was only indirect empirical 
support for its premises. One of the studies which tested the stimulation-seeking and 
fearlessness hypotheses has paradoxically provided empirical support for the crime 
propensity model (Armstrong & Boutwell, 2012). Namely, as previously mentioned, this 
study measured fearlessness through a reduced anticipation of guilt and shame should one 
commit an assault as described in a given scenario. The results showed that participants with 
low resting27 heart rate were less likely to anticipate guilt and shame and more likely to 
endorse committing the assault. Furthermore, anticipated moral emotions were confirmed as a 
mediating factor of the link between low resting heart rate and an intent to commit the 
 





assault. Therefore, as moral emotions of guilt and shame are a core component of crime 
propensity, these results provide support for the crime propensity model. Similarly, the only 
study which had beforehand explored self-control, the other fundamental component of crime 
propensity, as a potential mediator between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour, had 
confirmed its relevance (Portnoy et al., 2019). 
Until now, support for the crime propensity model has been only circumstantial as, 
apart from the fact that these studies have not been specifically designed to test this 
hypothesis, their conclusions are somewhat limited by their methodology. Therefore, the 
Cambridge adolescent behaviour study was conducted in order to specifically test the crime 
propensity model and address the methodological limitations of the prior studies. Its results 
showed unequivocal support for the crime propensity model. Not only did this variable 
significantly mediate the link between low heart rate reactivity and crime, it also rendered the 
direct effect of heart rate reactivity non-significant. In comparison, crime propensity 
explained 64% of the total effect of heart rate reactivity on crime, whereas the stimulation-
seeking model accounted for only 23%. Similarly, the stimulation-seeking model from a 
previous study interpreted as supportive of the stimulation-seeking hypothesis, explained 
only 36% of the total effect of heart rate on aggression, and 27% of the total effect of heart 
rate on non-violent delinquency (Portnoy et al., 2014). Therefore, the crime propensity model 
is not only rooted in a well-developed theoretical framework, but it has also received strong 
empirical support that has far surpassed evidence for any of the previous models. 
It was also hypothesized that both morality and the ability to exercise self-control will 
mediate the relationship between heart rate and crime, but that the former would have a 
stronger effect. Previous research has shown that the link between low heart rate and various 
antisocial behaviours remained significant despite controlling for the effects of self-control or 
impulsivity (Armstrong et al., 2009; Boisvert et al., 2017; Cauffman et al., 2005; Jennings et 
al., 2013). Therefore, there had been reasons to believe that the low ability to exercise self-
control would not be able to fully mediate the link between heart rate and crime, although the 
partial mediation was still possible. On the other hand, there had been empirical reasons to 
believe that moral emotions could fully mediate the relationship in question (Armstrong & 
Boutwell, 2012). Apart from empirical reasons, the fact that morality is considered more 
fundamental to engagement in crime compared to the ability to exercise self-control was 
another reason for this prediction (e.g., Wikström et al., 2012; Wikström & Svensson, 2010). 
However, data from the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study did not confirm this specific 





three components of crime propensity uniquely mediated the link between low heart rate 
reactivity and crime, and no significant differences between the effect sizes of the indirect 
effects emerged. Therefore, moral rules, moral emotions, and the ability to exercise self-
control seem all equally important in explaining the link between heart rate and criminal 
behaviour.  
 
5.3. Limitations of the Cambridge Adolescent Behaviour Study 
 
The Cambridge adolescent behaviour study provided a much needed advancement in 
biosocial criminology by focusing on causes of crime and potential explanations of how 
certain criminological phenomena happen, instead of fixating on correlational relationships 
and risk-factors as it is usually the case in such research. It also introduced cyber-crime items 
into a measure of criminal behaviour, which has been long overlooked in criminology despite 
its importance. The study addressed the methodological limitations of the prior research by 
using valid instruments for measuring key constructs, clearly defining the independent 
variable, and employing a varied sample. As a result, its results led to straightforward and 
unambiguous conclusions regarding the underlying mechanism explaining the link between 
low heart rate and crime. However, this study is not without limitations and they will be listed 
in the subsequent paragraphs. 
Firstly, there is a question of how representative the sample of Year 12 students is 
given that the acceptance rate of schools to take part in the research was 18%. The response 
rate was within the expected range based on prior projects involving schools in England, 
especially given that the study warranted considerable concessions from the participating 
schools. However, despite the small, albeit realistic acceptance rate, it is believed the study 
tapped into a varied sample. As explained in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.), the number of schools 
recruited across Bedfordshire, Hertfordshire, Suffolk, and Norfolk, mimics the ratio of the 
total number of schools in these counties. Furthermore, all schools were mixed-gender and 
non-selective. The sample included different types of schools (academy sponsor led 
mainstream, academy converter mainstream, foundation, and free schools) located in cities, 
towns, and rural areas. Participating schools also differed in the quality of the service they 
provided, given that the sample consisted of schools rated as outstanding, good, require 
improvement, or inadequate, that is, across all grades of the Ofsted scale. In sum, the final 





participants from diverse backgrounds, but its representativeness of the Year 12 students 
across the East of England cannot be verified. 
Secondly, weight and height which were used to calculate body mass index, a 
covariate in the analyses assessing the relationship between low heart rate and crime, were 
assessed using a self-report measure. Unfortunately, it was unfeasible to physically measure 
participants’ height and weight during the testing sessions at schools, and the self-report 
measures were the only alternative. Therefore, the accuracy of these data remains uncertain. 
However, it is not expected that the type of measurement would change the conclusions in 
any significant way for two reasons. Firstly, despite some evidence of over- or under-
estimation, research seems to suggest that self-reported weight and height measurements in 
samples of young people are fairly accurate and can be used as an alternative to calculate 
valid body mass index when objective measurements are not available (Bowring et al., 2012; 
Nikolaou, Hankey, & Lean, 2017; Olfert et al., 2018; Quick et al., 2015). Secondly, already a 
number of prior studies have rejected the hypothesis that the link between low heart rate and 
antisocial behaviours is somehow affected by body mass, height, or weight (Armstrong et al., 
2009; Jennings et al., 2013; Latvala et al., 2015; Murray et al., 2016; Raine, Venables, et al., 
1997). Therefore, despite the fact that body measurements were taken using a self-report 
measure, there are strong reasons to believe that the results would not change had more 
objective measurements been used. 
Thirdly, the fearfulness scale used to measure the tendency to experience fear has a 
significant number of items tapping specifically into fear of injury and physical pain. 
Namely, out of eight items, six tap into fear of physical harm, with four doing so explicitly, 
and two implicitly. However, this instrument was still either broader in scope or more 
relevant in comparison to the measures used in most of the previous studies testing the 
fearlessness hypothesis. For example, tendency to experience fear has been measured using 
state fear, behavioural inhibition, and costs associated with committing crime (such as low 
anticipated likelihood of sanctions and weak anticipated guilt and shame; Armstrong & 
Boutwell, 2012; Portnoy et al., 2014; Sijtsema et al., 2010). As a precaution, the analyses 
were repeated using a fearfulness measure reduced to include only the two items tapping into 
a general tendency to experience fear28. The results showed that fearfulness remained a non-
significant mediator of the relationship between low heart rate reactivity and crime, and 
 
28 These items were “Xxxxx xxx xxx xxxx xxxx pexxxxxx” and “Even in an emergency I wouldn't feel 
like panicking”. 
Item removed for copyright reasons. Copyright 






therefore there would be no difference in conclusions (see results in Appendix 7). This 
outcome is also in line with the only other study which tested the fearlessness hypothesis 
using an appropriate measure of trait fearlessness tapping into its different aspects (Portnoy et 
al., 2019), namely the fearlessness subscale of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory 
(Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). Nevertheless, future studies may benefit from using a wide-
ranging instrument of tendency to experience fear that would tap into different aspects of 
fear, involving both physical and social harm. 
Finally, even though the study explained the mediating effects of the relationship 
between low heart rate reactivity and crime, the underlying mechanism is not yet fully 
understood. It was hypothesised and then empirically confirmed using data from the 
Cambridge adolescent behaviour study that low heart rate reactivity correlates with high 
crime propensity, which in turn explains the relationship between the former variable and 
criminal behaviour. However, the explanation of the link between heart rate and crime 
propensity was only briefly mentioned when it was argued that it was a spurious relationship 
as both variables were caused by the same dysfunction of a specific brain network. In order to 
offer a comprehensive explanation of the mechanism by which heart rate is associated with 
crime, it is necessary to provide further details about the neurocognitive aspects of the crime 
propensity hypothesis. Therefore, the next chapter will offer a theoretical answer to the 
question of why there is an association between blunted heart rate reactivity and tendency to 
see and choose crime as an action alternative in response to a temptation or provocation, 
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6.1. Heart Rate Is Not a Cause of Crime: Understanding the Link With Crime 
Propensity 
 
As outlined in the introductory chapters, the primary aim of this study was to explain 
the link between heart rate and crime. This goal was successfully achieved by introducing a 
model well-grounded in theory which was able to fully explain the empirical link between 
low heart rate reactivity and engagement in criminal behaviour. However, in order to provide 
a comprehensive description of the underlying mechanism, it is necessary to move beyond 
mediation effects and expand the model to account for the relationship between the 
independent variable and the mediator. We learnt that crime propensity entirely mediates the 
effect of heart rate reactivity on crime, but now the final missing part of the puzzle is to be 
addressed – why is heart rate reactivity associated with crime propensity? 
As explained in Chapter 3 (section 3.1.), heart rate cannot be causally related to either 
crime or crime propensity. Having a blunted heart rate reactivity cannot move anyone to 
perceive and choose crime as an action response to a particular temptation or friction. Even 
though this relationship is only correlational, its origin still ought to be explained. The fact 
that both heart rate and criminal propensity are centrally underpinned by functions of certain 
brain regions gives rise to a possibility that their correlation is spurious and stems from the 
mutual causal factor. Namely, like other physiological functions, heart rate is centrally 
controlled by a specific neurological network which makes adjustments in line with the 
requirements of the internal and external environments (e.g., Benarroch, 1993, 1997; Thayer 
& Lane, 2009). Similarly, theoretical premises of situational action theory and empirical 
findings from neurocriminology show that neurocognitive functions are part of the causal 
process leading to criminal behaviour through their influence on crime propensity and the 
perception-choice process (e.g., Raine, 2019; Treiber, 2011, 2014, 2017; Wikström & 
Treiber, 2007). Therefore, it is possible that a central dysfunction of the overlapping brain 
regions causes both blunted heart rate reactivity and deficits in morality, ability to exercise 
self-control, and decision-making which make individuals prone to committing crime.  
In order to pinpoint the specific neural localisation that could underlie the link 
between low heart rate reactivity and crime propensity, a review of relevant findings from 
neuroscience, physiology, psychology, and criminology has been conducted. Convergence of 
insights across these fields has yielded the following brain areas as mutual to heart rate, the 
perception-choice process (specifically, crime propensity and decision-making), and criminal 





Guided by situational action theory and informed by findings from neuroscience and 
psychology, the proposed model of the link between heart rate and crime is as follows: The 
dysfunction of all or some parts of the above-mentioned fronto-temporal regions leads to 
impairments in moral emotions, weak behavioural inhibition (i.e., poor ability to exercise 
self-control), and deficient habitual decision-making, which in turn affect the perception-
choice process and thus lead to criminal behaviour in certain situations. As the same brain 
regions regulate heart rate reactivity to stress, it is proposed that the relationship between 
heart rate and crime propensity is confounded by the shared underlying central dysfunction of 
the lower fronto-temporal regions. The subsequent paragraphs will outline theoretical and 
empirical support for the premises this hypothesis is based upon. Firstly, the evidence for the 
central control of heart rate will be presented, followed by an overview of neural 
underpinnings of antisocial behaviour, crime propensity, and decision-making. This section 
will be concluded by a summary of the extended version of the crime propensity model. 
 
6.1.1. The Central Control of Heart Rate 
 
Heart rate is directly controlled by the sinoatrial node, a natural pacemaker located 
within the heart which constantly generates action potentials (i.e., electrical impulses) that 
cause cardiac muscle to contract. The activity of the sinoatrial node is in turn determined by 
the sympathetic and parasympathetic branches of the autonomic nervous system which have 
antagonistic effects on the heart rate (Bear, Connors, & Paradiso, 2016). The former releases 
norepinephrine, a neurotransmitter which has an excitatory influence on the sinoatrial node 
leading to heart rate acceleration, and the latter inhibits the firing of the pacemaker through 
discharge of acetylcholine resulting in heart rate deceleration (Appelhans & Luecken, 2006; 
Gordan, Gwathmey, & Xie, 2015; Thayer & Lane, 2009). Finally, the activity of the 
autonomic nervous system, and therefore heart rate by proxy, is regulated at the central level 
by an interconnected system of brain areas known as the central autonomic network (briefly 
mentioned in section 2.1.6.1.). Therefore, heart rate is controlled by the centres at different 
tiers of hierarchy with a network of brain regions regulating the whole system at the top level. 
The central autonomic network consists of the following regions located across the 
cortical, limbic, and brainstem areas: the medial and insular prefrontal cortices, the central 
nucleus of the amygdala and the bed nucleus of the stria terminalis, the hypothalamus, the 





ventrolateral medulla (Benarroch, 1993). This distributed network of interconnected brain 
regions receives and integrates visceral and sensory inputs regarding body functions and 
external environment, respectively, and in turn regulates physiological arousal in response to 
these internal and external demands. In particular, the medial prefrontal cortex, insula, and 
amygdala are proposed as responsible for higher-order processing of the visceral and sensory 
information and initiating a physiological response which is then carried out by the lower 
brain regions and the autonomic nervous system. 
Although the central autonomic network was originally based on findings from the 
animal experimental studies, it has since accumulated a compelling evidence base stemming 
from research involving human participants. A meta-analysis conducted on 43 neuroimaging 
studies aiming to delineate brain areas involved in autonomic processing has confirmed the 
activation of the areas belonging to the central autonomic network (Beissner et al., 2013). 
Namely, the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and amygdala, 
amongst others, were found to be commonly activated across the studies. The results of a 
meta-analysis focusing on functional neuroimaging studies exploring patterns of neural 
activation associated specifically with heart rate too has provided support for the involvement 
of the above-mentioned brain regions (Ruiz Vargas, Sörös, Shoemaker, & Hachinski, 2016). 
In addition, a recent study has also revealed a significant negative association between 
functional connectivity between regions of the central autonomic network and heart rate (De 
La Cruz et al., 2019).  
Furthermore, a number of lesion studies have confirmed the causal role of the fronto-
temporal regions in regulating autonomic arousal (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; 
Critchley et al., 2003; De Morree, Rutten, Szabo, Sitskoorn, & Kop, 2016; Schneider & 
Koenigs, 2017). Specifically, patients showed blunted autonomic reactivity and/or 
bradycardia following damage to the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, 
insula29, or amygdala. In addition, although fewer in number compared to the animal studies, 
experiments in humans have also demonstrated that electrical stimulation of the orbitomedial 
prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and amygdala leads to changes in heart 
rate (Benarroch, 1993; Inman et al., 2018; Oppenheimer et al., 1992; Parvizi, Rangarajan, 
Shirer, Desai, & Greicius, 2013). Such findings from the lesion studies and stimulation 
experiments are important due to their causal implications, as neuroimaging studies can only 
 
29 Structural deficits of insular cortex have been associated with a range of disturbances in cardiac 
regulation, including arrythmia, bradycardia, and tachycardia (Christensen et al., 2005; De Morree et al., 2016; 





reveal relationships at a correlational level. In sum, there seems to be a significant empirical 
support for the involvement of the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, insular cortex, anterior 
cingulate cortex, and amygdala (amongst others) in the central regulation of heart rate. 
 
6.1.2. Neural Underpinnings of Antisocial Behaviour 
 
In recent years, biosocial criminology has amassed a large body of evidence 
demonstrating neurological and neurocognitive impairments associated with antisocial 
behaviour and crime. An attempt to identify neurological underpinnings of criminal 
behaviour quickly leaves one overwhelmed by a large number of different brain regions and 
cognitive processes that have been associated over the years with different types of antisocial 
behaviours. However, as it is the case in general with human behaviour and personality traits, 
the neurocognitive deficits related to antisocial behaviours are mainly located in the fronto-
temporal areas involving the prefrontal cortex and the limbic system (Coccaro, Sripada, 
Yanowitch, & Phan, 2011; Raine, 2018). According to the neuroimaging studies, brain areas 
that are most commonly found to be structurally and functionally impaired in antisocial 
individuals are the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior 
cingulate cortex, and the amygdala (Boes, Tranel, Anderson, & Nopoulos, 2008; Chester, 
Lynam, Milich, & DeWall, 2017; Coccaro et al., 2018; Glenn & Raine, 2011; Glenn, Yang, 
& Raine, 2012; Raine & Yang, 2006; Yang, Glenn, & Raine, 2008; Yang & Raine, 2009). A 
growing body of evidence from neuroimaging studies has indicated that the role of the insula 
too merits a serious consideration when delineating neural underpinnings of antisocial 
behaviour (Fairchild et al., 2011; Krokoszinski, Westenberger, & Hosser, 2018; 
Noordermeer, Luman, & Oosterlaan, 2016; Repple et al., 2017; Sterzer, Stadler, Poustka, & 
Kleinschmidt, 2007).  
Building on the cross-sectional research, emerging prospective studies have generated 
some preliminary indications that neural measures obtained using functional and structural 
brain imaging techniques are also useful in predicting future offending (Aharoni et al., 2013; 
Aharoni et al., 2014; Kiehl et al., 2018; Steele et al., 2015). Namely, low brain activity in the 
anterior cingulate cortex during error processing in a behavioural inhibition task has 
significantly predicted subsequent rearrest rates in adult offenders during a follow-up period 
of up to four years (Aharoni et al., 2013, 2014; Steele et al., 2015). Similarly, a recent study 





reduced grey matter volume in the anterior temporal lobes, amygdala, and the orbitofrontal 
cortex was able to predict reoffending in an another sample of offenders (Kiehl et al., 2018). 
Although overall predictive models of crime are mostly incomplete, leaving a bulk of 
variance unexplained, the fact that neural factors have been found to significantly contribute 
to the prediction of offending over other traditional variables lends support to their 
importance in understanding antisocial behaviour.  
In general, neuroimaging studies have provided a robust evidence base demonstrating 
that antisocial behaviour is associated with structural and functional deficiencies of the 
fronto-temporal brain regions. On the downside, they cannot answer whether identified 
neural dysfunctions represent causes or correlates of crime due to the nature of their data 
(Adolphs, 2016). However, empirical findings coming from the lesion studies, patients with 
neurodegenerative diseases, and recently emerging experiments employing different brain 
stimulation techniques can provide crucial insight into a potentially causal character of these 
links. Indeed, they have supported the notion that neural factors have an important role in the 
causal chain leading to antisocial behaviours. There are a number of studies documenting 
cases in which previously socially well adapted individuals developed antisocial behaviour 
after suffering damage to the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex (Bramham, Morris, Hornak, 
Bullock, & Polkey, 2009; Meyers et al., 1992). These patients often develop clinical picture 
known in the literature as “pseudo-psychopathy” (Blumer & Benson, 1975) or “acquired 
sociopathy” (Damasio, 1994), which reflects personality changes similar to the profile of 
antisocial personality disorder. It seems that particularly severe antisocial behaviour happens 
in cases when there is a congenital malformation of the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, or 
when its damage occurs early in life (Anderson et al., 1999; Boes et al., 2011). Given the 
difficulty of recruiting neurological patients with specific focal lesions, a recent study 
involving 40 patients with brain lesions represents a particularly valuable source of insight 
into neural underpinnings of crime (Darby, Horn, Cushman, & Fox, 2018). The authors have 
firstly identified 17 patients with documented temporal link of the brain lesions preceding the 
onset of criminal behaviour. There was no specific brain region that was affected in all cases, 
which stresses the complexity of pinpointing neural localization subserving a specific 
function or behaviour. Identified lesions were scattered throughout the fronto-temporal 
region, with the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex being the most frequently affected region, 
followed by the amygdala and the anterior lateral temporal lobe. However, lesion network 
mapping has revealed that even though spatially dispersed, all lesions belonged to a brain 





the anterior temporal lobes. Finally, these results have been replicated in a sample of 23 
patients with a tentative temporal link between neural damage and crime. The replication 
analysis showed that all lesions were functionally connected to the orbitofrontal cortex, and 
most were linked to the anterior temporal lobe, amygdala, ventromedial prefrontal cortex, and 
nucleus accumbens.  
Patients with certain neurological diseases represent another valuable source of 
insight into the causal effects of brain dysfunctions. As the name already suggests, (behaviour 
variant) frontotemporal dementia represents a neurodegenerative disorder characterised by 
atrophy of specific frontal and temporal brain areas, particularly the orbitofrontal, anterior 
cingulate, and anterior insular cortices (Liljegren et al., 2015; Rabinovici & Miller, 2010; 
Seeley, Crawford, Zhou, Miller, & Greicius, 2009). The resulting core symptoms are apathy, 
behavioural disinhibition, lack of empathy, and violation of social and moral rules, including 
engaging in antisocial behaviours, whilst memory and visuospatial ability remain mostly 
spared (Bang, Spina, & Miller, 2015; Mendez, 2006, 2009; Mendez, Anderson, & Shapira, 
2005; Rosenbloom, Schmahmann, & Price, 2012). As the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex is 
more affected by the neurodegenerative process than the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(Mendez, 2009; Rosenbloom et al., 2012), these patients show diminished emotional concern 
for others and impaired emotional moral reasoning, whilst retaining intact moral knowledge 
and awareness that their antisocial behaviour is wrong (Mendez, Anderson, et al., 2005; 
Mendez, Chen, Shapira, & Miller, 2005). Research has shown that patients with 
frontotemporal dementia have significantly higher prevalence of antisocial behaviours 
compared to the patients with Alzheimer’s disease which affects different brain regions30 
(Diehl-Schmid, Perneczky, Koch, Nedopil, & Kurz, 2013; Hornberger et al., 2011; Liljegren 
et al., 2015; Miller, Darby, Benson, Cummings, & Miller, 1997). Crime specifically has been 
found to follow the onset of frontotemporal dementia in about half of the patients (Diehl-
Schmid et al., 2013; Mendez, Chen, et al., 2005). Therefore, this body of research seems to 
suggest that antisocial behaviour is caused by structural impairments of the fronto-temporal 
regions. Similarly, a study involving patients suffering from pharmacoresistant epilepsy 
affecting the orbitomedial prefrontal and anterior cingulate cortices revealed that these 
patients fulfilled diagnostic criteria for antisocial behaviour disorder, with many of them 
having committed crimes (Trebuchon, Bartolomei, McGonigal, Laguitton, & Chauvel, 2013). 
 
30 Frontotemporal dementia affects the anterior fronto-temporal regions, whereas Alzheimer’s disease 






Crucially, this study provided a further proof for the causal role of the affected brain regions 
in criminal behaviour since antisocial behaviour disappeared in all patients after seizure 
control had been reestablished. 
Finally, recently emerging studies using non-invasive brain stimulation techniques, 
which induce changes in cortical excitability, have generated experimental data in support of 
the causal role of the prefrontal cortex in antisocial behaviour. These studies are usually 
conducted in a form of randomised control trials in which participants are randomly assigned 
to either an experimental group which receives real stimulation or a control group which 
receives sham stimulation in order to control for the placebo effects, after which these groups 
are compared on an outcome variable. Research employing transcranial direct current 
stimulation to enhance neural activity in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex in healthy non-
offender adults has shown that this intervention is able to reduce aggression (Choy, Raine, & 
Hamilton, 2018; Dambacher et al., 2015). Namely, the experimental groups which received 
real stimulation have exhibited reduced proactive behavioural aggression, reported lower 
likelihood to commit physical and sexual assaults, and judged these assaults as more wrong 
compared to the sham control groups. These results have been replicated in a sample of male 
violent offenders in whom experimentally induced increase in the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex excitability has resulted in reduced self-reported aggression (Molero-Chamizo, Martín 
Riquel, Moriana, Nitsche, & Rivera-Urbina, 2019). Alternatively, there have been also 
findings that inhibitory stimulation over the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex leads to increased 
aggressive behaviour (Perach-Barzilay et al., 2013). Specifically, it seems that inhibitory 
effects of the transcranial magnetic stimulation over the left dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
cause a greater increase in aggression compared to the disruption of the right dorsolateral 
prefrontal functioning.  
Converging findings from the neuroimaging studies, patients with neurodegenerative 
diseases or brain lesions, and experimental brain stimulation studies leads to a conclusion that 
criminal behaviour is related to the impairments of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and amygdala, amongst 
others. This applies to deficiencies related to both structure and activity of these areas. 
However, only neurocognitive studies can elucidate what specific functions underpinned by 
these brain areas are deficient in individuals who exhibit antisocial behaviour. Executive 
functions represent an “umbrella term” used in cognitive psychology to describe a number of 
cognitive processes that enable purposeful and goal-oriented behaviour (Morgan & 





three core executive functions, namely inhibitory control, working memory, and cognitive 
flexibility, from which higher-order functions, involving reasoning, planning, and problem-
solving, are constructed (Diamond, 2013; Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012). 
However, there is no widely accepted finite list of cognitive processes comprising executive 
functions which can sometimes cause confusion as a number of different variables are used in 
their operationalisation across the literature (Ogilvie et al., 2011; Salthouse, 2005; Wikström 
& Treiber, 2007).  
Executive functions have been historically associated with the frontal lobe 
functioning, but updated overview of neuroimaging and lesion studies suggests that these 
should not be used synonymously as performance on the executive function tasks seems to be 
subserved by a broad network of cortical and subcortical brain regions (Alvarez & Emory, 
2006; Bettcher et al., 2016; Ogilvie et al., 2011; Zelazo & Müller, 2002). Overall, research 
shows that common measures of executive functions are sensitive, but not specific to 
impairment of the prefrontal cortex, and that they draw heavily on other brain regions as well. 
Equating executive deficiencies with frontal dysfunction might be related to the fact that 
executive functions were traditionally viewed as rational processes assessed using abstract 
tasks lacking affective aspects (Zelazo & Carlson, 2012). However, due to the influx of 
findings stressing the role of emotions and habitual processes in decision-making, the scope 
of the processes subsumed under executive functions have expanded and they have been 
recently split into the hot and cool types. Hot executive functions refer to top-down cognitive 
processes which are characterised by emotional and motivational components (De Brito, 
Viding, Kumari, Blackwood, & Hodgins, 2013; Zelazo & Carlson, 2012; Zelazo & Müller, 
2002). They are assessed with tasks tapping into processes such as response reversal, 
affective decision-making, and emotional processing (De Brito et al., 2013; Noordermeer et 
al., 2016). On the other hand, cool executive functions represent top-down cognitive 
processes that are elicited by abstract and affectively neutral problems (De Brito et al., 2013; 
Zelazo & Carlson, 2012). They involve functions such as working memory, response 
inhibition, and attentional flexibility (De Brito et al., 2013; Noordermeer et al., 2016). These 
two types of executive functions are underpinned by different functional-anatomical neural 
networks and seem to follow a different developmental trajectory with hot executive 
functions showing a somewhat delayed development (Gläscher et al., 2012; Zelazo & 
Carlson, 2012). Hot executive functions are supported by the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, 
anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and amygdala, whereas cool executive functions rely mainly 





& Müller, 2002). Such neuroanatomical foundation of hot and cool executive functions is in 
line with their differential relations with the affective and motivational aspects of cognitive 
processes. Namely, unlike the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the orbitomedial prefrontal 
cortex has strong bilateral connections to the amygdala and other limbic areas crucially 
associated with emotions and motivation, whereby it is in the perfect position to integrate 
cognitive and affective information necessary for the hot executive tasks (De Brito et al., 
2013; Zelazo & Müller, 2002). 
In line with the conclusions of the previously reviewed neuroimaging studies, 
neuropsychological research has confirmed deficient executive functioning amongst 
antisocial individuals (Baliousis, Duggan, McCarthy, Huband, & Völlm, 2019; De Brito et 
al., 2013; Meijers, Harte, Jonker, & Meynen, 2015; Morgan & Lilienfeld, 2000; Noordermeer 
et al., 2016; Ogilvie et al., 2011; Syngelaki, Moore, Savage, Fairchild, & Van Goozen, 2009). 
A meta-analysis involving 126 studies has shown a robust association between antisocial 
behaviour and impaired executive functions that applies to different antisocial groups and 
executive tasks (Ogilvie et al., 2011). The overall mean effect size was in the medium range 
(d = .44, p < .001), with criminality having the largest effect size across different antisocial 
groups (d = .61, p < .001). A recent review of studies employing prison population has 
confirmed that adult offenders tend to perform significantly worse on a number of executive 
functions compared to non-offender control samples (Meijers et al., 2015). Furthermore, a 
study which differentiated between the types of executive functions has demonstrated that, 
compared to a non-offender group, violent offenders exhibited poor performance in tasks 
assessing both hot and cool executive functions (De Brito et al., 2013). Similarly, a meta-
analysis and systematic review exploring neuroimaging findings involving individuals with 
oppositional defiant disorder/conduct disorder have found that they tend to have smaller 
volume and lower brain activity in areas underpinning hot executive functions, and to a 
smaller extent, cool executive functions (Noordermeer et al., 2016). 
In sum, converging evidence from neuroscience, neurology, and neuropsychology 
seems to suggest that antisocial behaviour is associated with dysfunctions in the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex subserving cool executive functions on one hand and the lower fronto-
temporal regions involving  the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex31, 
 
31 It is important to note that the anterior cingulate cortex is structurally and functionally heterogenous, 
and its functions are somewhat more nuanced than presented here (Margulies et al., 2007). Namely, there seems 
to be a functional division between the rostral and caudal areas of the anterior cingulate cortex wherein the 
former represents an affective subregion connected with the limbic system and the latter is a cognitive subregion 





insula, and amygdala, supporting hot executive functions on the other hand. Juxtaposing 
these areas against the areas identified in the previous section as involved in the central 
control of heart rate points to a remarkable similarity. Namely, the brain regions 
underpinning hot executive functions belong to the neural network which regulates heart rate. 
However, the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex which seems to be heavily involved in different 
antisocial behaviours is not part of the central autonomic network, and therefore is not 
expected to be relevant for the explanation of the link between heart rate and crime. 
 
6.1.3. Neural Underpinnings of the Underlying Causal Mechanism 
 
As demonstrated in the previous two sections of this chapter, there is a considerable 
overlap between neural regions involved in antisocial behaviour on one hand and heart rate 
control on the other. However, the question remains whether the identified lower fronto-
temporal regions are also involved in the mechanisms leading to criminal behaviour as 
proposed by situational action theory. Therefore, this section will outline neural bases of the 
personal aspects of the perception-choice process, namely morality, the ability to exercise 
self-control, and decision-making. 
 
6.1.3.1. Neural basis of crime propensity. 
 
According to situational action theory, a person’s crime propensity fundamentally 
depends on their morality, that is, what one thinks is right or wrong to do in a particular 
situation and the extent to which one cares about adhering to such norms. Moral rules and 
moral emotions are therefore inherently intertwined, as moral emotions regulate the strength 
of one’s moral rules. For example, if one thinks it is wrong to steal, but would not feel 
particularly guilty or ashamed of stealing, then that person is more likely to perceive stealing 
as an option in a criminogenic setting compared to someone with strong moral emotions. As 
 
been further suggested that the caudal and rostral regions distinctively support cool and hot executive functions, 
respectively (Gläscher et al., 2012; Petrovic & Castellanos, 2016). However, it has been suggested recently that 
both subregions underpin emotional processing, but instead they make different contributions, wherein the 
rostral area is involved in regulating limbic outputs and the caudal area is involved in emotion evaluation and 






moral rules are fundamentally a matter of content, this review of the neural underpinnings of 
morality will instead focus on moral emotions and moral decision-making.  
Although there is an abundance of research exploring the neural roots of basic 
emotions (e.g., anger, fear), only lately there has been an increased interest in understanding 
moral emotions from a neurobiological perspective (Bastin, Harrison, Davey, Moll, & 
Whittle, 2016). Moral emotions, such as guilt and shame, represent complex emotions that 
involve emotional processing, social cognition, and self-referential processes (Bastin et al., 
2016; Gifuni, Kendal, & Jollant, 2017; Mclatchie et al., 2016; Roth, Kaffenberger, Herwig, & 
Brühl, 2014). As self-conscious emotions, they are cognitively demanding and require 
evaluations of one’s behaviour, but also inferring about other people’s mental states and their 
view of one’s behaviour (Beer, Heerey, Keltner, Scabini, & Knight, 2003). It is therefore not 
surprising that neuroimaging studies involving healthy adult participants show that moral 
emotions engage a distributed network of the frontal, temporal, parietal, and limbic regions. 
Shame and guilt are normally found to recruit circuits typically involved in affective 
processing, such as the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insular 
cortex, and amygdala, as well as the circuits involved in self-referential processes and social 
cognition, namely the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, dorsolateral and ventrolateral prefrontal 
cortices, posterior cingulate cortex, and precuneus (Bastin et al., 2016; Blair & Fowler, 2008; 
Fourie, Thomas, Amodio, Warton, & Meintjes, 2014; Gifuni et al., 2017; Gilead, Katzir, 
Eyal, & Liberman, 2016; Mclatchie et al., 2016; Michl et al., 2014; Molenberghs et al., 2015; 
Roth et al., 2014; Shin et al., 2000; Ty, Mitchell, & Finger, 2017).  
The integrity of the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex seems to be particularly important 
for enabling a person to experience guilt (Wagner et al., 2011). Indeed, research investigating 
emotional functioning in patients with focal lesions to the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex has 
shown that they exhibit severely diminished guilt, whereas they remain perfectly capable of 
experiencing other emotions such as anger and envy (Koenigs et al., 2007; Krajbich et al., 
2009). Such findings have been explained by a theoretical distinction between primary and 
secondary emotions (Damasio, 1994). Primary emotions, such as fear, anger, and surprise, are 
considered innate and they emerge early on in life, whereas secondary emotions, such as 
shame and guilt, occur at later stages as they are built on the basis of the primary emotions. 
These emotions also have different neuroanatomical foundations, wherein the primary 
emotions are chiefly supported by the amygdala and the anterior cingulate cortex, whereas 
the secondary emotions mainly depend on the functioning of the orbitomedial prefrontal 





noticeable emotional blunting associated with the impairments in both types of emotions, 
while patients with the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex lesions may at first look emotionally 
unimpaired due to spared primary emotions and more subtle nature of deficits affecting moral 
emotions (Damasio, 1994). 
Moral emotions are closely related to moral judgement as any deficit in experiencing 
shame or guilt is also reflected in non-optimal functioning of moral reasoning. It is therefore  
not surprising that moral decision-making also shares a similar neural basis consisting of the 
fronto-limbic areas centred around the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex. According to the 
functional imaging research, the regions that are most frequently recruited during various 
moral reasoning tasks are the orbitomedial and dorsolateral prefrontal cortices, insula, 
anterior and posterior cingulate cortices, precuneus, amygdala, and temporoparietal junction 
(Blair & Fowler, 2008; Boccia et al., 2017; Eres, Louis, & Molenberghs, 2018; Fede & Kiehl, 
2020; Marazziti, Baroni, Landi, Ceresoli, & Dell’Osso, 2013; Mendez, 2009; Raine, 2019; 
Raine & Yang, 2006; Rosenbloom et al., 2012). As in the case of moral emotions, the 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex with its connections to the limbic system has been considered 
as critical for the development and effective functioning of moral reasoning. Namely, 
research shows that patients with lesions to the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex that occurred 
early in ontogenesis have both deficient knowledge about moral rules and immature moral 
reasoning (Anderson et al., 1999; Boes et al., 2011; Mendez, 2009; Taber-Thomas et al., 
2014). Their moral development does not evolve beyond the pre-conventional stage 
characterised by abnormally egocentric reasoning guided solely by self-interest. On the other 
hand, patients whose lesions to the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex happened later in life have 
intact moral knowledge, but their moral reasoning is still impaired (Koenigs et al., 2007; 
Rosenbloom et al., 2012; Schneider & Koenigs, 2017; Taber-Thomas et al., 2014; Young et 
al., 2010). They do not endorse immature self-serving rule violations like the early-onset 
patients, but they do show abnormally utilitarian moral judgment, that is, they endorse 
harmful actions that lead to aggregate welfare (Greene, 2007). When faced with hypothetical 
moral dilemmas, the adult-onset patients tend to focus on maximizing the overall benefit even 
when that involves committing emotionally aversive actions which usually repels healthy 
participants (e.g., killing one person to save five).  
Findings from patients with frontotemporal dementia, who have structurally 
compromised orbitomedial part of the prefrontal cortex, too are in line with the conclusion 
regarding the importance of this brain region in moral reasoning. Their knowledge about 





emotional moral judgement is remarkably utilitarian (Mendez, 2006; Mendez, Anderson, et 
al., 2005; Mendez, Chen, et al., 2005). Furthermore, research shows that brain stimulation 
applied over the medial prefrontal cortex in healthy participants induces changes in moral 
reasoning by increasing utilitarian responses to certain moral dilemmas (Riva, Manfrinati, 
Sacchi, Pisoni, & Romero Lauro, 2019). Therefore, there is a substantial evidence base 
demonstrating that the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex along with its connections to the limbic 
and paralimbic areas, such as the anterior cingulate cortex and amygdala, are crucial for 
experiencing moral emotions and applying them in affective moral reasoning. 
Converging results from the lesion and brain imaging studies seems to suggest that 
the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex has an integrative role in moral judgement (Greene, 2007; 
Shenhav & Greene, 2014). The amygdala is suggested to have a “bottom-up” influence, 
whereby it provides affective assessment of the situation and sends automatic emotional 
response to the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex. On the other hand, the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex, the seat of the cool executive functions, supports utilitarian reasoning by conducting 
aggregate cost-benefit analysis. The role of the anterior cingulate cortex is to detect and 
recruit a response to a conflict between the negative emotions produced by the amygdala and 
the overall benefits of the harmful action calculated by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. 
Finally, the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex generates an “all things considered” judgement by 
integrating the amygdala’s emotional aversiveness and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex’s 
utilitarian calculation (Greene, 2007; Shenhav & Greene, 2014). 
Even though morality is the fundamental component of crime propensity, the ability 
to exercise self-control is also important in crime causation under specific circumstances, 
namely whilst making a deliberate choice in a state of conflict between a person’s morality 
and an external pressure to transgress. An individual’s ability to exercise self-control depends 
mainly on the effectiveness of their executive functions to recognise a conflict between their 
motivation and morality, inhibit responses while deliberating, and finally choose an action 
that is in line with their morality (Wikström & Treiber, 2007). In other words, it 
fundamentally depends on the integrity of cool executive functions underpinned by the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, such as working memory, cognitive control, and response 
inhibition (Beaver et al., 2007; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). These functions support 
deliberate decision-making by activating, organising, maintaining, and integrating relevant 
information into internal representations within one’s virtual cognitive space, whilst also 






In addition to the dorsolateral area, the orbitomedial part of the prefrontal cortex is 
also involved in creation, maintenance, and evaluation of the internal representations that 
support decision-making and hence exercising self-control (Wikström & Treiber, 2007). If 
these internal representations are deficient, then a person’s behaviour will be driven by 
external cues which would likely result in impulsive actions. In addition, the orbitomedial 
prefrontal cortex has an important role in modulating emotional responses. Namely, due to its 
strong bilateral connections with limbic system that is heavily involved in emotional 
processing and generating responses, the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex is in the optimal 
position to exhibit top-down control and suppress emotional reactions in order to support 
self-control (Beaver et al., 2007; Treiber, 2011; Wikström & Treiber, 2007).  
Indeed, research exploring the neural basis of self-control shows its dependence on 
the structural integrity and optimal functioning of the prefrontal cortex. Empirical evidence 
demonstrates that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is responsible for various functions 
underpinning the ability to exercise self-control such as working memory, attention, planning, 
and regulation of impulsive behaviour (Cho et al., 2010, 2012; Szczepanski & Knight, 2014). 
Similarly, research supports the critical role of the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex in 
underpinning emotion regulation, impulse control, information integration, adequate 
frustration tolerance, and other processes fundamental for exerting self-control (Anderson et 
al., 1999; Boes et al., 2011; Gupta, Koscik, Bechara, & Tranel, 2011; Koenigs et al., 2007; 
Liljegren et al., 2015; Mendez, Chen, et al., 2005; Meyers et al., 1992; Schneider & Koenigs, 
2017; Szczepanski & Knight, 2014; Trebuchon et al., 2013). Overall, it seems that the ability 
to exercise self-control is supported by both cool, non-affective and hot, affective executive 
functions underpinned by the dorsolateral and orbitomedial prefrontal cortices, respectively.  
 
6.1.3.2. Neural basis of decision-making. 
 
Besides establishing neural underpinnings of crime propensity, it is also important to 
outline brain regions supporting the decision-making processes which are relevant to the 
process of choice, which were briefly touched upon in the previous section on the ability to 
exercise self-control. After a person perceives crime as an option in a particular situation, 
whether or not they will pursue such an action will depend on the choice they make (see 
section 3.3.3.). Two types of choices as outlined by situational action theory, habitual choice 





the dual-process theory in cognitive psychology, Type 1 and Type 2 processing, respectively 
(Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Kahneman, 2003, 2011; Stanovich & West, 2000).  
Rational deliberation is based on Type 2 processing which is distinguished by 
cognitive decoupling and dependency on working memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
Underpinned by working memory faculties, cognitive decoupling of secondary 
representations32 enables mental simulations which are the basis of hypothetical thinking and 
abstract reasoning (Evans, 2003; Stanovich, 2009; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). As this 
process is computationally demanding, it is constrained by the capacity and efficiency of a 
person’s working memory. Due to such heavy loading on limited working memory 
capacities, this type of processing tends to be slow, deliberative, sequential, conscious, 
abstract, controlled, effortful, low capacity, and associated with general intelligence (Evans, 
2008; Evans, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). As it is highly dependent on cool executive 
functions, Type 2 processing is primarily neuroanatomically supported by the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex (Treiber, 2011, 2014; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). 
Habitual choice is underpinned by Type 1 processing which is defined by its 
autonomy and a lack of dependency on working memory (Evans & Stanovich, 2013; 
Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). Namely, it does not require intervention from the higher-order 
cognitive systems, but it is rather executed automatically when a triggering stimulus is 
present. Unlike Type 2 processing, it puts minimal load on working memory and does not 
involve effortful attention. As such, Type 1 processing tends to be fast, automatic, parallel, 
unconscious, intuitive, high capacity, contextualised, and uncorrelated with general 
intelligence (Evans, 2008; Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). It involves 
innate behaviours and experience-based knowledge acquired by associative learning and 
conditioning (Evans, 2003; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). In addition to facilitating habitual 
choice, Type 1 processing also has an important role in the perception of action alternatives 
through its influence on the moral filter (Treiber, 2011, 2014). Neuroanatomically it has been 
associated with the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex and its affective neural network involving 
the limbic regions (Treiber, 2011, 2014; Wikström & Treiber, 2007). 
The somatic marker hypothesis (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2003; Damasio, 
1994, 1995, 1996; Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1990) provides an explanation of the 
 
32 Primary representation is an image of the world as it is and it has direct links with one’s response to 
it, whereas a secondary representation is a copy of the primary one which is decoupled from the world and used 
in simulations (Leslie, 1987; Perner, 1991). There is a need for two separate representations so that the 
representation of the world as it is does not get mixed with simulated representations of potential responses and 





mechanism through which a neural network centred in the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex 
supports habitual choice and Type 1 processing. After a series of empirical studies showing 
that the patients with focal lesions to the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex have severe deficits in 
experiencing emotions, generating autonomic arousal to socially meaningful stimuli, and 
making advantageous decisions in personal and social realms (e.g., Bechara, Tranel, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Damasio, 1995; Damasio et al., 1990), Damasio and colleagues 
have concluded that emotions and their attached somatic expressions have an important role 
in the process of decision-making. They have hypothesised that the orbitomedial prefrontal 
cortex is responsible for making and storing the experience-based associations between 
certain classes of situations and emotions that have arisen in such situations. As emotions 
express themselves primarily, although not exclusively, through changes in the state of the 
body, these emotional changes have been referred to as somatic markers. These learnt 
associations are dispositional such that once a person encounters a situation that was in the 
past linked with a specific emotional reaction, the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex 
automatically reactivates the appropriate somatic marker. The main function of the somatic 
markers is to aid the decision-making process by labelling outcomes of possible courses of 
actions as positive or negative based on the prior experience. In other words, they serve as 
qualifying signals by automatically rejecting unfavourable choices and endorsing 
advantageous choices. Indeed, research shows that without the ability to generate and 
reactivate somatic markers as a fast and automatic guiding system, patients with lesions to the 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex are governed solely by immediate prospects and remain 
oblivious to the future consequences, positive and negative alike (Bechara, Tranel, & 
Damasio, 2000; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). 
 Due to their biasing role in decision-making, somatic markers facilitate rational 
deliberation by constricting the number of courses of action a person would consider in a 
given situation. Otherwise, without somatic markers to quickly and automatically qualify 
potential responses as favourable or unfavourable, all options would be viewed as equal and 
that would result in having too many response-outcome pairs to assess in a cost-benefit 
analysis within a reasonable time period. On the other hand, if the reactivated somatic marker 
is particularly strong, it will suppress all other options leading to an automatic choice. 
Therefore, due to the associative and dispositional nature of the somatic markers, they 
represent a foundation of what situational action theory refers to as habitual choice. Finally, 
by signalling anticipated shame and guilt following the choice of crime as an action response, 





filter. In sum, somatic markers represent a mechanism underlying habitual choice, but they 
also facilitate the moral filter functioning and rational decision-making (Treiber, 2011, 2014). 
Although the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex is most commonly associated with the 
somatic markers, their unhindered functioning also depends on the integrity of other cortical 
and subcortical regions, such as the amygdala and insula, and the peripheral nervous system 
(Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Damasio, 1996; Poppa & Bechara, 2018). Namely, the 
amygdala is crucial for triggering autonomic reactions to primary inducers, that is, stimuli 
that unconditionally or through learning induce appetitive or aversive emotions. The 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex on the other hand produces autonomic reactions to secondary 
inducers that represent a memory or a thought of a primary inducer (Bechara et al., 2003; 
Gupta et al., 2011). Therefore, an intact functioning of the amygdala is a prerequisite for the 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex to develop appropriate triggering of somatic reactions to the 
secondary inducers, after which reactions to these stimuli are less dependent on the 
amygdala. The orbitomedial prefrontal cortex is necessary to link the aspects of a situation 
and the emotional reactions induced by the amygdala in relation to a specific outcome by 
associative learning, but it is also crucial in reactivating these somatic markers once the 
stored aspect of a situation is encountered. The activation of the somatic markers can be 
accomplished via “body loop”, when the amygdala triggers somatic changes which are then 
relayed back to the insula, or via “as if loop”, when the somatosensory signal goes straight to 
the insula, without eliciting the somatic changes (Damasio, 1995, 1996). Indeed, research has 
confirmed that focal lesions to both the amygdala and the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex 
cause inability to generate anticipatory somatic markers and make advantageous choices 
(Bechara et al., 1999).  
In sum, literature reviewed here seems to suggest that the rational deliberate choice 
depends on Type 2 processing underpinned mainly by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. On 
the other hand, perception of action alternatives (i.e., moral filter) and habitual choice are 
supported by Type 1 processing and the somatic markers system, which rely 
neuroanatomically on the lower fronto-temporal neural network involving the orbitomedial 







6.1.4. The Final Piece of the Puzzle: Explaining the Link Between Heart Rate Reactivity 
and Crime Propensity 
 
Neurocognitive factors have been incorporated in situational action theory as “causes 
of the causes” as they have indirect causal effect on criminal behaviour through their 
influence on the perception-choice process (Treiber, 2014). As the review of the empirical 
studies conducted in this chapter clearly demonstrates, the theoretical framework of crime 
causation outlined in situational action theory is consistent with current knowledge about how 
brain networks support morality, self-control, and decision-making. Summing-up different 
lines of research, it seems there are two functionally and anatomically different neural 
networks of relevance to crime causation. Specifically, there is a neural network seated in the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex which is crucial for the optimal functioning of cool executive 
functions which in turn support the ability to exercise self-control and rational deliberate 
decision-making. The other relevant neural network consists of the middle and lower parts of 
the prefrontal cortex along with their strong connections to the limbic system, with the 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala representing its central nodes. This network 
is fundamental for hot executive functions which are involved in crime propensity, both 
morality and to a lesser degree the ability to exercise self-control, and habitual decision-
making.  
Review of the research findings regarding the localization of the central control of 
heart rate has converged at a distributed network consisting of the cortical, limbic, and 
brainstem areas. Juxtaposing brain areas involved in the autonomic regulation on the hand, 
and causes of crime, on the other hand, has revealed a common network of the fronto-
temporal areas, involving the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, 
and amygdala. Importantly, the network centred in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is a point 
of divergence, as it is heavily implicated in crime causation but it is does not belong to the 
central autonomic network. Therefore, drawing upon research findings from a number of 
different fields (e.g., neuroscience, neurology, physiology, criminology, cognitive 
psychology), it is hypothesised that the link between heart rate reactivity and crime 
propensity is due to their shared neural underpinnings. It is suggested here that the 
dysfunction of the above-mentioned fronto-temporal areas causes both blunted heart rate 
reactivity and impairments in morality, ability to exercise self-control, and habitual decision-





the interaction with criminogenic exposure). Therefore, low heart rate reactivity to stress 
could be understood as a marker of a non-optimal functioning of the affective neural network 
spanning from the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, through the anterior cingulate and insular 
cortices, down to the amygdala, which in turn causes increased crime propensity.  
In addition, the suggested model wherein low heart rate reactivity to stress represents 
a marker of the impairments localised in the lower fronto-limbic areas also has the potential 
to explain other empirical findings related to blunted autonomic reactivity. For example, 
some studies have found that low heart rate reactivity to threat cues in women, but not their 
resting heart rate, is associated with retrospective and prospective sexual victimization (Soler-
Baillo, Marx, & Sloan, 2005; Waldron, Wilson, Patriquin, & Scarpa, 2015). These results 
have been explained by an underlying disability to recognise and respond to threat stimuli 
which would otherwise help them avoid dangerous situations. Indeed, this interpretation is in 
line with the proposed model given that effective detection, processing, and response to threat 
depend on the integrity of the aforementioned fronto-limbic circuitry (Coccaro, McCloskey, 
Fitzgerald, & Phan, 2007; Fisher et al., 2011; Ginty, Gianaros, Derbyshire, Phillips, & 
Carroll, 2013; Hu, 2018; Isenberg et al., 1999; Öhman, 2005). A finding that low heart rate 
measured in 18-year-old men during a conscription assessment is associated with higher 
likelihood of having unintentional injures later in life can also be potentially explained along 
the same lines (Latvala et al., 2015). 
Finally, the model presented above is in line with recent developments in the fields of 
behavioural medicine and physiology. Namely, since the late 1970s it has been considered 
that exaggerated heart rate reactions to stress are associated with the development of 
cardiovascular diseases as outlined by the reactivity hypothesis (Obrist, 1976, 1981). 
However, recent evidence has shown that blunted autonomic reaction to acute stress is not 
benign nor protective as it was initially thought, but rather it is associated with adverse health 
and behaviour outcomes, such as addictions, impulsivity, depression, bulimia, obesity, lower 
cognitive ability, and poor self-reported health (Bibbey et al., 2016; Carroll, Ginty, 
Whittaker, Lovallo, & de Rooij, 2017; Carroll, Lovallo, & Phillips, 2009; Gao et al., 2015; 
Ginty et al., 2013, 2011). To account for these findings, it has been suggested that blunted 
physiological reactivity to stress may be a peripheral marker of sub-optimal functioning of 
the fronto-limbic areas that support motivated behaviour, emotion regulation, and purposeful 
behaviour (Bibbey et al., 2016; Carroll et al., 2017, 2009; Ginty et al., 2013; Lovallo, 2013). 
Specifically, the central motivational dysregulation model proposes that the dysfunctions of 





short-term oriented cognitive processing, and unstable affect regulation, which in turn lead to 
impulsive behaviours associated with poor health outcomes (Lovallo, 2013).  
The reviewed support for the outlined model of the relationship between blunted heart 
rate reactivity and crime is only circumstantial. Although predictions deduced from this 
model are straightforward and falsifiable, it was not possible to fully test this model in the 
Cambridge adolescent behaviour study as it was unfeasible to obtain the necessary 
neuroimaging data. However, the study included some neurocognitive measures to enable 
preliminary testing of the complete crime propensity model which is presented in the next 
section. 
6.2. Testing the Complete Crime Propensity Model 
 
 This chapter will be concluded by presenting the results of the preliminary test of the 
extended crime propensity model which incorporates the neurocognitive causes of the crime 
propensity into the explanation of the relationship between heart rate reactivity and crime. 
Firstly, specific hypotheses stemming from the proposed model will be outlined, followed by 
a methods section. Next, the results of the statistical analyses will be presented. The chapter 
will be brought to an end by a discussion of the results. 
 
6.2.1. Study Hypotheses 
 
The analyses that will be presented in the following sections were conducted with aim 
to test the complete crime propensity model of the relationship between heart rate and crime 
as outlined in this chapter. Briefly, the model states that the subtle perturbations specific to 
the lower fronto-temporal regions supporting hot executive functions cause both low heart 
rate reactivity and increased crime propensity, that is, low morality and weak ability to 
exercise self-control. It is further hypothesised that high crime propensity leads to criminal 
behaviour, whereas the low heart rate reactivity is not part of this causal chain. In order to 
document the specificity of the lower fronto-temporal areas and hot executive functions, this 
study also included a test of a control model wherein the dysfunction of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex and its associated cool executive functions is used instead of the measure of 





prefrontal cortex leads to increased crime propensity, and therefore crime itself, but that it 
does not cause blunted heart rate reactivity.  
Therefore, it is expected that a task tapping into hot executive functions will be on one 
hand negatively associated with crime propensity and criminal behaviour, and on the other 
hand positively associated with heart rate reactivity. As for the control model, it is predicted 
that a task tapping into cool executive functions will be negatively associated with criminal 
propensity and crime, but that it will not show a significant association with heart rate 
reactivity. It is further expected that the former model involving hot executive functions will 
fit the data better. As for the bivariate relationships regarding individual crime propensity 
components, it is expected that the ability to exercise self-control will be positively associated 
with both cool and hot executive functions, whereas guilt and shame will demonstrate 





As the following analyses were conducted using data from the Cambridge adolescent 
behaviour study, all relevant information concerning methodology used is contained in the 
Chapter 4. Only the neurocognitive measures will be briefly commented on here, namely the 
working memory and emotion recognition tasks which were used to tap into the functioning 
of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and the lower fronto-temporal regions centred around the 
orbitomedial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala, respectively. 
Digit Span Backwards task (see section 4.3.2.1.) measures verbal working memory 
which represents a core cool executive function. It involves both maintenance and 
manipulation of information in the short-term memory, and fundamentally depends on the 
integrity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (De Brito et al., 2013; Diamond, 2013; 
Szczepanski & Knight, 2014). Working memory has been specifically associated with the 
functioning of the dorsolateral areas of the prefrontal cortex, as patients with damage to the 
orbitomedial regions have in general intact cool executive functions (Bechara, Tranel, 
Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Damasio et al., 1990; Saver & Damasio, 1991). 
Functioning of the lower fronto-temporal areas was measured using the emotion 
recognition task (see section 4.3.2.2.) indexing hot executive functioning (McDonald, 2013; 





facial expressions of emotions depends on a distributed network of the fronto-temporal 
regions, particularly the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex and the amygdala (Adolphs, 2002; 
Mendez, 2006; Yang et al., 2007). A number of lesion studies have documented that 
following damage to the orbitomedial prefrontal cortex, these patients experience severe 
deficits in recognising a range of different emotions from facial cues (Hornak et al., 2003; 
Hornak, Rolls, & Wade, 1996; Rosenbloom et al., 2012; Schneider & Koenigs, 2017; 
Szczepanski & Knight, 2014). It is important to note that specifically the orbitomedial areas 
of the prefrontal cortex are fundamental for the general ability to recognise emotions, as the 
damage to the dorsolateral regions of the prefrontal cortex has not been associated with these 
deficits (Heberlein et al., 2008; Hornak et al., 2003). Historically, the amygdala was 
associated primarily with fear recognition, but it is now widely accepted that it has an 
important role in general emotion processing as it has been found that its damage leads to 
inability to recognise a range of emotions (Adolphs, 2002; Ashwin, Chapman, Colle, & 
Baron-Cohen, 2006; Yang et al., 2007). 
 
6.2.3. Statistical Analyses 
 
The bivariate relationships between the neurocognitive variables, crime propensity, 
heart rate reactivity, and crime were assessed in the same manner as in the previous analyses 
(see section 5.2.2.). Two models involving different neurocognitive variables as the causes of 
crime propensity and heart rate reactivity were specified. In the first model, hot executive 
function was the exogenous variable which predicted crime propensity and heart rate 
reactivity, with the former in turn predicting criminal behaviour. All variables were observed, 
with the exception of crime propensity which was a latent variable manifested by guilt, 
shame, and the ability to exercise self-control. These three observed variables were 
previously reversed for their use in the structural equation modelling such that high crime 
propensity reflected weak moral emotions and poor ability to exercise self-control. Residual 
variances of guilt and shame were allowed to correlate, as it was believed that being moral 
emotions they had something in common that was not captured by crime propensity. By 
default, the factor loading of guilt was fixed to one in order to fix the scale of the crime 
propensity. The second model was identical except that the exogenous variable was cool 
executive function. Parameter estimates were derived using maximum likelihood method 





some deviations from normality in the data. Robust bias-corrected and accelerated 95% 
confidence intervals using 5000 samples were produced for each path coefficient value. 
There were no missing values for shame, guilt, and crime, whereas there was one missing 
value for the ability to exercise self-control, three each for hot and cool executive functions, 
and five for heart rate reactivity. Missing data were estimated using the full information 
maximum likelihood method. 
The significance of each model will be assessed using three criteria (Schumacker & 
Lomax, 2016). Firstly, the chi-square test as a measure of global fit should be non-significant. 
Secondly, individual path values specified by the model should be significant. Finally, the 
direction and the size of the parameter values should be theoretically meaningful. In line with 
Kline's (2016) suggestions, the following fit statistics were reported in addition to the chi-
square: root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) along with its 90% confidence 
interval, comparative fit index (CFI), and standardised root mean square residual (SRMR). 
RMSEA values below .08 and .06 represent acceptable and good fit, respectively; CFI values 
above .90 and .95 represent acceptable and good fit, respectively; SRMR values below .06 
represent good fit (Brown, 2015). Finally, Bayesian information criterion (BIC) will be used 




As predicted, emotion recognition which measured the lower fronto-temporal 
functioning showed significant correlations in the expected direction with all the other 
variables. Namely, there was a significant negative correlation with criminal behaviour,         
r = - .20, 95% BCa CI [- .33, - .07], p < .001, whereas it was positively correlated with heart 
rate reactivity,  r = .10, 95% BCa CI [.03, .18], p = .024, shame, r = .11, 95% BCa CI [.01, 
.22], p = .015, guilt, r = .16, 95% BCa CI [.06, .26], p < .001, and the ability to exercise self-
control, r = .14, 95% BCa CI [.05, .22], p = .003. In line with the hypotheses, working 
memory which tapped into the dorsolateral prefrontal functioning was significantly correlated 
with the ability to exercise self-control, r = .12, 95% BCa CI [.03, .22], p = .007, whereas 
there were no significant correlations with shame, r = .03, 95% BCa CI [- .06, .13], p = .474, 
guilt, r = .09, 95% BCa CI [- .01, .18], p = .06, and heart rate reactivity, r = .01, 95% BCa CI 





significantly associated with involvement in crime, r = - .07, 95% BCa CI [- .16, .02],            
p = .138. 
The measurement model consisted of one latent variable defined by three indicators, 
and therefore the model fit could not be evaluated. However, factor loadings were statistically 
significant (p < .001) and their standardised values ranged between .62 for the ability to 
exercise self-control to .75 for guilt.  
The model assessing hot executive function as the cause of the cause was evaluated 
first. There was no violation of the assumption of multicollinearity. An examination of the 
correlations between emotion recognition, heart rate reactivity, shame, guilt, and ability to 
exercise self-control showed no extreme multicollinearity as the largest correlation was          
r = .71, p < .001, found between shame and guilt. The lack of multicollinearity was further 
confirmed by the collinearity statistics, as all tolerance statistics were well above the 
threshold of .10 and all VIF values were well below 10.0. The model fit the data well as the 
chi-square was non-significant, all path values were significant and in the expected 
directions, and the model fit indices showed a good fit of the data to the hypothesised 
structure. The model fit indices were as follows: χ2 (8, N = 487) = 12.70, p = .123;       
RMSEA = .04, 90% CI [.00, .07]; CFI = .99; SRMR = .04. Emotion recognition significantly 
predicted both crime propensity, b = - 0.02, 95% BCa CI [- 0.03, - 0.01], p < .001, and heart 
rate reactivity, b = 0.17, 95% BCa CI [0.05, 0.29], p = .009, in the expected directions. In 
turn, crime propensity significantly predicted criminal behaviour, b = 1.30, 95% BCa CI 
[1.05, 1.60], p < .001. The graph illustrating this structural model with the standardised path 






Figure 6.1. Fronto-temporal structural model. Standardised parameter estimates are shown for 
each path (N = 487). 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
 
The control model assessing cool executive function as the cause of the cause was 
evaluated next. As in the case of the previous model, there was no violation of the assumption 
of multicollinearity. An examination of correlations between working memory, heart rate 
reactivity, shame, guilt, and ability to exercise self-control showed no extreme 
multicollinearity as the largest correlation was the one found between shame and guilt. The 
lack of multicollinearity was further confirmed by the collinearity statistics, as all tolerance 
statistics were well above the threshold of .10 and all VIF values were well below 10.0. The 
analysis showed that the structural model with the dorsolateral prefrontal functioning did not 
fit the data adequately. The chi-square was significant χ2 (8, N = 487) = 16.52, p = .036, 
implying that the observed and the implied theoretical variance-covariance matrices were 
significantly different. Other model fit indices were as follows: RMSEA = .05, 90% CI [.01, 
.08]; CFI = .99; SRMR = .05. As predicted, working memory did not predict changes in heart 
rate reactivity, b = 0.03, 95% BCa CI [- 0.25, 0.32], p = .828, and increased crime propensity 





p < .001. However, working memory predicted crime propensity only marginally, b = - 0.01, 
95% BCa CI [- 0.03, 0.00], p = .054. The graph illustrating this structural model with the 
standardised path coefficients is presented in Figure 6.2. Finally, BIC values showed that the 
fronto-temporal model (BIC = 5393.201) provided a better fit in comparison to the 




Figure 6.2. Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex structural model. Standardised parameter estimates 
are shown for each path (N = 487). 




Overall, the results seem to confirm the hypotheses outlined at the beginning of this 
section. Most importantly, the complete explanatory model of the relationship between heart 
rate and crime, which incorporated neurocognitive factors, received empirical backing. Data 
from the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study supported the explanation wherein blunted 





itself on the other hand originate from the shared impairments of hot executive functions. The 
subtle dysfunctions of the fronto-temporal areas centred around the orbitomedial prefrontal 
cortex and the amygdala seem to cause diminished moral emotions, poor ability to exercise 
self-control, and blunted heart rate reactivity to acute stress. Therefore, the inverse 
association between heart rate reactivity and crime is likely spurious and confounded by the 
common causal factor. Equally importantly, the results demonstrated specificity of the 
common cause given that the underlying neural dysfunction did not seem to be global, but 
instead confined to the lower prefrontal and limbic areas supporting the hot executive 
functions. Specifically, the model wherein cool executive functioning of the dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex was tested as the common source of both low heart rate reactivity and 
increased crime propensity was not supported by the existing data. Therefore, the fronto-
temporal model was supported by both the theoretical review laid out in the first half of this 
chapter and the empirical results that followed in the second half. 
Looking at the results concerning the bivariate relationships, specific hypotheses 
referring to the functioning of the lower fronto-temporal regions were all supported by the 
data. Namely, as predicted, poor hot executive functioning was associated with increased 
criminal behaviour, diminished moral emotions, and low ability to exercise self-control. 
Indeed, these results are also in line with a number of prior studies which have demonstrated 
impaired ability to recognise emotional expressions among antisocial populations (Bowen, 
Morgan, Moore, & Van Goozen, 2014; Dawel, O’Kearney, McKone, & Palermo, 2012; 
Hoaken, Allaby, & Earle, 2007; Marsh & Blair, 2008). As for the dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex functioning, all hypotheses involving individual crime propensity variables were 
empirically endorsed. Involvement of the cool executive functions in supporting the ability to 
exhibit self-control, as outlined in situational action theory, was confirmed (Treiber, 2014; 
Wikström & Treiber, 2007). It is also important to note the aggregate pattern of results 
relating to the ability to exercise self-control. Namely, although biosocial criminology tends 
to associate self-control with purely cognitive executive processes (e.g., Beaver et al., 2007; 
Cauffman et al., 2005; Wikström & Treiber, 2007), the theoretical review and results outlined 
in this chapter suggest that self-control involves top-down control of both affective and 
cognitive processes. Therefore, it seems reasonable to revise the mainstream understanding of 
the ability to exercise self-control by including more explicitly not only cool, but hot 
executive functions as well (Buckholtz, 2015). Finally, the expected inverse relationship 
between cool executive functions and criminal behaviour was not supported by the data. The 





the overall weak links between neurocognitive factors and crime due to a number of 
mediating processes happening in between (Treiber, 2014). In addition, these results confirm 
the more important role of habitual processes in criminal decision-making in comparison to 
rational deliberation as suggested by situational action theory (Treiber, 2014). 
Although the empirical results presented here provide clear support for the fronto-
temporal model of the link between blunted heart rate reactivity and engagement in crime, 
they should be interpreted in light of the study’s limitations. Firstly, the collected data did not 
include structural or functional neuroimaging measurements pertaining to the brain regions of 
interest which would help strengthen the overall conclusions. Secondly, both hot and cool 
executive functioning were each assessed using a single instrument. Given the inherent 
difficulties of designing tasks that would tap exclusively into hot or cold executive processes 
and specific neural regions (Zelazo & Müller, 2002), it is necessary to replicate these results 
using different neurocognitive measures. Therefore, the obtained results should be interpreted 
as providing only preliminary support for the fronto-temporal model stressing the common 
cause underlying both heart rate reactivity and crime propensity. Future studies are strongly 
encouraged to test the extended crime propensity model using neuroimaging data and a 


























































 The final chapter will be concise and to the point wherein the main contributions of 
the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study will be recapitulated. Firstly, the need to embrace 
an analytical approach in biosocial criminology and, indeed, the whole field in general, was 
explained and emphasised in Chapter 1. In the past years, biosocial criminology has come a 
long way from being an outlier to representing “a new paradigm capable of guiding 
criminology in the 21st century” (Cullen, 2009, p. xvii). It has brought (back) biology and all 
the attached advancements in science and technology into the field of criminology, and 
stressed the importance of the interaction between biological and environmental factors in 
understanding criminal behaviour. As any theory which aims to explain crime while ignoring 
the human body is incomplete, biosocial criminology has indeed advanced the field by 
introducing a missing piece of the criminological puzzle. However, if the biosocial paradigm 
truly aims to revolutionise and guide criminology in this century, it needs to move from the 
risk-factor approach of piling up hundreds of correlates of crime without trying to understand 
how these numerous factors are actually associated with crime. Instead, it is necessary to sort 
out which few of many correlates are causally related to crime, and by what means. The 
overarching goal of this study was to contribute to making such a paradigm shift in biosocial 
criminology by taking one of the most prominent correlates of crime, low heart rate, and 
establishing its relation to crime.  
Secondly, a thorough review of the research literature on the connection between 
heart rate and a range of antisocial behaviours, including crime, was conducted throughout 
Chapter 1. This led to a conclusion that this link is indeed robust as suggested in many prior 
reviews and meta-analyses. However, this meticulous analysis of the empirical studies also 
resulted in a completely new insight regarding the fundamental nature of the relationship of 
interest. Namely, the conclusions of many studies which have reported a negative association 
between resting heart rate and antisocial behaviour proved questionable given their 
methodological characteristics. In many cases, these studies have either measured resting 
heart rate in unstandardised conditions, which different participants could have experienced 
differently, or in potentially stressful circumstances. Therefore, there is a strong possibility 
that such studies have in fact measured heart rate reactivity under the false label of resting 
heart rate. Furthermore, the studies which have measured resting heart rate under 
standardised conditions for eliciting baseline level have very often failed to find a significant 
relationship with antisocial behaviours. On the other hand, studies which have measured heart 





significant results not only with antisocial behaviours, but with a range of other outcomes, 
such as threat detection, addiction, and impulsivity. This observation gave rise to a hypothesis 
that antisocial behaviour is associated with blunted heart rate reactivity, whereas it is 
unrelated to resting heart rate. 
Thirdly, Chapter 2 contains a comprehensive overview of the proposed theoretical 
explanations of the inverse link between heart rate and antisocial behaviours. Some of these 
explanations are more established, like the fearlessness and stimulation-seeking hypotheses, 
whereas others have been only briefly mentioned in the literature and are less known, such as 
the autonomic feedback and right hemisphere functioning hypotheses. All proposals were 
subjected to theoretical evaluation in order to test their usefulness in providing a sound 
explanation of the heart rate – antisocial behaviour association. However, the result of this 
review led to a conclusion that not a single theoretical explanation offered a viable solution 
which could withstand a detailed scrutiny. In general, these hypotheses have been based upon 
unfounded and/or questionable assumptions. In addition, few empirical studies which have 
been conducted in order to test some of these explanations, primarily the fearlessness and 
stimulation-seeking hypotheses, were reviewed as well. In line with theoretical evaluation, 
the research findings were unconvincing having in mind identified methodological issues and 
the actual statistical results. 
Fourthly, after pinpointing the problems plaguing the existing theoretical explanations 
of the empirical connection between low heart rate and antisocial behaviour, Chapter 3 
followed up with outlining a new, viable model that would be able to account for this 
phenomenon. Employing situational action theory as a theoretical framework of the analysis, 
it was argued that heart rate cannot be a cause of crime, and that instead it was a marker of a 
cause of crime. As heart rate represents a personal characteristic, it was suggested that its 
association with criminal behaviour could be explained through crime propensity. 
Specifically, it was hypothesised that low heart reactivity correlates with weak morality and 
poor ability to exercise self-control which comprise high crime propensity that in turn leads 
to criminal behaviour in certain situations. Therefore, the crime propensity model predicted 
that the relationship between heart rate and crime would be fully explained by the mediating 
effect of crime propensity. 
Next, Chapters 4 and 5 presented the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study and its 
results, respectively. This study was specifically designed to address the research questions 
that were raised in the prior chapters. Its principal goal was to test the new model of the heart 





yet unlikely explanations, the fearlessness and stimulation-seeking hypotheses. In addition, 
the study aimed to address other important uncertainties that were identified in the preceding 
review. Primarily, it was of paramount importance to establish whether criminal behaviour 
was associated with heart rate reactivity to stress, resting heart rate, or both. This was dealt 
with by employing standardised protocols of measuring heart rate under resting and stressful 
conditions. Next, both fearlessness and stimulation-seeking concepts were measured using 
valid instruments which has not always been the case in the prior studies. This made it 
possible to have a pure measure of stimulation-seeking and avoid its conflations with 
impulsivity, an issue that has plagued much of the previous research. At last, an outcome 
measure assessed criminal behaviour specifically, and therefore avoided the usual pitfalls of 
using a loosely defined concept of antisocial behaviour. In addition, the instrument used to 
measure criminal behaviour also included items that tapped into cyber-crime which has been 
strikingly lacking in the criminological research. 
The results have firstly established the exact nature of the link between low heart rate 
and crime. Namely, it was found that crime was inversely associated only with heart rate 
reactivity to stress, and was unrelated to resting heart rate. However, the most profound 
finding from the Cambridge adolescent behaviour study was that the newly developed crime 
propensity model fully accounted for the link between heart rate reactivity and engagement in 
crime. As for the other two models, the fearlessness hypothesis did not mediate the link at all, 
whereas the stimulation-seeking exhibited only partial mediation. In fact, the latter ceased to 
be a significant mediator once the ability to exercise self-control, a construct distinct from 
stimulation-seeking, but related to it, was accounted for in the model. Therefore, the 
empirical results did not support the most prominent explanations of the link between heart 
rate and antisocial behaviour. Moreover, the results gave rise to a hypothesis that the prior 
findings pertaining to the significant mediation effects of stimulation-seeking could be due to 
its conflation with impulsivity. The study also provided an important insight into the cyber-
crime activity of English youth which is a completely new finding. 
Finally, the complete crime propensity model which aimed to include an explanation 
of the link between crime propensity and heart rate reactivity was outlined in detail 
throughout Chapter 6. Given that heart rate cannot be a cause of crime propensity, it was 
argued that their relationship is spurious and that it could be explained by their links to a 
common, third factor. By converging evidence from neuroscience, criminology, and 
cognitive psychology, a theoretical model was proposed wherein both increased crime 





dysfunction viewed as “the cause of the cause”. Specifically, it was argued that the subtle 
perturbations in the lower fronto-temporal regions involving the orbitomedial prefrontal 
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insula, and amygdala, caused diminished moral emotions 
and poor ability to exercise self-control, which in turn led to criminal behaviour in certain 
situations. The same neural dysfunction was proposed to cause blunted heart rate reactivity to 
stress. In addition to a review of empirical findings and theoretical work supporting this 
model, it was also empirically tested using data from the Cambridge adolescent behaviour 
study. In the analyses, two models were compared with regards to their fit to the data. The 
first model involved a measure of hot executive functions which tapped into the functioning 
of the lower fronto-temporal regions as the common cause of both heart rate reactivity and 
crime propensity, whereas the other model employed a measure of cool executive functions 
underpinned by the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, a designated control brain region. The 
results provided empirical support for the first model whereby the dysfunction of the lower 
fronto-temporal regions leads to both blunted heart rate reactivity and increased crime 
propensity that in turn causes criminal behaviour. As predicted, the alternative, control model 
was not supported by the empirical results.   
Therefore, by outlining a clear and precise theoretical mechanism underlying the 
relationship between low heart rate and crime, and providing the empirical results to support 
it, this study has contributed towards tidying up the knowledge base in biosocial criminology 
and disentangling correlates from the causes of crime in an effort to bring the analytical 
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Appendix 1. Demographics Questionnaire 
1. What is your sex? 
Response options: Male; Female. 
2. How old are you? 
Response options: 16; 17; Other (type-in answer option). 
3. What is your ethnicity? 
Response options: White; Asian/Asian British; Black/Black British; Mixed/Multiple ethnic 
groups; Other ethnic group. 
4. What is the highest level of education completed by your mother? 
Response options: Not completed compulsory school; Completed compulsory school 
(GCSEs); A-levels; University degree. 
5. What is the highest level of education completed by your father? 
Response options: Not completed compulsory school; Completed compulsory school 
(GCSEs); A-levels; University degree. 
6. Are you receiving free school meals? 
Response options: Yes; No. 
 
Appendix 2. Working Memory 
 
Instructions: “You will be presented with a series of numbers and your goal is to 
repeat the numbers in the reverse order as they were presented. For example, if you are 
presented with numbers 3 and 5, respectively, the correct answer would be 53. This is a 
measure of your memory span, and therefore it is not allowed to write down the numbers. 
The goal of the task is to try to remember and reverse the order of numbers using only your 
mind, without using any external help (such as pencil and paper). Each number will be 









Repeat the numbers in the reverse order as they appeared: 
 
Trial 1: 2 4 
 5 8 
Trial 2: 6 2 9 
 4 1 5 
Trial 3: 3 2 7 9 
 4 9 6 8 
Trial 4: 1 5 2 8 6 
 6 1 8 4 3 
Trial 5: 5 3 9 4 1 8 
 7 2 4 8 5 6 
Trial 6: 8 1 2 9 3 6 5 
 4 7 3 9 1 2 8  
Trial 7: 9 4 3 7 6 2 5 8 
 7 2 8 1 9 6 5 3 
 
Appendix 3. Crime Questionnaire 
 
Participants were firstly asked whether they had committed a crime since they had 
started secondary school (crime versatility). If answered negatively, they would move to the 
next question. If answered affirmatively, they would be asked how many times had they 
committed the crime (crime frequency). In the interest of clarity, crime frequency and crime 
versatility questions will be presented independently. 
 
3.1. Crime versatility. 
 
 Response options: “Yes” (=1), “No” (=0). 
 
1. Since you started secondary school, have you stolen anything from a shop (for example, a 
CD, clothes, cosmetics, or any other things)? 






3. Since you started secondary school, have you broken into a non-residential building to 
steal something (for example, broken into a shop, school, warehouse, office)? 
4. Since you started secondary school, have you broken into a car to steal something? 
5. Since you started secondary school, have you stolen anything from another person (for 
example, money, a mobile telephone, a bicycle, a wallet or a purse, a hand-bag, jewellery, a 
watch)? *Not counting events in which you broke into a car, house or non-residential 
building or shop-lifted 
6. Since you started secondary school, have you stolen a car? 
7. Since you started secondary school, have you damaged or destroyed things not belonging 
to you for fun or because you were bored or angry (for example, smashed windows or street 
lights, scratched the paint off cars, sprayed graffiti on a wall, damaged a bicycle)? 
8. Since you started secondary school, have you set fire to something you were not supposed 
to set fire to (for example, started a fire in a school, started a fire in an empty building, set fire 
to a house, started a fire in a playground, started a fire in a wood)? 
9. Since you started secondary school, have you used a weapon, hit or threatened to hurt 
someone, to take money or other things from them? 
10. Since you started secondary school, have you beaten up or hit someone (for example, 
punched, stabbed, kicked, or head-butted someone)? *Not counting events when you took 
money or other things from someone 
11. When you are out by yourself or with your friends do you ever carry a knife or other 
weapon?33 *Do not count when you are at home or in school 
Follow up questions: 
11a. How often do you carry a knife or other weapon when you are out by yourself or 
with your friends? (response options: “Always”, “Most times”, “Sometimes”, “Not 
very often”) 
11b. When you carry a weapon, what kind of weapon do you usually carry? (response 
options: “Knife”, “Other, please say what ____”) 
12. When you are at school do you ever carry a knife or other weapon? 
Follow up questions: 
12a. How often do you carry a knife or other weapon when you are at school? 
(response options: “Always”, “Most times”, “Sometimes”, “Not very often”) 
 
33 The answers from the questions regarding carrying knifes or other weapons when out and at school 





12b. When you carry a weapon in school, what kind of weapon do you usually carry? 
(response options: “Knife”, “Other, please say what ____”) 
13. Since you started secondary school, have you accessed someone else's computer, email or 
an online account without their permission? 
Follow up questions: 
13a. What type of computer material have you accessed without the owner's 
permission? (response options: “Files stored on a hard drive or cloud storage (for 
example, photos, videos, and documents)”, “Social networking account”, “Email 
account”, “Bank account”, “Other, please say what _____”) 
13b. How do you usually obtain access to someone else's computer or an online 
account? (response options: “Accessing someone else's computer that is not password 
protected”, “Using the computer or an online account after their owner had forgotten 
to log out”, “Watching the person enter their details and then using their username 
and password to log in”, “Guessing password”, “Malware, please say what type”, 
“Other, please say what _____”) 
14. Since you started secondary school, have you developed or distributed malware (for 
example, a computer virus) or other harmful software to deliberately damage or infect 
another person’s computer? 
Follow up questions: 
14a. What type of malware do you usually use? (response options: “Viruses”, 
“Worms”, “Trojans”, “Ransomware”, “Spyware”, “Other, please say what _____”) 
15. Since you started secondary school, have you used a denial of service (DoS) attack 
(including “booter” or “stresser” services) to disrupt an online service or an individual’s 
internet connection? 
Follow up questions: 
15a. Why do you usually initiate a DoS attack? (response options: “For fun”, “To 
retaliate”, “To win in an online game by knocking the other player offline”, “For 









3.2. Crime frequency. 
 
Response option: type-in answer (participants were required to enter a number describing  
how many times they had committed each crime) 
 
1. How many times have you stolen something from a shop? 
2. How many times have you broken into someone’s house or flat to steal something? 
3. How many times have you broken into a non-residential building to steal something? 
4. How many times have you  broken into a car to steal something? 
5. How many times have you stolen something from another person? 
6. How many times have you stolen a car? 
7. How many times have you damaged or destroyed something not belonging to you? 
8. How many times have you set fire to something you were not supposed to? 
9. How many times have you used a weapon, hit or threatened to hurt someone, to take 
money or other things from them? 
10. How many times have you beaten up or hit someone? 
Follow up questions: 
10a. Did you use a weapon the last time you beat up someone? (response options: 
“Yes”, “No”) 
10b. What sort of weapon did you use? (response options: “Knife”, “Other sharp 
instrument (for example, a broken bottle or razor)”, “Blunt instrument (for example, a 
piece of wood, iron bar or cosh)”, “Air gun”, “Firearm”) 
11. How many times have you accessed someone else's computer or an online account 
without permission? 
12. How many times have you developed or distributed malware or other harmful software to 
deliberately damage or infect other person’s computer? 
13. How many times have you used a DoS attack to disrupt an online service or an 









Appendix 4. Lifestyle and Health Questionnaire 
 
1. During a typical week, how many times do you do the following exercises for more than 
25 minutes: 
A. Mild exercise that requires minimal effort where you could easily sing while doing 
the activity, such as yoga, fishing, bowling, golf, and leisure walking 
Response options: “Never” (=0), “1-3” (=1), “4-6” (=2), “7-9” (=3), “10 times or 
more” (=4). 
B. Moderate exercise that is not exhausting where you could easily carry on a 
conversation while doing the activity, such as jogging, non-competitive sports, leisure 
dancing, and leisure swimming 
Response options: “Never” (=0), “1-3” (=1), “4-6” (=2), “7-9” (=3), “10 times or  
more” (=4). 
C. Vigorous exercise where you become winded or too out of breath to carry on a 
conversation while doing the activity, such as running, competitive sports games 
(soccer, football, basketball, etc.), energetic dancing, and swimming laps 
Response options: “Never” (=0), “1-3” (=1), “4-6” (=2), “7-9” (=3), “10 times or 
more” (=4). 
2. How many cigarettes do you smoke on an average day? 
Response options: “None / I do not smoke” (=0), “1-5” (=1), “6-10” (=2), “11-15” 
(=3), “16-20” (=4), “more than 20” (=5). 
3. How often do you have a drink containing alcohol? 
Response options: “Never” (=0), “Monthly or less” (=1), “2-4 times a month” (=2), 
“2-3 times a week” (=3), “4 or more times per week” (=4). 






Response options: “1-2” (=0), “3-4” (=1), “5-6” (=2), “7-9” (=3), “10 or more” (=4)34. 
5. How often have you had 6 or more units of alcohol on a single occasion in the last year?35 / 
How often have you had 8 or more units of alcohol on a single occasion in the last year?36 
Response options: “Never” (=0), “Less than monthly” (=1), “Monthly” (=2), 
“Weekly” (=3), “Daily or almost daily” (=4). 
6. How many caffeine-containing drinks (e.g., coffee, tea [excluding fruit and herbal teas, 
such as camomile or mint tea], coke, energy drinks) have you consumed in the past 12 hours? 
Response options: “0” (=0), “1” (=1), “2” (=2), “3” (=3), “4” (=4), “5” (=5), “more 
than 5” (=6). 
7. Have you ever tried drugs (cannabis, amphetamines, ecstasy, heroin, cocaine, crack, LSD, 
GBH, crystal meth, tranquilizers, magic mushrooms, or anabolic steroids)? 
Response options: “Yes” (=1), “No” (=0). 
8. For the drugs you have tried, please state how many times you have used them since you 
started secondary school.37 
Listed drugs: “Cannabis (also called marijuana, grass, hash, dope, pot, weed, blow, 
skunk, ganja, spliff, wacky backy)”, “Amphetamines (also called speed, whizz, sulph, 
billy, sulphate, whites, base)”, “Ecstasy (also called E, pills, adam, doves, mitsubishis, 
rolexs, dolphins, XTC)”, “Heroin (also called smack, brown, dragon, gear, H, horse, 
junk, skag)”, “Cocaine (also called powder, C, charlie, coke, snow, percy, white, 
toot)”, “Crack (also called rocks, stone, wash, freebase)”, “LSD (also called acid, 
tabs, trips, dots, flash, smilies, rainbows)”, “Crystal methamphetamine (also called 
 
34 This question was not presented to the participants who responded with “never” to the previous 
question. 
35 This question was presented to female participants only 
36 This question was presented to male participants only 





crystal meth, ice, crank, glass)”, “Methadone (also called linctus, physeptone)”, 
“GHB (also called GBH, Georgie Home Boy, liquid ecstasy, liquid Z, liquid G, 
fantasy)”, “DXM, DM (cough suppressant)”, “Tranquilizers (also called 
diazepam,valium, vallies, downers, roofies, benzos, temazepam, king kong pills, 
jellies, tams, mazzies, beans, eggs, rugby balls, ruggers, terminators, vitamin T)”, 
“Magic mushrooms (also called shrooms, magics, liberties)”, “Ketamine (also called 
green, K, super K)”, “Anabolic steroids (also called roids)” 
Response options: “Once or twice” (=1), “A few times (3-5 times)” (=2), “Many 
times (6-10 times)” (=3), “Very many times (11-50 times)” (=4), “Very, very many times 
(50+ times)” (=5). 
9. Have you ever sold drugs (cannabis, amphetamines, ecstasy, heroin, cocaine, crack, LSD, 
GBH, crystal meth, tranquilizers, magic mushrooms, or anabolic steroids)? 
Response options: “Yes” (=1), “No” (=0). 
10. Please enter how many times you have sold different drugs.38 
Listed drugs: “Cannabis (also called marijuana, grass, hash, dope, pot, weed, blow, 
skunk, ganja, spliff, wacky backy)”, “Amphetamines (also called speed, whizz, sulph, 
billy, sulphate, whites, base)”, “Ecstasy (also called E, pills, adam, doves, mitsubishis, 
rolexs, dolphins, XTC)”, “Heroin (also called smack, brown, dragon, gear, H, horse, 
junk, skag)”, “Cocaine (also called powder, C, charlie, coke, snow, percy, white, 
toot)”, “Crack (also called rocks, stone, wash, freebase)”, “LSD (also called acid, 
tabs, trips, dots, flash, smilies, rainbows)”, “Crystal methamphetamine (also called 
crystal meth, ice, crank, glass)”, “Methadone (also called linctus, physeptone)”, 
“GHB (also called GBH, Georgie Home Boy, liquid ecstasy, liquid Z, liquid G, 
fantasy)”, “DXM, DM (cough suppressant)”, “Tranquilizers (also called 
diazepam,valium, vallies, downers, roofies, benzos, temazepam, king kong pills, 
jellies, tams, mazzies, beans, eggs, rugby balls, ruggers, terminators, vitamin T)”, 
“Magic mushrooms (also called shrooms, magics, liberties)”, “Ketamine (also called 
green, K, super K)”, “Anabolic steroids (also called roids)” 
Response option: type-in answer (participants are required to enter a number 









11. What is your height? 
Response option: type-in answer (participants are required to enter a number 
describing their height). 
12. What is your weight? 
Response option: type-in answer (participants are required to enter a number 
describing their weight). 
 
Appendix 5. Instructions for the Montreal Imaging Stress Task 
 
“Now that the video has finished, please listen carefully to the instructions for the 
mental arithmetic task that will follow. You will be working through a computer program 
which will display a series of mental arithmetic tasks for you to solve. Your goal is to solve 
each of these tasks correctly within the time limit. Prior participants in this study have 
performed well and solved 80% to 90% of the tasks correctly. Here is a screenshot of the 
program for you to see what it will look like. Here is where the arithmetic task will be 
displayed. Here is where you submit a response by pressing the appropriate number. 
Remember that this is a touch-screen, so the fastest way to submit an answer is by selecting a 
response using your finger.  For example, two times two is four, and four plus four is eight, 
so the correct answer in this case would be eight. The program will always create tasks for 
which the solution is a number between zero and nine. As such, you only need to press a 
number once to select your response. Here is where the elapsed time will be shown. The 
progress bar moves from left to right and indicates how much time you have left to solve the 
task. Here is where the performance bar will be shown. The green part of the bar indicates 
good performance, the yellow part is marginal performance, and the red part signifies poor 
performance. There are also two performance indicators. You, the one below the bar, shows 
your own performance, and average, the one above the bar, shows an average performance of 
all the participants in this study. After you submit a response, you will then receive a 
feedback on your submitted response here. If you submit a correct answer, “correct” will 
appear in this text-box. However, if you submit a wrong answer, or you run out of time, 
“incorrect” will appear in this feedback box. It is very important to perform these calculations 
accurately. You must solve at least 80% of the tasks correctly, because otherwise we will not 
be able to use your data in this study. The required threshold is indicated by the green area of 





range of the bar. The study leader will monitor the whole experiment remotely to check if 
everyone’s performance is within the green area. Now that you understand these instructions, 
you may proceed to the arithmetic task. Please begin the task now by pressing the continue 
button as shown on this screenshot.” 
 
Appendix 6. Correlations Between Control Variables, Heart Rate, and Crime 
 
Free school meals correlated only with crime, r = .12, 95% BCa CI [.03, .21],             
p = .009, such that participants who received free school meals committed more crimes. Race 
only correlated with crime, r = .13, 95% BCa CI [.03, .22], p = .006, such that compared to 
non-white participants, white participants reported committing fewer criminal offences. 
Parental education did not correlate with either variable. Physical fitness correlated only with 
crime, r = .18, 95% BCa CI [.07, .29], p < .001. Smoking correlated only with crime, r = .23, 
95% BCa CI [.12, 33], p < .000. Caffeine consumption prior to testing correlated only with 
crime, r = .13, 95% BCa CI [.04, .22], p = .007. Drug use correlated only with crime, r = .38, 
95% BCa CI [.29, .51], p < .001. Body mass index correlated with neither of the variables.  
 
Appendix 7. Fearlessness Mediation Model Using Modified Scale 
 
Path analysis exploring mediation effects of fearfulness in context of the relationship 
between heart rate reactivity and crime was run in R version 3.5.3 (R Core Team, 2019) using 
the package lavaan 0.6-3 (Rosseel, 2012), whereas the histogram was produced using 
package ggplot2 3.1.0 (Wickham, 2016). Fearfulness was measured as a mean of two items, 
namely “Xxxx xxx xxxx xxx x xxxxxx xxxxx” and “Even in an emergency I wouldn't feel 
like panicking”. Internal consistency was measured using Spearman-Brown coefficient as it 
was found to be superior in comparison to Cronbach’s alpha for assessing reliability of two-
item subscales (Eisinga, Grotenhuis, & Pelzer, 2013). The resulting value of .51 indicated a 
low reliability, just above the acceptable level of .50. Histogram of the modified fearfulness 
indicated a relatively normal distribution (see Figure A7.1). Crime frequency was log 
transformed to alleviate the positive skew. 
 
Item removed for copyright reasons. Copyright holders 






Figure A7.1. Frequency distribution of modified fearfulness. Dashed line represents the mean 
value of fearfulness (n = 486). 
 
The assumption of multicollinearity was not violated in the model. There was no 
extreme collinearity as the correlation between the predictors, heart rate reactivity and 
modified fearfulness, was r = .11, p  = .015. The lack of multicollinearity was further 
confirmed by collinearity statistics, as all tolerance statistics were well above the threshold of 
.10 and all variance inflation factor values were well below 10.0 (Kline, 2016). 
Parameter estimates were derived using maximum likelihood method with robust, 
bootstrapped standard errors calculated from 5000 bootstrap samples due to violation of 
multivariate normality. For each path value and indirect effect, robust bias corrected and 
accelerated 95% confidence intervals using 5000 samples were produced. Across all variables 
used in these models, the number of missing values ranged from none in crime frequency to 
five in heart rate reactivity. Missing data were estimated using the full information maximum 
likelihood method.   
There was a statistically significant effect of heart rate reactivity on modified 
fearfulness, b = 0.014, 95% BCa CI [0.003, 0.026], p = .016, which in turn significantly 
predicted crime, b = - 0.132, 95% BCa CI [- 0.196, - 0.066], p < .001. Direct effect of heart 
rate reactivity on crime was statistically significant, b = - 0.009, 95% BCa CI [- 0.016,           





significant, b = - 0.002, 95% BCa CI [- 0.004, 0.000], p = .038. The results involving the 
standardised coefficients are presented in Figure A7.2. 
 
 
Figure A7.2. Mediation model of modified fearlessness. Standardised parameter estimates are 
shown for each path: a, b, c’, c, and ab (n = 487). Paths c and c’ refer to the total effect and 
direct effect of heart rate reactivity on crime, respectively. Path ab refers to the indirect effect. 
*p < .05. **p < .01. 
